Workmen's compensation laws are State or Federal statutes, through which the State or the Federal Government provide compensation to workmen injured during the course of their employment, either private or for the government. The State laws are enacted to control and regulate workmen's compensation when injury occurs in private employment, other than workmen engaged in interstate commerce. The Federal Acts were enacted to provide compensation for those employees injured in the Federal Government service, or while engaged by an interstate commerce carrier. The workmen's compensation acts of the various States and of the Federal Government have, as their basis, the German Code, which that government developed in an elaborate manner during the past twenty-five years.

The various workmen's compensation laws have certain characteristics in common. They usually provide for the abolition of the Common Law rules affecting the rights of workmen to recover for injuries, and stipulate in lieu thereof other recompense, its manner of payment, and the amount, without the aid of a trial by jury, or a lawsuit. They also provide that the compensation stipulated shall be the entire amount the injured may collect as damages; this sum is usually non-assignable by the injured or his defendant to whom it is paid, and is not subject to any court procedure or levy.

Under the Common Law, it is the rule that an injured person cannot collect for injuries if he himself has been negligent. This is true, although his negligence is only slight, and the employer is decidedly in the wrong. Also, under the Common Law, an injured employee cannot collect for injuries if these have been caused by the negligence of a fellow workman, although the injured man has himself not been negligent. The workmen's compensation Acts abolish these rules and provide for compensation in all cases except where there has been gross or wilful misconduct on the part of the employee, and this caused the injury. Such misconduct precludes his recovery, even under the Acts, but the burden of showing that the injury was caused in this manner is usually upon the employer.

These several acts have many common features, although, the details and specifications differ. In general they (1) cover particular classes of employees, (2) govern the giving of notices of injury, (3) enumerate the injuries covered, (4) fix the compensation in event of death, (5) specify the persons who are beneficiaries and dependents, (6) regulate the time when compensation begins in case of disability, (7) specify what medical and surgical aid is included, (8) regulate the manner in which the compensation should be paid, (9) provide for the necessary examination of the injured workman, and (10) regulate the taking of appeals from awards made by the board, adjudicating in the matter.

Workmen's Compensation and Insurance Laws have been enacted in the following States: Montana, New York, Washington, Ohio, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Illinois, Kansas, California, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Maryland and Arizona. The Federal Government has provided two sets of laws governing workmen's compensation in case of injury. One set governs compensation paid to injured employees of carriers engaged in interstate commerce. The other was enacted to cover compensation paid to the Federal Government employees, in case of injury.

The majority of the States named above may be grouped in one general class, having enacted laws providing for a stipulated liability to employers, for injured employees, determined usually by a board of arbitration. Some of these Acts expressly declare that both employers and employees are governed thereby in all cases, and the Common Law rules, formerly applicable, are totally abolished. The New York statutes of 1910, made compulsory for both employer and employees, was declared unconstitutional in the case of Ives vs. South Buffalo Railway Company, reported in Volume 94 North Eastern Reports, (New York) Page 431. This case is considered a leading and important one on the entire problem of Workmen's Compensation, although the decision has been seriously and vehemently criticized by sociologists, economists, and jurists.

The New York Court in sustaining its contention said: (1) That the law denied to the parties the constitutional right of trial by jury, (2) that an employee could not be compelled by the legislature to accept less than his Common Law damages, nor could the employer be forced to pay damages when he was nowise at fault. Those who criticize the court's reasoning in this case, argue that under our present highly developed factory system, the system itself, or the commodity produced, should pay for injuries, when such occur without the wilful misconduct and wrongdoing of the injured. The Washington State Supreme Court, in maintaining its compulsory law, stressed police power, holding that a State might compel an employee to take less than his Common Law damages, or an employer to relinquish his Common Law rights, on the ground that the public welfare demanded. The contention is that the State can exercise police power in this manner for the protection of the health, safety, and general welfare of the public.

Most of the States grouped in the first class, as having laws providing for a settlement and payment by the employer to the injured employee through a board of arbitration, make these laws optional. That is, the parties interested may elect to proceed under them, or elect to decide their controversy under the Common Law. The New Jersey Act automatically places each employment contract under its compensation section, but permits either party to elect not to be subject to its provisions, and to have recourse to actions at Common Law for compensation. In Illinois, acceptance of the Act is virtually compulsory upon the employer, for if he declines he is deprived of his Common Law defenses, (1) that the workman himself has been negligent, or (2) that the injury was caused by the fault of a fellow workman except that contributory negligence of the injured party may be considered by the jury in a Common Law case, in determining the amount of damages. The Rhode Island and Maryland Acts are similar to Illinois, except that they are so stringent, in that they omit the last feature as to contributory negligence.