It is to be observed before leaving this point that, so far as regards the acts that may be done by military and civil authorities in effectuating their purposes, the necessity for them being present, there is no difference between the commander's powers in a domestic insurrection and in a war. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in a recent case13 has said: "In truth he has whatever powers may be needed for the accomplishment of the end, but his use of them is followed by different consequences. In war he is answerable only to his military superiors, but for acts done in domestic territory, even in the suppression of public disorder, he is accountable, after the exigency has passed, to the laws of the land, both by prosecution in the criminal courts and by civil action at the instance of the parties aggrieved."

A very recent case emphasizing the extent of the martial powers that may be exercised by the civil authorities of a State in times of emergency is that of Moyer v. Peabody.14 Here an action was brought by the plaintiff in error against a former governor of a State, and other state officers for an imprisonment suffered under their order at a time when considerable disorder existed, and the country had been declared in a state of insurrection and the state troops had been called upon to assist the civil authorities in the maintenance of law and order. The Supreme Court in its opinion affirming the order of the court below dismissing the complaint affirm the right of the civil authorities to make arrests, not only for purposes of punishment but to prevent the exercise of hostile acts, and say: "So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the honest belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection off, the governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected to an action after he is out of office on the ground that he had not reasonable ground for his belief. If we suppose a governor with a very long term of office, it may be that a case could be imagined in which the length of the imprisonment would raise a different question. But there is nothing in the duration of the plaintiff's detention or in the allegations of the complaint that would warrant submitting the judgment of the governor to revision by a jury. It is not alleged that his judgment was not honest, if that be material, or that the plaintiff was detained after fears of the insurrection were at an end."

13 Commonwealth of Pa. ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. St. 165. 14 212 U. S. 78; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 235; 53 L. ed. 410.

This language is too broad. In all cases it should be required that reasonable ground should be shown for believing the infringement of personal and property rights was demanded. The court do, indeed, immediately add that "no doubt there are cases where the expert on the spot may be called upon to justify his conduct later in court, notwithstanding that he had sole command at the time and acted to the best of his knowledge. That is the position of the captain of a ship." But this, in turn, is followed by the statement that "When it comes to a decision by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process."