When a public improvement is to be undertaken which will result in special benefit to a particular district, it is not obligatory upon the legislature to levy a special assessment upon that district for the purpose. Whether or not it will do so lies within its free discretion. Also the fact that the proposed improvement will be, to a certain extent, of general benefit to the whole community, does not render invalid a special assessment upon the district specially benefited.

In Bauman v. Ross,9 with reference to an act of Congress relating to the District of Columbia, it was contended by some of the owners of lands that the public improvement proposed was not of a local character, but was for the advantage of the whole country, and should be paid for by the United States, and not by the District of Columbia, or by the owners of the lands affected by the improvement. The court, however, said: "It is for the legislature, and not the judiciary, to determine whether the expense of a public improvement should be borne by the whole State, or by the district or neighborhood immediately benefited. The case, in this respect, comes within the principle upon which this court held that the legislature of Alabama might charge the county of Mobile with the whole cost of an extensive improvement of Mobile harbor; and, speaking by Mr. Justice Field, said: 'The objection urged is that it fastens upon one county the expense of an improvement for the benefit of the whole State. Assuming this to be so, it is not an objection which destroys its validity. When any public work is authorized, it rests with the legislature, unless constrained by constitutional provisions, to determine in what manner the means to defray its cost shall be raised. It may apportion the burden ratably among all the counties or other particular subdivisions of the state, or lay the greater share or the whole upon that county or portion of the state specially and immediately benefited by the expenditure.' " 10

"But notwithstanding the rule of uniformity lying at the basis, of every just system of taxation, there are doubtless many individual cases where the weight of a tax falls unequally upon the owners of the property taxed. This is almost unavoidable under every system of direct taxation. But the tax is not rendered illegal by such discrimination. Thus, every citizen is bound to pay his proportion of a school tax, though he have no children; of a police tax, though he have no buildings or personal property to be guarded; or of a road tax, though he never use the road. In other words, a general tax cannot be dissected to show that, as to certain constituent parts, the taxpayer receives no benefit. Even in case of special assessments imposed for the improvement of property within certain limits, the fact that it is extremely doubtful whether a particular lot can receive any benefit from the improvement does not invalidate the tax with respect to such lot. Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78; 26 L. ed. 658; Amesbury Nail Factory Co. v. Weed, 17 Mass. 53; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340: 42 L. ed. 740; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U. S. 430; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466; 49 L. ed. 819. Subject to these individual exceptions the rule is that in classifying property for taxation some benefit to the property taxed is a controlling consideration, and a plain abuse of this power will sometimes justify a judicial interference. Norwood v. Baker. 172 V. S. 269; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187; 43 L. ed. 443."

9 167 U. S. 548; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 966; 42 L. ed. 270.

10 Citing Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691; 26 L. ed. 238. The opinion continues:

"The legislature, in the exercise of the right of taxation, has the authority to direct the whole, or such part as it may prescribe, of the expense of a public improvement, such as the establishing, the widening, the grading, or the repair of a street, to be assessed upon the owners of the land benefited thereby. Davidson, v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97: 24 L. ed. 616: Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, III U. S. 701; 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663; 28 L. ed. 569; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 921; 31 L. ed. 763; Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192; 32 L. ed. 544; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 825; 35 L. ed. 419; Illinois C. K. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293; 37 L. ed. 132; Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 750; 37 L. ed. 637. This authority has been repeatedly exercised in the District of Columbia by Congress, with the sanction of this court. Willard v. Presbury, 14 Wall. C76; 20 L. ed. 719; Mattingly v. District of Columbia. 97 U. S. 687; 24 L. ed. 1098; Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 361; 37 L. ed. 170.

"The class of lands to be assessed for the purpose may be either determined by the legislature itself, by defining a territorial district, or by other designation; or it may be left by the legislature to the determination of commissioners, and be made to consist of such lands, and such only, as the commissioners shall decide to be benefited. Spencer v. Merchant, and Shoemaker v. United States, above cited; Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56: 41 L. ed. 369; Ulman v. Baltimore, 105 U. S. 719; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1001; 41 L. ed. 11S4. See also the very able opinion of the court of appeals of New York, delivered by Judge Ruggles, in People v. Brooklyn, 4 X. Y. 419.