The right of trial by jury provided for in the Constitution applies only in the federal courts, and in them it applies only to those cases in which, by common practice at the time the Constitution was adopted, it was employed in the colonies and in England. Thus it does not apply to equity causes, to cases in admiralty and to military courts, nor where the special prerogative rights of courts are involved, as, for example, in proceedings for disbarment or for contempt.25

23 170 U. S. 343; Is Sup. Ct. Rep. 620; 42 L. ed. 1061.

24 In Capital traction Co. v. Hof (174 U. S. 1; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580; 43 L. ed. 873) the court say: "It is beyond question at the present day, that the provisions of the Constitution of the United States securing the right of trial by jury, whether in civil or in criminal cases, are applicable to the District of Columbia" (quoting Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437; 13 L. ed. 761; Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1301; 32 L. ed. 223; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620; 42 L. ed. 1061).

A serious constitutional question might, however, be raised by a legislative attempt to extend equity jurisdiction over a matter not essentially equitable in nature, and thus render it triable without a jury. As to such action upon the part of the States, the federal question involved would be one of due process of law.26

In habeas corpus proceedings a jury is neither required nor proper.

It has been held that due process of law does not require a jury in the execution of political and executive functions, as, for example, the enforcement of the Chinese exclusion acts.27

25 In Re Debs (158 U. S. 564; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900; 30 L. ed. 1092), after asserting that it is often within the competence of a court of equity to enjoin the commission of an act; even though that act be also forbidden by the criminal law, the court declare: "Nor is there in this any invasion of the constitutional right of trial by jury . . . the power of a court to make an order carries with it the equal power to punish for a disobedience of that order, and the inquiry as to the question of disobedience has been, from time immemorial, the special function of the court. And this is no technical rule. In order that a court may compel obedience to its orders it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience reof. To submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal, be it a jury or another court, would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency."

In Eilenbecker v. Disk Court of Plymouth Co. (134 U. S. 31; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 424; 33 L. ed. 801), the court say: " If it has ever been understood that proceedings according to the common law for contempt of court have been subject to the right of trial by jury, we have been unable to find any instance of it. It has always been one of the attributes, one of the powers necessarily incident to a court of justice - that it should have this power of vindicating its dignity, of enforcing its orders, of protecting itself from insult, without the necessity of calling upon a jury to assist it in the exercise of this power."

In Ex parte Robinson (19 Wall. 513; 22 L. ed. 205), the court say: "The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and in-w-ted with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power." Of. Ex parte Terny, 128 U. S. 289; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77: 32 L. ed. 405.

26 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. G23; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; 31 L. ed. 205.