The right to engage in interstate commerce it has often been declared is a federal right, and is, therefore, independent of state control. In Vance v. Vandercook,34 as has already been referred to, the right of the individual to import was declared to be "derived from the Constitution of the United States, and does not rest on the grant of the state law."

32 171 U. S. 30: 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 768; 43 L. ed. 60.

33 171 U. S. 1 : 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757; 43 L. ed. 49. 34 170 U. S. 438; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 674; 42 L. ed. 1100.

Nor, as we have also learned, can a State render illegal or in any way restrain the making of contracts by its residents with reference to interstate commerce.35

So, likewise, it is established that a State, though it may prevent, or attach such conditions as it sees fit to the entrance of a foreign corporation within its borders for the purpose of doing business generally within the State, may not prevent or restrain that corporation, any more than it may prevent or restrain an individual, from engaging in interstate commerce within its borders.

That a corporation is not considered a "citizen" within the meaning of the provision of the Constitution which declares that the citizens of each State 6hall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States, has not been questioned since Paul v. Virginia.33 The privileges and immunities referred to in that clause are those which are common to the citizens under their Constitution and laws by virtue of their being citizens, and are not those special privileges which may be granted them and which are valid only within the State creating them. "A grant of corporate existence," the court say, "is a grant of special privileges to the corporators, enabling them to act for certain designated purposes as a single individual, and exempting them (unless otherwise specially provided) from individual liability. The corporation being the mere creation of local law, can have no legal existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty where created."

But though not a citizen within the interstate comity clause, the corporation is a person within the "due process clauses" of the Constitution and possesses all the other federal privileges and immunities, which can attach to an artificial person, and among these is the right to engage in interstate commerce. "If," say the court in Crutcher v. Kentucky,37 "a partnership firm of individuals should undertake to carry on the business of interstate commerce between Kentucky and other States, it would not be within the province of the state legislature to exact conditions on which they should carry on their business, nor require them to take out a license therefor. To cany on interstate commerce is not a franchise or privilege granted by the State; it is a right which every citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the accession of mere corporate facilities, as a matter of convenience in carrying on their business, cannot have the effect of depriving them of such right, unless Congress should see fit to interpose some contrary regulation on the subject." 38

35 Delamater v. South Dakota, 205 El S. 93; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 447; 51 L. ed. 724.

36 8 Wall. 168; 19 L. ed. 357.

37 141 U. S. 47; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 851; 35 L. ed. 649.

In Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. "Western Union Telegraph Co.39 it is established that a company chartered by the United States to do an interstate commerce business cannot be prevented by a State from carrying on that business within its borders. With reference to the case of Paul v. Virginia the court observed that the corporation there involved was not engaged in interstate commerce and "enough was said by the court to show that if it had been, a very different question would have been presented." 40

A State, though not able to exclude from its borders a federally chartered corporation engaged in interstate commerce, is not compelled to aid that corporation by granting to it any special privileges, as, for example, the right of eminent domain. Congress may, however, endow such a corporation with the right of eminent. domain, which right it may exercise within the States without their consent or against their will.41

38 In these respects the court go on to say, the States have no more authority than they have over corporations chartered in foreign countries, and engaged in landing goods or passengers in American ports, or soliciting business here.

39 96 U. S. 1; 24 L. ed. 708.

40 It may be said, generally, that a State cannot exclude a corporation in the employ of, or performing services for the Federal Government. Pembina Co. v. Penn. 125 U. S. 181; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 737: 31 L. ed. 650; Postal Tel. Co. v. Adams 156 U. S. 688; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 268; 39 L. ed. 311.

41 This right may not. however, be exercised with reference to land owned or already devoted to a public use by the State. Chapter XXVI (The District Of Columbia. 162. The Government Of The District Of Columbia).