The constitutional definition of a direct tax was again raised in Knowlton v. Moore85 with, reference to the constitutionality of the inheritance taxes levied by the War Revenue Act of 1898. The court applied the well established doctrine that the taxes in question were not upon the property inherited but upon the right to inherit, and, therefore, not being taxes upon property but upon a right, were in the nature of an excise tax, and as such indirect.85

85 178 U. S. 41; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747; 44 L. ed. 969.

86 To the argument that the doctrine declared in Scholey v. flew (23 Wall. 331; 23 L. ed. 99), had been practically overruled by the Income Tax Case, the court say:

"It is asserted that it was decided in the Income Tax Cases that m order to determine whether a tax be direct within the meaning of the Constitution, it must be ascertained whether the one upon whom by law the burden of paying it is first cast can thereafter shift it to another person. If he cannot, the tax would then be direct in the constitutional sense, and hence, however obvious in other respects it might be a duty, impost, or excise, it cannot be levied by the rule of uniformity, and must be apportioned. From this assumed premise it is argued that death duties cannot be shifted from the one on whom they are first cast by law, and therefore they are direct taxes requiring apportionment. The fallacy is in the premise It is true that in the income tax cases the theory of certain economists by which direct and indirect taxes are classified with reference to the aibility to shift the same was adverted to. But this disputable theory was not the basis of the conclusion of the court. The constitutional meaning of the word direct was the matter decided. Considering that the constitutional rule of apportionment had its origin in the purpose to prevent taxes on persons solely because of their general ownership of property from being ievied by any other rule than that of apportionment, two things wore decided by the court: First, that no sound distinction existed between a tax levied on a person solely because of his general ownership of real pro petty, and the same tax imposed solely because of his general ownership of personal property. Secondly, that the tax on the income derived from such property, real or personal, was the legal equivalent of a direct tax on the property from which said income was derived, and hence must be apportioned. These conclusions, however, lend no support to the contention that it was decided that duties, imposts and excises which are not the essential equivalent of a tax on property generally, real, or personal, solely because of its ownership, must be converted into direct taxes, because it is conceived that it would be demonstrated by a close analysis that they could not be shifted from the person upon whom they first fall. The proposition now relied upon was considered and refuted in Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522; 43 L. ed. 786."