Opposing, however, these dicta which have been quoted are a line of cases, in which treaties have been held constitutional with reference to matters which are admittedly not within the power of Congreu to control. And, also, there have been numerous cases in which state laws with reference to matters within the ordinary legislative competence of the States, have been held void because of conflict with subsisting federal treaties.14

Thus, in the case of De Geofroy v. Biggs,15 to which reference has already been made, it is declared: "That the treaty power of the United States extends to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and the government of other nations, "is clear. It is also clear that the protection which should be afforded to the citizens of one country owning property in another, and the' manner in which that property may be transferred, devised or inherited, are fitting subjects for such negotiations and of regulation by mutual stipulations between the two countries. As commercial intercourse increases between different countries the residence of citizens of One countrv within the territorv of the other naturally follows, and the removal of their disability from alienage to hold, transfer and inherit property in such cases tends to promote amicable relations. Such removal has been within the present century the frequent subject of treaty arrangement. The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the government or of its department?, and those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent. (Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 995; 29 L. ed. 264.) But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country."

14 Ware v. Hyltan, 3 Dall. 190; 1 L. ed. 56S; Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cr. 454; 2 L. ed. 497; Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cr. 603; 3 L. ed. 153; Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259; 4 L. ed. 234; Lattimer v. Poteet, 14 Pet. 4; 10 L. ed. 328; Haucnstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483: 25 L. ed. 628; De (Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.'s. 25S; 10 Sup. Ct. Hep. 295; 33 L. ed. 642. See also a rtrong dictum in Ward v. Pace Horse, 163 U. S. 504; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1076; 41 L. ed. 244.

15 133 U. S. 258; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep.. 295; 33 L. ed. 642.

In 1898 the President requested the official opinion of his Attorney-General as to the power of the United States- to enter into treaty stipulations with Great Britain for the regulation of fisheries in the waters of the United States and Canada along the international boundary. In his opinion Mr. Griggs said: "The waters of the lake and rivers which form the boundary between the United States and Canada are upon this side of the boundary line within the territorial jurisdiction of the several riparian States. The regulation of fisheries in navigable waters within the territorial limits of the several States, in the absence of a federal treaty, is a subject of state rather than of federal jurisdiction. Congress has the paramount right to regulate navigation in the navigable waters of the United States for the benefit of all the citizens of the Union, but Congress has no authority in the absence of treaty regulations, to pass laws to regulate or protect fisheries within the territorial jurisdiction of the States. (McCready v. Virginia, 91 U. S. 391; 21 L. ed. 248; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 199; 38 L. ed. 385.) The question, for consideration, therefore, is whether the United States by treaty may deprive the riparian States of the power of control and regulation over the fisheries in the waters within their respective jurisdictions conterminal with the boundary- between the United States and Canada. It is- obvious that if by the exercise of the treaty-making power the regulation of this subject is assumed by the Federal Government, the respective state governments will be deprived of jurisdiction over that subject in the same waters. The regulation of fisheries has been recognized as a proper subject for international agreement. . . . Where a lake or river is divided into two jurisdictions by a boundary line between two nations, it is manifest that it would be not only convenient but almost necessary for the adequate regulation of the subject that an agreement by treaty or other stipulation should exist between the governments of the two countries, in order to make any system of regulation and protection effective. The several States are by the Constitution forbidden to enter into any such treaty or regulation with any foreign power, and unless the United States may regulate the subject by treaty it is impossible of regulation by uniform and reciprocal rules. I advise you, therefore, that the regulation of the fisheries in these boundary waters is a proper subject of the treaty-making power vested by the Constitution in the President If it be suggested that such a treaty is beyond the constitutional power of the President and the Senate to effect, because it deprives the States of jurisdiction and authority now vested in them, and practically would annul their laws and destroy one subject of state sovereignty, without going into a history of that clause of the Constitution above quoted, which declares that all treaties made or which shall be made by the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land (the discussions of which in the Constitutional Convention and in the state conventions called for the adoption of the Constitution were very extensive and interesting), it is sufficient to say that it has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States that it is no objection to the validity of a treaty that it establishes within state jurisdiction a different law and standard of rights from that established by the laws of the State." In a number of instances, as said, state laws, with reference to matters ordinarily within state cognizance, have been held void when in conflict with existing federal treaties. Examples of this, are laws denying the right of the alien to be employed by contractors upon public works, or to be employed by private corporations.16