Whether or not this necessity for senatorial approval to all treaty projects renders it constitutionally impossible for the United States to give to diplomatic agents full powers to ratify treaties negotiated by them and thus render them immediately effective without subsequent submission to the Senate, is doubtful. The point has never been passed upon by our courts; but it is quite possible that should a judicial pronouncement upon this point be required, it would be held that for the Senate to commit itself itself in advance to whatever conditions the treaty negotiators might agree upon, would be the delegation of a power prohibited by that principle of our constitutional law, which declares that a power the exercise of which is delegated by the Constitution to a particular governmental organ may not be delegated by that organ to another department.

However this may be, the Senate and the President may, of course, give to their agents such powers and instructions as will hold them - the President and the Senate - morally bound to ratify what their plenipotentiaries have agreed to.

In earlier times writers upon International Law, Grotius, Putfendorf and Vattel, for instance, held that a State was absolutely- bound by the treaties entered into by its agents when acting within the limits of their instructions. Later writers, however, generally hold that this ratification may, for strong and substantial reasons, be refused.21

Up to 1815 the general practice of the President was to obtain the approval of the Senate to the appointment of, and to the instructions given to, commissioners for the negotiation of contemplated treaties. Since that time, however, this practice has been seldom followed. This change has, however, not escaped occasional formal protest from the Senate.

After a treaty has been signed by the commissioners appointed to negotiate it, or agreed upon between the departments of State of the countries concerned, there is no constitutional obligation upon the President to submit it to the Senate, and, even after submission to that body, he may withdraw it, as for instance was done by President Cleveland with reference to a reciprocity treaty with Spain which had been sent to the Senate in 1884 by President Arthur. In a like manner the Hawaiian annexation treaty of 1893 and the Nicaraguan Canal Convention of 1884 were withdrawn "for re-examination," after having been sent to the Senate.

Even after being favorably acted upon by the Senate, it would appear that, under certain circumstances, the President may refuse his ratification. Thus, in 1888, when China proposed certain changes in an agreement with this country which had already been approved by the Senate, the President abandoned the entire project

21 Crandall, pp. 12 et seq.