The governments established in the Territories by Congress act as agencies of Congress, in the same sense that an administrative board acts as the agent of the law-making body that creates it. As such congressional agencies, the territorial governments are not considered to be parts of the General Government established or directly provided for by the Constitution. This point was early determined in American Insurance Co. v. Canter.8 In this case the point was raised that the territorial judges in Florida had been appointed for terms of but four years, whereas the Constitution provides that the judges of both the Supreme and inferior federal courts shall hold office during good behavior. In sustaining the validity of the territorial law in this matter, Marshall said: "These courts . . . are not constitutional courts in which the judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the General Government can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the Tinted States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested is not a .part of that judicial power which is defined in the third article of the Constitution, but was conferred by Congress in execution of those general powers which that body possesses over the Territories of the United States."

In Benner v. Porter9 the court say with reference to territorial governments: "They are legislative governments, and their courts legislative courts, Congress, in the exercise of its powers in the organization and government of the territories, combining the powers of both the federal and state authorities. There is but one system of government or of laws operating within their limits, as neither is subject to the constitutional provisions in respect to state and federal jurisdiction. They are not organized under the Constitution, nor subject to its complex distribution of the powers of government, as the organic law; but are the creations, exclusively, of the legislative department, and subject to its supervision and control. Whether or not there are provisions in that instrument which extend to and act upon these territorial governments, it is not now material to examine," l0

8 1 Pet. 511; 7 L. ed. 2 42. 9 9 How. 235: 13 L. ed. 119.

In United States v. Pridgeon11 it was held that the courts provided for the Territory of Oklahoma could be and had been authorized by Congress to sit as territorial courts to administer the laws of the Territory, and as courts of the United States to administer the laws of the United States.

In American Insurance Co. v. Canter12 and in Re Cooper13 it was held that the territorial courts may be granted 'admiralty jurisdiction. Also, though not "inferior" courts within the meaning of Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution, an appeal may be granted from them to the Supreme Court. In United States v. Coe14 the court say: "As wherever the United States exercises the power of government, whether under specific grant, or through the dominion and sovereignty of plenary authority as over the Territories, that power includes the ultimate executive, legislative, and judicial power, it follows that the judicial action of all inferior courts established by Congress may in accordance with the Constitution be subjected to the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme judicial tribunal of the government. There has never been any question in regard to this as applied to territorial courts, and no reason can be perceived for applying a different rule to the adjudications of the court of private land claims over property in the Territories."

10 In Clinton v. Englebrecht (13 Wall. 434; 20 L. ed. 659), the court say: "There is no Supreme Court of the United States, nor is there any district court of the United States in the sense of the Constitution, in the Territory of Utah. The judges are not appointed for the same terms, nor is the jurisdiction which they exercise part of the judicial power conferred by the Constitution of the General Government. The courts are the legislative courts of the Territories, created in virtue of that clause which authorizes Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the Territories belonging to the United States."

To the same effect are the cases Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 18 Wall. 648. 21 L. ed. 966; Good v. Martin, 95 U. S. 90; 24 L. ed. 341; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145; 25 L. ed. 244; The City of Panama, 101 U. S. 453; 25 L. ed. 1061; McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 949; 35 L. ed. 693; United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U. S. 48; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 746; 38 L. ed. 631, and United States v. Coe, 155 U. S. 76; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep 16; 39 L. ed. 76.

11 153 U. S. 48; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 746; 38 L. ed. 631.

12 1 Pet. 511; 7 L. ed. 242.

13 143 U. S. 472; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 453; 36 L. ed. 232.

14 155 U. S. 76; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 16; 39 L. ed. 76.

Whether or« not the courts of the District of Columbia are "inferior" federal courts within the meaning of Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution has never been squarely settled. In James v. United States15 the court implies that is not determined, but does not in that case find it necessary to pass upon the point.

With reference to the District of Columbia it will be pointed out16 that Congress may not delegate to the local governing body legislative powers, but only authority to issue local municipal ordinances. This limitation does not apply with reference to the Territories; for whereas with regard to the District it is provided that Congress shall exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, with regard to the Territories it is provided simply that Congress shall have the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulation." There has thus been no question but that, under this grant of authority, Congress may provide for the establishment in the Territories of legislatures exercising full law-making powers, subject of course to the provisions of the Constitution and to subsisting or subsequent acts of Congress. Thus, for example, in Leitensdorfer v. Webb,17 with reference to the abliahment of courts, the court declare: "It was, undoubtedly, within the competency of Congress either to define directly, by their own act, the jurisdiction of the courts created by them or to delegate the authority requisite for that purpose to the territorial governments."

15 202 U. S. 401; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 685; 50 L. ed. 1079.

16 Chapter XXVI (The District Of Columbia. 162. The Government Of The District Of Columbia).

1720 How. 176; 15 L. ed. 891.