"The rule in Shelley's case, however, does not apply-where the ancestor takes only an estate for years (another person being the grantor); for, in such case, a remainder to his heirs, or to the heirs of his body, will not vest in himself, but in such heirs, by purchase. Post, 319 b. Sir C. Tippin's case, cited 1 P. Wms., 359. Neither will it take place, unless the particular estate of freehold, and the remainder to the heirs or heir of the body, are created by the same conveyance. Cran-mer's case, 2 Leon., 57; Moor vs. Parker, 1 Ld. Raym., 37; 2 Vera., 486; Doe vs. Fonnereau, Dougl., 487, 510. Venables vs. Morris, 7 T. R., 342; Fearn. Cont. Rem., 99. But as an appointment in pursuance of a power, when executed, is to be considered as if it had been inserted in the original deed by which the power of appointment was created, 7 T. R., 347; it seems, that where there is a limitation to a person for life by one deed, and the estate is afterwards limited to the heirs of his body, under an execution of a power of appointment contained in that deed, in such case the several limitations will consolidate. Fearn. Cont. Rem., 102; Prest. Ess. on Rule in Shelley's case, 57. And it is immaterial, with respect to this rule, whether the ancestor takes the freehold by express limitation, or by implication arising from the deed in which the estate is limited to his heirs, &c; in either case the subsequent limitation vests in himself. Pybus vs. Mitford, 1 Ventr., 372.

"It may be further observed, that the rule in question is only applied to limitations in which the word 'heirs' is used, on account of the peculiar signification of that word, and the maxim that nemo est hoeres viven-tis; so that if lands are limited to A. for life, remainder to his first and other sons and the heirs of their bodies; or remainder to the child and children of A., or to the issue of A. and the heirs of their bodies; no more than an estate for life will vest in A., and the words son, child, or issue, will operate as words of purchase. Lewis Bowles's case, 11 Co., 30. And the rule does not extend to the word 'heir' in the singular number, with words of limitation superadded. Walker vs. Snow, Palm., 359. Nor where the estates are of different natures, as if the first limitation only gives a trust estate of freehold, and the subsequent limitation to the heirs of the body carries the legal estate. Lord Say and Sele vs. Jones, 3 Bro. P. C, 113. Nor to cases of marriage articles; which being executory are construed according to the intention of the parties, whose chief object in such agreement, is to make a provision for the issue of the marriage; therefore, where in marriage articles it is agreed to settle lands, to the use of the husband for life, with remainders to the heirs of his body, these last words are construed to be words of purchase, and to mean the first and other sons of the marriage, and the heirs of their bodies. 1 Bro. C. C, 222; Trevor vs. Trevor, 1 P. Wms., 662; 1 Ab. Eq., 387; Cusack vs. Cusack, 1 Bro. P. C, 470. And where articles and a settlement are made before marriage, and the settlement is made in pursuance of the articles, ift he words 'heirs of the body' are transcribed from the articles into the settlement, they will be altered in chancery, and the settlement will be rectified according to the intention of the articles, by making the husband only tenant for life, with remainders to the issue of the marriage. West vs. Erissey, 2 P. Wms., 349; 3 Bro. P. C, 327; 1 Collect. Jur., 463; Hart vs. Middlehurst, 3 Atk., 371; Roberts vs. Kingsley, 1 Ves., 238. So if the settlement is made after the marriage, and adopts the words of the articles. Streatfield vs. Streatfield, Forrest., 176. But this doctrine is adopted only in cases of marriage articles, and is not extended to limitations, in settlements, of the legal estate. Alpass vs. Watkins, 8 T. R., 516. And, although where articles are entered into before marriage, and a settlement is made after marriage different from those articles, the court will set up the articles against the settlement; yet, where both the articles and settlement are previous to the marriage, at a time when all the parties are at liberty, and the settlement is not expressed to be made in pursuance of the marriage articles (as in the above cited case of West and Erissey) if such settlement differ from the articles, it will be considered as founded on a new agreement between them, and will control the articles. Legg vs. Goldwire, Cas. Temp. Talb., 20; Fearn. Cont. Rem., 154; 4 Cru. Dig., 487.

"The rule, in Shelley's case, has been adopted in the construction of assignments of terms for years; and the words 'heirs of the body' have been held to be words of limitation, Peacock vs. Spooner, 2 Vern. 43, 195; Webb vs. Webb, 1 P. Wms., 132; Hayter vs. Rod,

1 P. Wms., 360; 2 Ves., 660; Theebridge vs. Kilburne,

2 Ves., 233; though the construction has been different where there were words of limitation superadded to the words 'heirs of the body.' Archer's case, 1 Co., 66; Hodsol vs. Bussey, Forrest. MSS.; S. C, 2 Atk., 89; Barnard., 199; Price vs. Price, 2 Ves., 234; Sands vs. Dixwell, 2 Ves., 652.

"2dly. Of the application of the rule of Shelley's case, in the construction of surrenders of copyholds:-The rule under consideration is equally applied in construing surrenders of copyhold estates as in deeds; and therefore where a person surrenders to the use of himself for life, remainder to another in tail, remainder to his own right heirs, there the heirs shall take by-descent. Gilb. Ten., 270; Fearn. Cont. Rem., 79; Allen vs. Palmer, 1 Leon., 101; Roe vs. Aistrop, 2 Bl. Rep., 1228. And Mr. Fearne observes, that where an estate for life is limited either to the father or mother only, and the subsequent limitation is to the heirs of both their bodies, the construction is the same in regard to copyholds as to freeholds; viz., the subsequent limitation does not vest in the ancestor taking the estate for life, but is a contingent remainder to the heirs of the bodies of both father and mother. Lane vs. Pannel, 1 Rol. Rep., 238; Frogmorton vs. Wharrey, 2 Bl. Rep., 728. In Lane vs. Pannel, Lord Coke took a distinction between a limitation upon a surrender by a copyholder in fee to his own heirs general where he takes a preceding estate of freehold himself, and the like limitation where he takes no preceding freehold estate; a distinction which certainly has no place in respect of freehold lands; for in freeholds, we have seen, where the estate moves from the grantor, the ultimate limitation to his heirs general, though the ancestor takes no preceding freehold, will be a reversion in him, and part of the old estate, and the heir will take it by descent; but Lord Coke held, that where a person surrendered a copyhold to the use of himself for life, remainder to another in tail, remainder to the right heirs of the surrenderor, there the heirs should have it by descent; but otherwise, where the surrenderor had an estate for life or in tail limited to him; for then his heir should enter as a purchaser, as if such use had been limited to the right heirs of a stranger. But Mr. Fearne observes, that the only ground upon which he could account for Lord Coke's opinion, is, the supposition that an entire new estate was created and derived under the uses of the surrender, throughout the whole of them, and that no estate taken under those uses is any part of the whole estate. Fearn. Cont. Rem., 87; and this notion has been entirely exploded by modern decisions. See Gilb. Ten., 272; Roe vs. Griffiths, 4 Burr., 1952; Thurstout, d. Gower vs. Cunningham, 2 Bl. Rep., 1046; Fearn. Cont. Rem., 90.