This was called a recognizance. If the debt was not paid at the time appointed, the recognizance was held to be forfeited, and the body, lands and goods of the debtor, were to be delivered to the merchant creditor, in execution, to compel payment of the debt. The process by which this was done, was called an extent, because the sheriff was to cause them to be appraised, to their full or extended value, before he delivered them to the creditor. By the statute of the 27th Edw. 3. c. 9. a similar process for the recovery of debts was provided for those, whose debts were acknowledged before the mayor of any of the towns, where the staple was held. These securities are generally known by the short appellation of statutes merchant and statutes staple. From their nature, they were, at first, appropriated to the commercial part of the community. By the 23d Hen. 8. a similar security, by a recognizance in the nature of a statute staple, was extended to the community at large. The laws, respecting bankrupts, seem now, to have made landed property of merchants and other tradesmen, generally subject to their debts. The statutes respecting fraudulent conveyances and devices have proceeded, some way, towards making lands generally liable. It may not be improper to close this account of involuntary alienation by an account of involuntary alienation in the Roman law, as it is succinctly stated in the Digest, lib. 42, tit. 1. Primo quidem res mobiles animales pignori capi jugentur, mox distrahi; quarum pretium, si suffecerit, bene est; si non suffecerit, estiam soli pignora capi jubentur et distrahi. Quod si nulla moventia sint, a pignoribus soli initium faciunt. Quod si nec quoe soli sunt, sufficiant, vel nulla sint soli pignora, tunc pervenietur etiam ad jura. Si pignora qoeu capta sunt, emptorem non inven-iant, rescriptum est ut addicantur ipsi cui quis condemnatus est. Addicantur autem ea quantitate qua debetur.

With respect to the heir, - it has been observed, as one of the most striking peculiarities of the feudal system, that the heir claimed nothing from the ancestor, but came in under the original feudal contract. The consequence was, that, originally, though on the decease of the debtor, the executor was answerable, as far as he had assets, the heir was not answerable in respect of the lands descended. But after the free alienation of land was allowed, the attachment of it, in the hands of the heir, for the debt of his ancestor, followed as a necessary consequence. But, here again, the principle of the feudal law introduced a distinction, which, with some qualifications, prevails at this day; that, the assets in the hands of the executor, are liable generally to the ancestor's debts of every kind, but the assets in the hands of the heir, are liable only to debts of record, and debts by specialty, in which the heir is named; to the former, in respect of the lien, which the process of the court created, on the lands themselves; to the latter, on the supposition, that the heir was comprehended in the original contract. For the ancestor's debts by-simple contract, in opposition to the Roman law, and to the most obvious principles of natural justice, the heir still remains not liable. As to involuntary-alienation, in respect to the king, it has been observed, that, in the case of a common person, the body of the debtor was not liable to execution; but, in the case of the king, it was different; for, at the common law, the body of the king's debtor is generally supposed to have been always liable to execution. Yet it seems singular, that, when the statute of magna charta restrained the king from seizing a man's land for debt, it should leave him at liberty to seize his person. In the course of time, however, it is certain that the body of the debtor might be seized, and that, after the law made it liable for the debts of the subject, the king had these special prerogatives, that he could protect his debtor against the suits of his other creditors; and that, at the common law, he had a right to the custody of his debtor's person, in another prison, at the suit of the subject. By the common law also, all the goods and chattels of the king's debtor might be sold for the payment of his debts. But the most important of the prerogatives of the crown, at the common law was, that, in the king's case, execution issued, not only against the goods and chattels, but against the lands of the debtor. Another important prerogative was, in the case of rent, for which the king might distrain on any of the lands of the debtor.

He had other important prerogatives, with respect to priority and preference in execution, and satisfaction of his debts, a minute investigation of which does not fall within the subject.of this discussion. These extensive prerogatives have been considerably increased by the statute law of the realm. By the 33d Henry 8. c. 39. all obligations made to the king, are to have the same force, and to be attended with the same remedies, to recover them, as a statute staple. By the 13 Eliz. c. 4. the lands of treasurers, receivers, and other accountants to the crown, were made liable to execution for debts to the crown, in the same manner as if the party had acknowledged a recognizance, under the statute of Henry 8. A doubt arose upon this statute, whether a sale might be made under it, after the death of the accountant or debtor. To remedy this, the explanatory statute of the 27th Eliz. c. 3. was passed, by which a power of sale, after the death of the debtor, was expressly given. Afterwards by an act made in the 39th year of Queen Elizabeth, this explanatory act was repealed, and a new exposition was made of the statute of the 13th Eliz. with various new provisions. But the act of the 39th Eliz. being only temporary, and having expired early in the reign of James the 1st, the explanatory act of the 27th of Eliz. was revived; but it fell into disuse, and when it came to be examined, on occasion of the late exertions made for the recovery of the crown debts, it was found defective. This gave rise to the act of the 25th of his present majesty, c. 35. by which the court of exchequer is authorized, on the application of his majesty's attorney general, in a summary way, by motion, to order the estates of crown debtors, which should be extended by any writ of extent, or diem clausit extremum, to be sold for the payment of the debts. Thus the law appears to stand at present, on the involuntary alienation of land, with respect to the debts due to the crown. VI. 10. As to TESTAMENTARY ALIENATION; the influence of feudal principles, on this branch of alienation, is still strongly felt. It has been observed, that by the Roman law, a will was an appointment of an heir; and he was considered, at the death of the testator, as universal successor to all the property, rights, and obligations of the deceased. Testamentary alienation, like every other alienation, was prohibited by the genius and law of the feuds.