"As to the fifth sort of bailment, viz., a delivery to carry or otherwise manage, for a reward to be paid to the bailee, those cases are of two sorts: either a delivery to one that exercises a public employment, or a delivery to a private person. First, if it be to a person of the first sort, and he is to have a reward, he is bound to answer for the goods at all events. And this is the case of the common carrier, common hoy-man, master of a ship, etc.; which case of a master of a ship was first adjudged, 26 Car., 2, in the case of Mors. vs. Slew, Raym. 220, 1 Vent., 190, 238. The law charges this person thus entrusted to carry goods, against all events, but acts of God, and of the enemies of the king. For though the force be never so great, as if an irresistible multitude of people should rob him, nevertheless he is chargeable. And this is a public establishment, contrived by the policy of the law, for the safety of all persons, the necessity of whose affairs obliges them to trust these sorts of persons, that they may be safe in their ways of dealing; for else these carriers might have an opportunity of undoing all persons that had any dealings with them, by combining with thieves, etc., and yet doing it in such a clandestine manner as would not be possible to be discovered. And this is the reason the law is founded upon that point. The second sort are bailees, factors and such like. And though a bailee is to have a reward for his management, yet he is only to do the best he can; and if he be robbed, etc., it is a good account. And the reason of his being a servant is not the thing; for he is at a distance from his master, and acts at discre-tion, receiving rents and selling corn, etc. And yet, if he receives his master's money, and keeps it locked up with a reasonable care, he shall not be answerable for it, though it be stolen. But yet this servant is not a domestic servant, nor under his master's immediate care. But the true reason of the case is, it would be unreasonable to charge him with a trust, further than the nature of the thing puts it in his power to perform it. But it is allowed in the other cases, by reason of the necessity of the thing. The same law of a factor. "As to the sixth sort of bailment, it is to be taken, that the bailee is to have no reward for his pains, and yet that by his ill management the goods are spoiled. Secondly, it is to be understood, that there was a neglect in the management. But thirdly, if it had appeared that the mischief happened by any person that met the cart on the way, the bailee had not been chargeable. As if a drunken man had come by in the streets, and had pierced the cask of brandy; in this case the defendant had not been answerable for it, because he was to have nothing for his pains. Then the bailee having undertaken to manage the goods, and having managed them ill, and so by his neglect a damage has happened to the bailor, which is the case in question, what will you call this? In Bracton, lib. 3, 100, it is called mandatum. It is an obligation which arises ex mandato. It is what we call in English an acting by commission. And if a man acts by commission for another gratis, and in the executing his commission behaves himself negligently, he is answerable. Vinnius in his commentaries upon Justinian, lib. 3, tit. 27, 684, defines mandatum to be contractus quo aliquid gratuito gerendum committitur et accipi-tur. This undertaking obliges the undertaker to a diligent management. Bracton, ubi supra, says, 'Con-trahitur etiam obligatio non solum scripto et verbis, sed et consensu, sicut in contractibus bonae fidei; ui in emptionibus, venditionibus, locationibus, conduc-tionibus, societatibus, et mandatis.' I do not find this word in any other author of our law, besides in this place in Bracton, which is a full authority, if it be not thought too old. But it is supported by good reason and authority.

"The reasons are, first, because in such a case, a neglect is a deceit to the bailor. For, when he entrusts the bailee upon his undertaking to be careful, he has put a fraud upon the plaintiff by being negligent, his pretence of care being the persuasion that induced the plaintiff to trust him. And a breach of a trust undertaken voluntarily will be a good ground for an action. 1 Roll. Abr., 10, 2 Hen., 7, 11, a strong case to this matter. There the case was an action against a man who had undertaken to keep an hundred sheep, for letting them be drowned by his default. And there the reason of the judgment is given, because when the party has taken upon him to keep the sheep, and after suffers them to perish in his default; inasmuch as he has taken and executed his bargain, and has them in his custody, if, after, he does not look to them, an action lies. For here is his own act, viz., his agreement and promise, and that after broke of his side, that shall give a sufficient cause of action.

"But secondly, it is objected, that there is no consideration to ground this promise upon, and, therefore, the undertaking is but nudum pactum. But to this I answer, that the owner's trusting him with the goods is a sufficient consideration to oblige him to a careful management. Indeed, if the agreement had been executory, to carry these brandies from the one place to the other such a day, the defendant had not been bound to carry them. But this is a different case, for assumpsit does not only signify a future agreement, but in such a case as this, it signifies an actual entry upon the thing, and taking the trust upon himself. And if a man will do that, and miscarries in the performance of his trust, an action will lie against him for that, though nobody could have compelled him to do the thing. The 19 Hen., 6, 49, and the other cases cited by my brothers, show that this is the difference. But in the 11 Hen., 4, 33, this difference is clearly put, and that is the only case concerning this matter, which has not been cited by my brothers. There the action was brought against a carpenter, for that he had undertaken to build the plaintiff a house within such a time, and had not done it, and it was adjudged the action would not He. But there the question was put to the court - what if he had built the house unskilfully? - and it is agreed in that case an action would have lain. There has been a question made, if I deliver the goods to A, and in consideration thereof he promises to re-deliver them, if an action will He for not re-delivering them; and in Yelv., 4, judgment was given that the action would He. But that judgment was afterward reversed; and, according to that reversal, there was judgment afterwards entered for the defendant in the like case. Yelv., 128. But those cases were grumbled at; and the reversal of that judgment in Yelv., 4, was said by the judges to be a bad resolution; and the contrary to that reversal was afterwards most solemnly adjudged in 2 Cro., 667., Tr., 21, Jac, 1, in the King's bench, and that judgment affirmed upon a writ of error. And yet there is no benefit to the defendant, nor no consideration in that case, but the having the money in his possession, and being trusted with it, and yet that was held to be a good consideration. And so a bare being trusted with another man's goods must be taken to be a sufficient consideration, if the bailee once enter upon the trust, and take the goods into his possession. The declaration in the case of Mors vs. Slew, was drawn by the greatest drawer in England in that time; and in that declaration, as it was always in such cases, it was thought most prudent to put in, that a reward was to be paid for the carriage. And so it has been usual to put it in the writ, where the suit is by original. I have said thus much in this case because it is of great consequence that the law should be settled in this point; but I do not know whether I may have settled it, or may not rather have unsettled it. But however that happen, I have stirred these points, which wiser heads in time may settle. And judgment was given for the plaintiff."