The traditional evidence, as it is called in such cases, consists of proof of what has been said long since by persons who may be supposed to have had some personal knowledge, or to have heard from others who had such knowledge. Pedigree, including the facts relating to birth, marriage, and death, may also be shown by proof of what has been said by members of the family or relatives of the person whose parentage or relationship is in question. Many other illustrations could be cited, but these will suffice. It should be remarked that upon the same principle by which the kind of evidence last referred to is admissible, other modes of proof, which are ordinarily classed under hearsay, though they in fact belong to that species of evidence in no other sense than as above explained in respect to oral testimony, are admit- • ted, such as a family register, inscriptions on monuments, and the like. But with the exceptions, if they may be so called, which We have specified, hearsay evidence is wholly and absolutely excluded by the English law.

The reasons usually given for this exclusion are its uncertain and untrustworthy character, the endless prolixity to which it would lead in the attempt to sift facts in judicial proceedings, the ease with which it might be manufactured for the occasion, and the probability that better evidence is attainable, b. Another rule relates to the competency of witnesses, and it has been more prolific of subtle distinctions and perplexing questions than any other rule in the law of evidence. A chief ground of exclusion was formerly interest in the subject of the action. The theory was that there is an inevitable tendency to suppress or pervert the facts under the influence of a supposed interest in the result. This of course constituted a proper exception so far as respects credibility; but instead of receiving the testimony subject to a proper discrimination as to its effects, courts relieved themselves of all embarrassment in determining its relative weight, by wholly excluding the testimony of an interested witness. Under this rule not only the parties to the action, but all persons having an interest in the result, were, as a general rule, adjudged incompetent to testify.

In determining, however, the nature of the interest which should constitute a disqualification, it was found exceedingly difficult to fix precise rules of general application, and much connection was involved in the decisions. Finally it was settled that the interest must be a direct gain or loss by the operation of the judgment in the action, or that the record would be evidence for or against the witness in some other action. But no interest other than pecuniary was sufficient to exclude, and therefore near relatives might testify for each other even in the most serious cases, and where the temptations to shield them by untruthful statements might be the strongest possible. But husband and wife were not admitted to testify for or against each other, for which two reasons were principally assigned: 1, that it would tend to destroy the domestic harmony; and 2, that the wife was under such coercion of the husband as would be likely to lead her to distort or suppress the truth. An exception, from the necessity of the case, was made of prosecutions for injuries done or threatened by one against the other.

The conviction at length became general that the exclusion of witnesses on account of interest worked injuriously, and accordingly, both in England and the United States, the system has been virtually abrogated. By statute 3 and 4 William IV., c. 42, it was provided that no person offered as a witness should be excluded on the ground that the verdict or judgment in the action could be used for or against him. The act 6 and 7 Victoria, c. 85 (1843), provided that no one, except a party, or the husband or wife of a party, should be excluded from testifying on the ground of interest in the subject of the action or event of the trial. The act 14 and 15 Victoria, c. 99 (1851), enacted that parties and persons on whose behalf a suit is brought or defended shall be competent and compellable to testify as witnesses for either party except that in criminal proceedings for an indictable offence neither the party charged nor the husband or wife of such party could be a witness; and except also that the provision should not apply to actions founded upon adultery, or for a breach of promise of marriage.

By a subsequent act, 16 and 17 Victoria, c. 83 (1853), the husband or wife of a party in a civil action was made competent as a witness except in cases of adultery, but with the qualification that such witness should not be bound to disclose any confidential communication made by either to the other during marriage. In the United States similar provisions have very generally been adopted; and as a rule all persons having knowledge of material facts are competent and compellable to testify, except husband and wife against each other, and the defendants in criminal proceedings. The former, however, are allowed to be witnesses for each other, and by consent may be called by the opposite party. In a number of the states the defendants in criminal cases are allowed either to testify in their own behalf under oath, or to make a statement without oath which the jury may receive as evidence; but constitutional provisions forbid their being compelled to testify against themselves.-The third of the classes into which we have divided the rules of evidence consists of presumptions of law in lieu of actual proof, or of what could be proved, under which may be specified the following: a.

The statutes of limitation, by which a period of time is fixed when a debt shall be presumed to have been paid, or satisfaction to have been received. This sort of presumption is made not for want of actual proof, as the period is usually short, but to put an end to controversy within a reasonable period. The current business of life has enough to employ our attention without our being burdened with the memory of all former transactions. (See Limitation, Statutes of.) b. Es-toppels. A man is said to be estopped when it would be inconsistent with good faith or with the policy of the law to allow him to deny a certain fact or legal conclusion. Thus, if he claims under a deed or will, he is bound by all that is contained in it, and is estopped either from denying any recital therein, or from setting up any claim of title adverse to or inconsistent with such deed or will. An estoppel in pais, as it is called in the old cases, is when a man is precluded by his own act or admission from proving anything contrary thereto.