And if a private person make an arrest for a felony, without a warrant, in good faith and upon a reasonable suspicion that the person whom he arrested had committed the offence, he will not be liable either civilly or criminally though his suspicions turn out to have been unfounded, provided the felony was actually committed by some one. Even in respect to crimes of less degree than a felony, a private person may make an arrest, though there is not in such cases the same legal obli-gation as in the case of felonies. Thus, in case of an affray or breach of the peace, any person may on the spot, and without any warrant, detain any of the offenders. Neither a private person nor an officer can make an arrest without a warrant when the time of the commission of the offence is fairly past. A constable is not justified in taking a person into custody without a warrant for a mere assault, unless he is present when the act is done. But constables, police officers, and the like officials may on reasonable suspicion arrest a person for a past felony, and they will be protected in such an act, unlike a private person in this respect, although no felony has been committed by anybody.

Such officers may ordinarily make arrests without special authority, in order to prevent imminent breaches of the peace. An officer may call bystanders to help him in making an arrest, though he is acting without a warrant; and a refusal to give such help is indictable at common law. An officer may also apprehend any one who interferes to prevent his making an arrest, and it is said that he may even take into custody one who encour-ages another already arrested to resist. - It seems to be the better opinion that an officer, especially one who is commonly known to be such, like a sheriff or constable acting in his proper precinct, and probably as well one who, from being elected or appointed in the usual way, may be justly presumed to be known to be such officer, need not show his warrant nor even declare his official character before making an arrest; for the power to make the arrest might be lost by going through the form of producing and explaining the process. If the officer have no proper warrant or authority, he is liable in damages to the person arrested; but if the party resist before investigating the officer's right, and the officer has the authority in fact, then the party is indictable for resisting the officer in the proper discharge of his duty.

When an officer acts under a warrant, he is justified in executing it, though it was unlawfully issued in fact, provided it is in due and regular form on its face, and the magistrate had general jurisdiction of the case. The question of jurisdiction the of ficer must decide for himself and at his peril; and if the process is invalid on that ground, the officer is liable in damages. The maxim of the law that a man's house is his castle, does not hold good so far as to secure asylum to criminals; and when a felony has been certainly committed and the guilty party takes refuge even in his own house, an officer or a private person, even without a warrant, may break into the house to take him, after a proper demand for admission. An officer in such a case, acting in good faith on the positive information and charge of another, would be excused even though the party arrested were not the guilty party. But a private person, in order to justify the breaking of doors without a warrant, must in general prove the actual guilt of the party arrested, and it will not suffice for him to show that a felony was actually committed by some person, or that reasonable grounds of suspicion existed.

When an officer has a warrant, he may, even before an indictment, break open doors in cases of treason or felonies or breaches of the peace; but it seems to be the law that, without a warrant and before indictment, he may not do so in the case of mere misdemeanors unaccompanied with violence. After indictment, a person guilty of an offence of any degree may be arrested in any place, and no house can give him sanctuary; and not only his own house, but the house of a third person, may in such a case be broken into, after reasonable demand, for the purpose of taking him. - To constitute an arrest, there must ordinarily be some physical force or restraint imposed upon the person, though there need not be more than the slightest. Mere words are not enough, unless upon these the party submits without the manifestation of any force. The mere laying of the hand upon the prisoner, or preventing his egress from a room, with words indicating the intent to arrest him, is sufficient. If an officer attempts to arrest one committing a felony, and he takes to flight to escape arrest, the officer may, after demanding that he stop and surrender, shoot him to compel him to do so. But the officer may not do this in the case of a mere misdemeanor.

And if an officer or other authorized person, in attempting to make an arrest, is resisted, and in overcoming the resistance, and in using what seems to him to be necessary force, kills the man, he will be held innocent; and if a person already arrested attempts to escape, an officer is justified in killing him if that is necessary to prevent his escape. But whenever an unlawful arrest is attempted or made, as for example when an officer arrests for a misdemeanor without a warrant, and neither on fresh pursuit nor when a breach of the peace is threatened, the party arrested may lawfully resist; and if in making such resistance he take the officer's life by mischance, it is only manslaughter. When a prisoner is arrested without a warrant, he should be handed over without delay to some magistrate. When the arrest is made under a warrant, all its requirements must be observed, and such a process usually directs the officer to take his prisoner to some court or justice. - It is a common practice for police officers and constables to search a prisoner immediately after his arrest, and take from him everything found in his possession.

There are several English cases reported on this subject, and it is laid down in them that there is no legal authority for such a proceeding, unless possibly it be in those cases where the things taken are probably the fruits of the crime with which the prisoner is charged. In several such cases in England the judges have severely denounced the practice, and have ordered money especially to be returned to prisoners where their possession of it did not appear to have any connection with the offence for which they were taken, and on the ground that therefore there was no possible justification for depriving them of it.