In tactical organization, the principle of mixing infantry, cavalry, and artillery in the smaller portions of an army, in corps and divisions, became the rule. Every division thus became a complete army on a reduced scale, fit to act independently, and capable of considerable resistance even against superior numbers. The order of battle was now based upon the column; it served as the reservoir, from which sallied and to which ! returned the swarms of skirmishers; as the | wedge-like compact mass to be launched against a particular point of the enemy's line; as the form to approach the enemy and then to deploy, if the ground and the state of the ! engagement made it desirable to oppose firing lines to the enemy. The mutual support of the three arms, developed to its full extent by their combination in small bodies, and the combination of the three forms of fighting, skirmishers, line, and column, compose the great tactical superiority of modern armies. Any kind of ground thereby became fit for fighting; and the ability of rapidly judging the advantages and disadvantages of ground, and of at once disposing troops accordingly, became one of the chief requirements of a captain.

And not only in the commander-in-chief, but in the subordi-nate officers, these qualities, and general aptness for independent command, were now a necessity. Corps, divisions, brigades, and detachments were constantly placed in situations where their commanders had to act on their own responsibility; the battlefield no longer presented its long unbroken lines of infantry disposed in a vast plain with cavalry on the wings; but the single corps and divisions, massed in columns, stood hidden behind villages, roads, or hills, separated from each other by seemingly large intervals, while but a small portion of the troops appeared actually engaged in skirmishing and firing artillery until the decisive moment approached. Lines of battle extended with the numbers and with this formation; it was not necessary actually to fill up every interval with a line visible to the enemy, so long as troops were at hand to come up when required. Turning of flanks now became generally a strategical operation, the stronger army placing itself completely be-tween the weaker one and its communications, so that a single defeat could annihilate an army and decide a campaign.

The favorite tactical ' manoeuvre was the breaking through the enemy's centre with fresh troops, as soon as the state of affairs showed that his last reserves were engaged. Reserves, which in line tactics would have been out of place and would have detracted from the efficiency of the army in the decisive moment, now became the chief means to decide an action. The order of battle, ex-; tending as it did in front, extended also in depth; from the skirmish line to the position of the reserves the depth was very often two miles and more. In short, if the new sys- tem required less drill and parade precision, it required far greater rapidity, exertion, and intelligence from every one, from the lowest skirmisher as well as the highest commander; and every fresh improvement made since Napo-leon tends in that direction. - The changes in ' the materiel of armies were but trifling during| this period; constant wars left little time for improvements the introduction of which re- quires time. Two very important innovations took place in the French army shortly before the revolution. The first was the adoption of a new model of musket of reduced calibre and windage, and with a curved stock instead of the straight one previously in use.

This weapon, more accurately worked, contributed a great deal toward the superiority of the French skirmishers, and remained the model upon which with trifling alterations the muskets in use in all armies up to the introduction of percussion locks were constructed. The second was the simplification and improvement of the artillery; by Gribeauval. The French artillery under Louis XV. was completely neglected; the guns were of all sorts of calibres, the carriages old-fashioned, and the models upon which they were constructed not even uniform. Gribeauval, who had served during the seven years' war with the Austrians, and then seen better models, succeeded in reducing the number of calibres, equalizing and improving the models, and greatly simplifying the whole system. It was with his guns and carriages that Napoleon fought his wars. The English artillery, which was in the worst possible state when the war with France broke out, was gradually but slowly much improved; with it originated the stock- trail carriage, which has since been adopted \ by all continental armies, and the arrangement for mounting the foot artillerymen on the limbers and ammunition wagons.

Horse artillery, invented by Frederick the Great, was much cultivated during Napoleon's period, especially by himself, and its proper tactics were first developed. When the war was over, it was found that the British were the most efficient in this arm. Of all large European armies, the Austrian is the only one which supplies the place of horse artillery by batteries in which the men are mounted on wagons provided for the purpose. - The German armies still kept up the special class of infantry armed with rifles, and the new system of fighting in extended order gave a fresh importance to this arm. It was especially cultivated and in 1838 taken up by the French, who felt the want of a long range of musket for Algiers. The tirailleurs de Vincennes, afterward chasseurs & pied, were formed, and brought to a state of efficiency without parallel. The adoption of this formation was rendered necessary by the great improvements in small arms, and especially in rifles, by which both range and precision were increased to a wonderful degree. The names of Delvigne, Thouvenot, and Minie thereby became celebrated. For the whole infantry, the percussion lock was introduced between 1830 and 1840 in most armies; as usual, the English and the Russians were the last.