79. Knight v. Browne, 7 Jur. N. S. 894; Re Brewer's Settlement (1896) 2 Ch. 503; Detmold v. Detmold, 40 Ch. D. 585.

80. See Phipps v. Ennismore,

4 Russ. 131; Gray. Restraints on Alienation, Sec.Sec. 95-100. See also the remarks in Doherty v. Power (1916) 1 Ir. 337. 81. Ante, Sec. 116(d).

The question of the legal effectiveness of such an expression of intention by the creator of the trust has been the subject of much debate, particularly with regard to bis right thus to prevent involuntary alienation of the cestui's interest, that is, to relieve it from liability to sale for the latter's debts. In so far as such an expression of intention is given effect, the trust is ordinarily referred to as a "spendthrift trust."

(g) Spendthrift trusts. In England, ordinarily, both the right of voluntary alienation and the liability to involuntary alienation in behalf of creditors are regarded as necessary incidents of property, legal or equitable, and consequently any indication of a contrary intention in connection with the creation of a trust is nugatory.82 But even there the equitable separate estate of a married woman may, by the terms of the settlement upon her, be enjoyed by her, so far as regards the income, without any right to alienate the corpus of the fund, or to anticipate the income, and free from the claims of creditors, the theory being that since the separate estate is the creature of equity, and it is only by reason of the recognition thereof that, apart from modern statutes, a married woman has any right of alienation, the allowance by equity of restrictions upon the right to alien the separate estate involves merely a partial return to the common law view of a married woman's status.83

82. Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429; Snowdon v. Dales, 6 Sim. 524, Lewin Trusts (12th Ed.) 111.

83. Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 483; Stogdon v. Lee [1891] 1 Q. B. 661; Perry, Trusts, Sec.Sec. 670, 671; 2 Jarman, Wills, 779; Gray, Restraints on Alienation, Sec.Sec. 270, 271. The restraining clause ceases to have any effect when the coverture ends by the husband's death. Barton v. Briscoe, Jac. 603. As to such a restriction in a settlement made by the married woman herself, see Gray, Restraints on Alienation, Sec. 277a; Editorial note in 12 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 53.

For American cases involving the validity of such a provision in connection with the separate estate of a married woman, see Robinson v. Randolph, 21 Fla.

In some states the English view, that one cannot be given an equitable interest, any more than a legal one, free from liability for his debts, has been asserted,84 but the later decisions have usually adopted a contrary view, to the effect that the intention of the creator of a trust, as indicated by the language used in its creation, that the interest of the cestui que trust shall not be liable for his debts, will be given effect by a court of equity.86 As before stated, a trust the beneficial interest in which is thus immune from liability for the cestui'$ debts is ordinarily referred to as a spendthrift trust.

629, 58 Am. Rep. 692; Wells v. McCall, 64 Pa. St. 207; Lampert v. Haydel, 96 Mo. 439, 2 L. R. A. 113, 9 Am. St. Rep. 358, 9 S. W. 780; Mebane v. Mebane. 4 Ired. Eq. (39 N. C.) 131, 44 Am. Dec. 102; Scruggs v. Mayberry, 135 Tenn. 586, 188 S. W. 207; Simonton v. White, 93 Tex. 50, 77 Am. St. Rep. 824, 53 S. W. 339.

84. Jones v. Reese, 65 Ala. 134; Samuel v. Salter, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 259; Knefler v. Shreve, 78 Ky. 297; Brock v. Brock, 168 Ky. 847, 183 S. W. 213; Bram-hall v. Ferris, 14 N. Y. 41 (dictum) Mebane v. Mebane, .4 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 131, 44 Am. Dec. 102; Vaughan v. Wise, 152 N. Car. 31, 67 S. E. 33 (valid only as authorized by statute); Till-inghast v. Bradford, 5 R. I. 212; Heath v. Bishop, 4 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 46; Hutchinson v. Maxwell, 100 Va. 169, 93 Am. St. Rep. 944, 57 L. R. A. 384, 40 S. E. 665; Honaker v Duff, 101 Va. 675, 44 S. E. 900. This view is strongly presented in Professor Gray's work, Restraints on Alienation of Property, especially the preface to the second edition.

See also editorial note in 11 Columbia Law Rev. at p. 765.

86. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716, 21 L. Ed. 254 (dictum); Seymour v. McAvoy, 121 Cal. 438, 41 L. R. A. 544, 53 Pac. 496; Mason v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 78 Conn. 81, 3 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 586, 61 Atl. 57 (dictum); Fearson v. Dunlop, 21 Dist. Col. 236; Sinnott v. Moore, 113 Ga. 908, 39 S. E 415; Wagner v. Wagner, 244 111. 101, 18 Ann. Cas. 490, 91 N. E. 66; McCoy v. Houck, 180 Ind. 634, 99 N. E. 97; Olsen v. Youngerman, 136 Iowa, 404, 113 N. W. 938; Sherman v. Havens, 94 Kan. 654, 146 Pac. 1030, Ann. Cas. 1917B 394; Roberts v. Stevens, 84 Me. 325, 17 L. R. A. 266, 24 Atl. 873; Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 9 Am. St. Rep. 398, 14 Atl. 497, 15 Atl. 92; Jackson Square Loan Ass'n v. Bartlett, 95 Md. 661, 93 Am. St. Rep. 416, 53 Atl. 426; Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 43 Am. Rep. 504; Billings v. Marsh, 153 Mass. 311, 10 L. R. A. 764, 25 Am. St. Rep. 635, 26 N. E. 1000; Lathrop v. Merrill, 207 Mass. 6, 92 N. E. 1019; Boston Safe DeIn vindication of the validity of spendthrift trusts the courts have referred to various considerations, as that the donor of property should be entitled to determine who shall be the beneficiary of his bounty, thai the creditors of the beneficiary of such a trust are no worse off than if the trust had not been created, and that such a trust finds support in the analogy both of the English doctrine of restraints on anticipation by married women and of the exemption and homestead statutes in .force in various states. It is also sometimes said that a provision of this character, originating in affection, by which it is sought to afford to the beneficiary protection from the vicissitudes of fortune, is entitled to the fostering care of a court of equity.87 Of these various considerations, however, all except perhaps, the last would apply as well in support of a provision exempting a legal estate from the claims of creditors, and yet the invalidity of such a provision in the case of a legal estate is clearly recognized. The justification for any distinction which may be recognized in this regard must be based upon the fact that the characteristics of a legal estate, among which is its liability to voluntary and involuntary alienation, are fixed and absolute, while the characteristics of an equitable interest are determined by the intention of the creator of the trust. This is recognized in all jurisdictions to the extent that if the trustee has absolute discretion as to the distribution of the income among persons named, one of such persons has no right to demand any part posit & Trust Co. v. Collier, 222 Mass. 390, Ann. Cas. 1918c, 962, 111 N. E. 163; Leigh v. Harrison, 69 Miss. 923, 18 L. R. A. 49, 11 So. 604; Lampert v. Haydell. 96 Mo. 444, 9 Am. St. Rep. 358. 8 S. W. 793; Kessner v. Phillips, 189 Mo. 515, 107 Am. St. Rep. 380, 88 S. W. 82; Weller v. Noff-singer, 57 Neb. 45, 77 N. W.