It follows from the three rules as to priorities stated above that it is not sufficient for the second mortgagee, in order to gain priority, to prove that he is a purchaser in good faith for value and without notice (x). He must in addition, either hold the legal estate or prove that he has been misled by the misconduct of the first mortgagee and thus establish a case of estoppel against the first mortgagee. It thus appears that a legal claim is measured by a different standard from that applied to an equitable claim. Prima facie the former has priority over the latter, and while mere negligence will postpone one equitable claim in favour of another equitcommunicated to the principal, notice will not be imputed to the principal. Kennedy v. Green, 1834, 3 My. & K. 699, 21 R.C. 820; Rolland v. Hart, 1871, 6 Ch. App. 678; Cave v. Cave, 1880, 15 Ch. D. 639; Berwick & Co. v. Price, [1905] 1 Ch. 632, at pp. 640-1. If a solicitor acting for both parties is guilty of concealment from one of them with the cognisance of the other, the first client is not affected with notice. Sharpe v. Foy, 1868, L.R. 4 Ch. 35; Berwick & Co. v. Price, supra.

(w) If the notice to the agent is actual, and not merely constructive, notice, the principal will be considered to have actual notice. See Rose v. Peterkin, 1885, 13 Can. S.C.R. 677, at pp. 694 ff.; and other cases cited in chapter 8, The Registry Act, Sec. 75.

(x) Prior to the Judicature Act if a plaintiff in an action at law required, in order to establish his right at law, discovery of documents in the defendant's possession or other purely equitable relief, he was obliged to sue in equity and ask the Court of Chancery to exercise its equitable jurisdiction. If the defendant proved that he was a purchaser in good faith for value and without notice the Court of Chancery would refuse to grant relief against him, or, as it was said, would not deprive him of his tabula in naufragio. The result was that the plaintiff was unable to prove his legal right. Bassett v. Nosworthy, 1673, Rep. temp. Finch 102, 2 W. & T.L.C. Eq. 163, 21 R.C. 702; cf. Phillips v. Phillips, 1862, 4 DeG. F.&J. 208, at pp. 216, 217, 10 R.C. 533, at pp. 540, 541. Owing to the practical abolition of the auxiliary jurisdiction by the Judicature Act,.

The distinction made-between the legal estate and an equitable interest is reasonable, because the legal estate is only another name for property or ownership, a right in rem prima facie good against the whole world, while every equitable interest is a right in personam, which is in many respects treated as if it were a right of property but which in essence is only a personal obligation enforceable against definite persons or classes of persons, who either undertook the equitable obligation or succeeded to the title to the property in such circumstances that in equity they are bound by it (z).