(p) Cattell v. Corrall, 4 Y. & C. 228; see above, p. 385, n. (p). Here it may be noted that under stat. 3 & 4 Will. IV.c.74, ss. 1, 15, a tenant in tail, who has by deed unenrolled conveyed away all his estate in the lands entailed, whether to a purchaser for value or to a volunteer, may nevertheless subsequently bar the entail, by a proper disentailing assurance duly executed and enrolled under the Act. In such case, if the prior conveyance were made in favour of a purchaser for valuable consideration, the subsequent assurance will (unless it were itself made to a purchaser for value not having- express notice of the prior conveyance) operate to confirm the prior conveyance; see sect. 38; Sturgis v. Morse, 2 De G. F. & J. 223; Hankey v. Martin, 49 L. T. 560; Cotton, L. J., Bankes v. Small, 36 Ch. D. 716, 721; Re Gaskell & Walters' Contract. 1906, 2 Ch. 1

(q) Sug. V. & P. 205; Bankes v. Small, 36 Ch. D. 716.

(r) Stat. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 38. s. 58 (1) (i).

(s) Sect. 31 (2).

Copyholds.

(t) Above, p. 300

Wms. Real Prop. 91, 99, 108, 109, 21st ed

(x) See Sug. Pow. 343 sq.,

8th i d. . Farwell on Powers, 266. 2nd ed.

(y) Above, p. 221.

(z) Above, pp. 228, 231 236. Above, pp. 21(3, 629.

(6) Above, pp. 221, 222, 530

(c)Re Somerville and Turner's Contract, 1903, 2 Ch. 583; above, p. 235.

(d) Above, p. 530.

Leaseholds

As between the vendor and his own representatives after his death, the property sold, if real estate, is, as we have seen (f), converted into personalty as from the date of the contract for sale, provided that the contract become fully binding by the acceptance of the title. If this condition be fulfilled, the purchase money and the vendor's lien therefor belong, in case of his death before completion, to his executors or administrators as part of his personal estate (g): but the benefit of the vendor's right to take the rents and profits up to the proper time for completion will pass, if he die before that time, to his heir or devisee (h), subject to the executor's or administrator's interest therein for payment of the vendor's debts under the Land Transfer Act, 1897 (i). If the vendor should, prior to the contract for sale, have specifically devised the land afterwards sold, the devise - although it would, prior to the Land Transfer Act, 1897, convey the vendor's estate at law (k) - is in equity adeemed; so that the devisee is not entitled to the purchase money (l) unless a contrary intention should appear from the will (m). If a contract for the sale of real estate become unconditionally binding by the acceptance of the vendor's title and the vendor die pending completion, and afterwards the contract fail to be performed owing to the purchaser's default in payment of the price, the land becomes in equity the property of the persons entitled on the vendor's death to his personal estate; for they became absolutely entitled to the benefit of the vendor's lien when the contract became fully binding; and they remain entitled, on failure of the contract by the purchaser's default, to take possession of their security in specie (n). But if the contract never become absolutely binding upon and specifically enforceable against both parties, as where there is a failure to show a good title on the vendor's part, or the contract is voidable ab initio and is avoided for fraud, misrepresentation, or any other cause (such as omission to comply with the Statute of Frauds (o)), there is no conversion of the property sold in the vendor's hands, and if he die, the land, which was the subject of the contract, will pass as such to the persons entitled to his lands either on his intestacy or under his will (p). And the like result follows where a contract for sale of lands has been rescinded or abandoned by consent of the parties in the vendor's lifetime (q). When a man has entered into a valid contract giving to another an option to purchase (r) his real estate, the property is converted into personalty in the hands of the vendor, his heirs and assigns, as from the time of the exercise of the option; and if the vendor die before that time, his heirs or assigns of the hereditaments in question are entitled to the rents and profits thereof until the option is exercised, after which, in the absence of any disposition to the contrary made by his will (s), his legal personal representatives are entitled to the purchase money, with interest from that time until payment, as part of his personal estate (t).

Conversion of the land sold in the vendor's hands.

(e) Above, pp. 217, 219.

(f) Above, p. 505.

(g) Above, pp. 506, S28.

(h) Lumsden v. Fraser, 12 Sim. 263; 1 Dart, V. & P. 263, 5th ed.; 302, 6th ed.; 306, 7th ed.; Watts v. Watts, R. 17Eq.217.

(i) Above, pp. 229 - 231.

(k) Above, p. 529.

(l) Moor v. Raisbeck, 12 Sim. 123; Farrar v. Winterton, 5 Beav. 1; Weeding v. Weeding, 1 J. & H. 424, 431; Watts 'v. Watts, L. R. 17 Eq. 217; Sag. V. & P. 190; 1 Dart, V. & P. 263, 5th ed.; 302, 6th ed.; 306, 7th ed. The same law is applicable where the land has been disposed of by will in exercise of a general or special power of appointment and afterwards sold: Re Dowsett, 1901, 1 Ch.398; Beddington v.Baumann, 1903, A. C. 13.

(m) Drant v. Vause, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 580; Emuss v. Smith, 2 De G. & S. 722; Weeding v. Weeding, 1 J. & H. 424, 431; 1 Dart, V. & P. 263, 264, 5th ed.; 302, 303, 6th ed.; 306, 7th ed.; and see Sugd. Law of Property, 223.

Option to purchase.

(n) Curre v. Bowyer, 5 Beav. 6, n.: Lysaght v. Edwards, 2 Ch. D. 499, 506

(o) Above, p. 11.

Above, pp. 213 sq,' and see Haynes v. Haynes, 1 Dr. & Sm. 426; Edwards v. West, 7 Ch. D. 858, 862; 1 Jarm. Wills. 54, 5th ed.

(q) Sug. V. &P. 191; and consider Ridout v. Fowler, L904, 1 Ch. 658, 2 Oh. 93

(r) A contract giving an option to purchase any land gives an interest in the land to the person who has the option, and must therefore conform with the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds (above, p. 3); see London and Smith Western Railway v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562; above, pp. 370, 371. In order that an option to purchase any land may be well exercised, the terms of the contract, grant or devise, which created the option, must in all respects be strictly pursued, and where any particular time is specified for the exercise of the option, time is of the essence of the contract or matter: Brooke v. Garrod, 2 De G. & J. 62; Rane-lag/i v. Melton, 10 Jur. N. S. 1141; Weston v. Collins. 11 Jur. N. S. 190; and see Milk v. Ray-wood, 6 Ch. D. 196; Brnner v. Moore, 1904,1 Ch. 305. The benefit of an option given by covenant contained in a lease to the lessee, his executors, administrators or assigns, to purchase the fee simple of the demised premises goes, after the lessee's death, to the persons becoming entitled to the lease: Re Adams and Kensington Vestry, 27 Ch. D. 394. As to the question how far an option to purchase must conform with the rule against perpetuities, see above, pp. 370 - 372. As to the effect of a contract to give the first refusal of land, see Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester Racecourse Co., 1901, 2 Ch. 37.