(e) Litt. 8. 183; Co. Litt. 121 b: Williams on Commons, 315; Beddington v. Atlee, 35 Ch. D. 317, 326.

(f) Watts v. Kelson, L. R. 6 Ch. 166; Kay v. Oxley, L. R. 10 Q. B. 360; Barkshire, v. Grubb, 18 Ch. D. 616; Williams on Commons, 170, 315 - 319, 323, 324; Wms. Conv. Stat. 64 - 66.

(g) Stat. 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, which came into operation immediately after the 31st December, 1881; see Wms. Conv. Stat. 60 sq.

(h) This does not exactly follow the usual form of general words, which mentioned all rights, etc. now or heretofore enjoyed with the land. As to the effect of this difference, see Hall v. Byron, 4 Ch. D. 667, 671, 672: Wms. Conv. Stat. 68.

(i) Broomfieldv. Williams, 1897, 1 Ch. 602; International Ten Stores Co. v. Hobbs, 1903. 2 Ch. 165; see Quiche v. Chapman, 1903, 1 Ch. 659.

A contract for the sale of a piece of land, either with or without mention of "the appurtenances," passes (equally with a conveyance at common law of the legal estate therein (k) ) only such rights, privileges or easements as are legally appendant or appurtenant thereto; and does not, in absence of special stipulation, entitle the purchaser to have conveyed to him any privileges or advantages which were used by the vendor in connexion with the land sold over adjoining or other land of his own, but are not necessary for the enjoyment of the property as sold(l). And the 6th section of the Conveyancing Act of 1881 (m) affects only conveyances of land made by deed and does not apply to contracts for the sale of land (n). It follows, therefore, that if the conveyance, as drawn on the purchaser's behalf, incorporate tacitly, according to the present practice, the provisions of this enactment, and these provisions would, if uncontrolled, operate to grant to the purchaser as an easement or a right some advantage previously enjoyed in fact by the vendor, but not included in the contract for sale, the vendor is entitled to require that words shall be inserted modifying the statutory provisions to the extent necessary to give to the contract for sale its true effect (o). And in such cases the vendor should be most careful to have the effect of the enactment in question duly limited by express words, or he may find, after conveyance, that he has subjected the land retained by him to some easement or other right which he did not intend to grant when he made the contract for sale (p). If so, he will have no remedy but to bring an action for the rectification of the conveyance; and this relief (apart from fraud) will be granted only in case of common and not of unilateral mistake (q). If, however, the use of some privilege or advantage over adjoining land retained by the vendor be necessary to the proper enjoyment, as contemplated by the contract (r), of the property sold, the purchaser will be entitled to have that privilege or advantage granted to him by the conveyance as a legal easement or right. Indeed, where the easement would be necessary and continuous, as in the case of a right to the access of light, or even necessary only, such as a way of necessity (s), a grant thereof would be implied from the mere conveyance of the land to which it was necessarily accessory. But in such cases the purchaser is not obliged to rest content with such grant as would be implied in law from the conveyance of the land. He is certainly entitled to have such an express grant of the privilege or advantage in question as would he made by incorporating in the conveyance, without any restriction, the statutory general words. And since the object of the conveyance is to carry out with certainty the intention of the parties to the contract, it is thought that, if the conveyance as drawn on the purchaser's behalf contain a grant defining accurately in express words some privilege or advantage impliedly sold by the contract and to be enjoyed over some land retained by the vendor, the vendor cannot object to execute the conveyance in that form. As the vendor may, where necessary, exclude or restrict the operation of the statutory general words and, in place thereof, define his liabilities in express and unambiguous terms (t), so the purchaser is not obliged to accept the general description of his rights which would be given by such general words (a description which cannot be reduced to certainty without proof of the facts existing at the time of conveyance (u) ), but is entitled to have such rights particularly and exactly defined (x). Any easements or other accessory rights expressly mentioned in the contract as being included in the sale should of course be expressly granted in the conveyance.

What easements or other privileges the purchaser can require to be conveyed to him.

(k) Wms. Real Prop. 427, 21st ed.; Wms. Conv. Stat. 64, 65; above, p. 638.

(l) Bolton v. Bolton, 11 Ch. D. 968; Berkshire v. Grubb, 18 Ch. D. 616, 620: Re Feck and London School Board, 1893, 2 Ch. 315; Re. Hughes and Ashley's Contract, 1900, 2 Ch. 595. But, of course if the vendor induce the purchaser to enter into the contract by a representation that he shall have some privilege over other land of the vendor's, the vendor cannot enforce the contract without granting the same as a Legal right: see the last mentioned

See also Bimingham, etc. Banking Co. v. Ross, 38 Ch. D. 2

Burrows v. Lang, 1901, 2Ch. 502; Godwin v. Schweppes, Ld., 1902, 1 Ch. 926; above, pp. 429, 430. So the sale of a house having windows overlooking land not belonging to the vendor implies no warranty that the vendor has a right to the access of light through those windows: Green-halgh v. Brindley, 1901, 2 Ch. 324; but if the vendor were to represent (contrary to the fact that he had such right, he could not enforce the contract.

(m Stat. 44 & 45 Vict, c 41 see sect. 2 v) ; above, p. 638,

(n)Re Peck and London School Board, 1893, 2 Ch. 315, 318.

(o) Re Peck and London School Board, 1893, 2 Ch. 315, and Re Hughes and Ashley's Contract, 1900, 2 Ch. 595.