(f) See Tucker v. Vowles, 1893, 1 Ch. 195; Rowell v. Satchell, 1903, 2 Ch. 212; Osborne v. Brad-ley, 1903, 2 Ch. 446; above, p. 497, n. (s).

(g) Above, p. 494, and n. (a); Nottingham Patent Brick, Sec.c. Co. v. Butler, 16 Q. B. D. 778, 784, 785; Collins v. Castle, 36 Ch. D. 243.

(h) See cases cited in previous note; Re Birmingham, etc. Co. and Allday, 1893, 1 Ch. 342; Davis v. Leicester, 1894, 2 Ch. 208, 219, 227, 232: Holford v. Acton Urban Council, 1898, 2 Ch. 240; Rowell v. Satchell, 1903, 2 Ch. 212; Elliston v. Rcacher, 1908, 2 Ch. 374, 384, 385, 665.

The estate clause always inserted in conveyances of laud before the year 1882, and purporting to assure all the conveying party's estate or interest in the laud conveyed (m). went out of use after the commencement of the Conveyancing Act of 1881 (n); the 63rd section of that Act providing that every conveyance shall by virtue of that Act be effectual to pass all the conveying party's estate or interest in the property conveyed, but this euactment shall apply only if and as far as a contrary intention is not expressed in the conveyance and have effect subject to the terms of the conveyance and the provisions therein contained. Having regard to this express saving and to the construction placed on the estate clause formerly usual (o), it is thought to be unnecessary expressly to exclude the operation of that enactment upon conveyances assuring in proper terms less than the whole estate of the party conveying, such as leases for life or years, or gifts in tail. But if upon the sale of the fee simple, or other the vendor's whole estate in some land, it is stipulated that some exception or reservation shall be made, the same must of course be clearly denned in the deed of conveyance (p); for if all mention thereof be omitted, the deed will take effect at law according to its terms, and the vendor's only remedy will be an action for rectification of the conveyance (q).

Estate clause.

Tucker v. Vowles, 1893, 1

Ch. 195: Holford v. Acton Urban L898, 2 Ch. 240; Reid v.

Bickerstaff, 1909, 2 Oh. 305; above, p. 648, n. (f).

(k) Re Birmingham, &e. Co. and Allday, 1893, 1 Ch. 342; Davis v. Leicester, 1894, 2 Ch. 208, 220.

(k) Above, pp. 640, 641.

(m) 1 Davidson, Pree. Conv.

94, 4th ed.; see Wms. Conv.

Stat. 242; Wms. Real Prop. 625, 21st ed.

(n) Stat. 4 1 & 45 Vict. c. 41.

(o) See Blundell v. Stanley, L3 Jur. 998: Hunt v Remnant, 9 Ex. 635; Rooper v. Harrison, 2 K. & J 86, 113; Neam v. Moor-som, L. R. 3 Eq. 91; Frawis v. Vinton, L. R. 2 0. P. 643; 1 Davidson, Prec, Couv. 94, 4th ed.

The reader may be reminded that, although a contract for the sale of land, without defining the estate to be sold therein, is intended to mean a sale of the freehold in fee (r), this rule has no application to a conveyance on sale, in which the estate to be taken by the purchaser must be duly limited or marked out, either by the use of the words necessary to convey the fee at common law, or by the exact expressions mentioned in the 51st section of the Conveyancing Act, 1881 (s). If, therefore, an estate in fee simple were sold, the land must be conveyed either to the purchaser and his heirs or to him in fee simple, and no other words will suffice to effect this or (excepting the words proper to confer an estate tail) will avail to convey a greater estate than for the grantee's life (t). And it must not be forgotten that where the land sold is to be conveyed to a grantee to uses, it is equally necessary to limit to him an estate in fee simple in express and proper terms, otherwise he takes an estate for his own life only in the land conveyed, with the consequence that the same legal estate and no more will pass under the Statute of Uses (u) to the person or persons to whose use it is expressed that he shall hold the land(r). But if the purchaser should, through a mistake of this kind, acquire by the conveyance a less estate at law than he was entitled under the contract to have assured to him, he will nevertheless be entitled in equity to such an estate as he actually purchased in the land, and will be entitled to have the conveyance rectified accordingly (y). This consideration has an important bearing on cases where an equitable estate in lands is limited in a deed by words which would be insufficient to convey the fee if the estate were legal, but indicate an intention to pass the entire equitable estate. It is settled that equity follows the law to this extent, that a grant by deed of an equitable estate in lands to the grantee simply, without any words of limitation or any other words indicating an intention to pass the fee, will confer an estate for the grantee's life only (z). But it is otherwise if the deed show an intention to transfer the grantor's whole equitable interest in the land (a). Thus, if A. agree with B. to buy the lands of which C. is seised in fee on trust for B. in fee, or to buy B.'s equity of redemption in the lands comprised in B.'s mortgage to D., and B. convey these lands to A. by a deed, in which the nature of the agreement between the parties is by recital or otherwise sufficiently shown and the payment of the purchase money is stated as the consideration, but which contains no words or no correct technical words of limitation of the fee simple to A., it is submitted that A. will none the less be entitled to the entire equitable estate in the lands. But, of course, it would be proper in such a case for A. to take a conveyance to himself and his heirs or in fee simple.

Limitation of the purchaser's estate.

(p) See 1 Davidson, Prec. Conv. 95 - 98, 4th ed., also showing the difference between an exception and a reservation.

(q) Above, pp. 640, G41.

(r) Above, p. 41.

(s) Stat. 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41.

(t) Re Ethel and Mitchells and Butler's Contract, 1901, 1 Ch. 945, where the limitation was to the grantee in fee; Wms. Real Prop. 207, '21st ed. It may be noted that it is sufficient if the proper words of limitation be contained in the habendum only of a deed, as where A. grants to B. All that farm called Blackacre To Hold the same unto and to the use of B. and his heirs, or in fee simple; see Jenkins v. Young, Cro. Car. 230; 6'. C, nom. Meredith v. Joans, Cro. Car. 244; Orme's Case, L. R. 8 C. P. 281, 295 - 298, 300; Spencer v. Registrar of Titles, 1906, A. C. 503; Williams on Settlements, 4 - 7.