Completed sale of land by infant.

(h) Flight v. Bolland, 4 Russ. 298; Lumley v. Ravenscroft, 1895, 1 Q. B. 683.

(i) See Clayton v. Ashdown, 9 Vin. Abr. 393; 2 Dart, V. & P. 1191; Fry, Sp. Perf. Sec. 460, n. The same principle seems applicable as that on which contracts for the sale of land signed only by one party were held to be specifically enforceable against him, notwithstanding the original want of mutuality; Child v. Comber, 3 Swanst. 423, n.; Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265, 275; Fowle v. Freeman, 9 Ves. 351; Western v. Russell, 3 V. & B. 187, 192; Flight v. Holland, 4 Russ. 298, 301; Fry, Sp. Perf. Sec. 471.

(k) Above, p. 795.

{I) Above, pp. 796, 797.

[m) Above, pp. 786 sq.

(n) See Johnson v. Pie, 1 Keb. 905, 913, where it appears that the infant had avoided a mortgage made by him; Stikeman v. Dawson, 1 De G. & S. 113; Thurstan v. Nottingham, etc. Bdq. Socy., 1902, 1 Ch. 1, 12, 13; affirmed, 1903, A. C. 6; above, p. 787. It is true that in the last-mentioned case the mortgage was made void ab initio by statute. But that does not appear to make any difference. Where an infant's conve3'ance is voidable at his option, it becomes absolutely void when he chooses to repudiate it; above, p. 787. And where the law declares that a man's conveyance is void as against him, equity will not, in the absence of fraud, impose terms of restitution or payment as a condition of his exercising his legal right to recover possession of the property. Otherwise the protection which the law accords to infants would be effectually defeated. And since the law regards the protection of infants against their natural want of discretion as of such paramount importance that it will not lay an infant under an obligation ex delicto to repay money obtained under a contract induced by the infant's fraud (see Johnson v. Pie, ubi sup.: Jennings v. Rundall, 8 T. R. 335, 337), it does not appear that, where money is paid to an infant under a contract in the belief, not induced by his fraud, that he is of full age, the law imposes on him any obligation quasi ex contractu to repay the money as having been parted with under a mistake of fact. Cf. the law applied in the case of contracts made with married women and induced by their fraud; see below.

Completed purchase of land by infant.

(o) Above, p. 788.

(p) Above, p. 785.

(q) Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508, 509.

(q) Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508; Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 166.

(s) Holmes v. Blogg, ubi sup.

(t) See cases cited above, n. (r); Hamilton v. Vaughan-Sherrin, etc. Co., 1894, 3 Ch. 589, 592 - 594.

Infant's contract to buy or sell land.

{u) Above, pp. 746, 752, 753.

(x) See 1 Dart, V. & P. 27, 5th ed.; 31, 6th cd.

(y) Hamilton v. Vaughan-Sherrin, etc. Co., 1891, 3 Ch. 589; see above, p. 787, n. (n).

(z) Above, p. 440, n. (m).

(a) Thurston v. Nottingham, etc. Bdg. Sony., 1902, 1 Ch. 1, 1903, A. C. G.

(b) Above, p. 794. It is conceivable that the purchase of land by an infant may be a contract for necessaries, as if he required a residence and could obtain one in no other way; but this would be an exceptional case.

(c) Above, pp. 797, 798. {d) Above, p. 795.

[e) See above, p. 796.

Recovery of deposit by-infant avoiding his contract to buy land.

According to modern law, the act in pais of a person, who is so insane as to be incapable of understanding its effect, is void, if it be purely gratuitous (k): it is voidable, if it be done for valuable consideration under agreement with some person who was aware of his insanity (l); and it is valid, if it be done for valuable consideration under agreement with some person dealing with him in good faith and without knowledge of or reasonable cause to suspect his insanity (m). This doctrine applies to all dispositions of property as well as to all contracts made by an insane person, and so governs his purchase and conveyance of land equally with his contract to sell or buy it (n). And it has not only been held that the promise of an insane person made for valuable consideration paid or executed in good faith without notice of his insanity is at law enforceable against him, but it has also been laid down that the same doctrine is applicable whether the contract be executed or executory (o). As yet, however, it has not been precisely decided whether or how far a contract made in good faith with an insane person without notice of his insanity is enforceable against him, where the consideration is executory on both sides and consists of mutual promises. But it seems to be no objection that the consideration given in the insane man's favour is executory only; for if he make a conveyance of his property in consideration of some promise made to him by a person acting in good faith and without notice of his insanity, the conveyance is held to be valid and irrevocable (p). It appears, therefore, that an insane man's contract is valid at law, if the other party enter into it in good faith and in ignorance of his insanity, notwithstanding that it consist of mutual promises only. It follows from what has been said above that an insane person is under no incapacity to hold land.

Persons of unsound mind.

(/) Above, pp. 795, 796, and n. (z).

(g) Wilson v. Kearse, Peake, Add. Cas. 196. See also Expte. Taylor, 8 De G. M. & G. 254, where note that payments had been made to the infant under the contract; and cf. Corpe v. Overton, 10 Bing. 252.

(A) Above, p. 799.

(i) Above, pp. 787, n. (n), 800.

(k) Elliot v. Ince, 7 De G. M. & G. 475; Manning v. Gill, L. R,. 13 Eq. 485; see also Clerk v. Clerk, 2 Vern. 412; Expte. Roberts, 3 Atk. 308, 312, 313. But it seems that the delivery by such a person of any chattel, wherein the property passes by delivery, must be voidable only, as was an insane person's feoffment with livery of seisin before the year 1845; Thompson v. Leech, 3 Salk. 300, 301; Bac. Abr. Idiots and Lunatics (P); Sug. Pow. 604, 605, 8th ed.; cf. above, p. 787, n. (n) . As to a power of attorney given by an insane person, see A.-G. v. Parnther, 3 Bro. C. C. 441, 4 Bro. C. C. 409; and as to the degree of mental capacity necessary to make a valid will, see Banks v. Goodfellow, L. R. 5 Q. B. 549; Since v. Smee, 5 P. D. 84.