Sale or lease of infant's under the Settled Land Acts.

{d) Stat. 40 & 41 Vict. c. 18.

(e) Stat. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 38, ss. 59, 60.

(/) See Re Wells, 31 W. R. 764, W. N. 1883, p. 111; Re Morgan, 24 Ch. D. 114; Re Newcastle's Estate, ib. 129, 139, 140; Re Simpson, 1897, 1 Ch. 256.

(g) Above, p. 311.

(A) Stat. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 38, s. 58.

(i) See above, pp. 308 sq.

At common law, the contracts of infants are generally voidable at their option (o), but are valid if beneficial to the infant in the opinion of the Court [p), especially contracts for necessaries, or whatsoever things are reasonably necessary for the use of the infant according to his circumstances and condition of life (q). But by the 1st section of the Infants Relief Act, 1874 (r), all contracts thenceforth entered into by infants for the repayment of money lent or to be lent (s) or for goods supplied or to be supplied (other than contracts for necessaries) and all accounts stated with infants shall be absolutely void: provided always that this enactment shall not invalidate any contract into which an infant may by any existing or future statute or by the rules of common law or equity enter, except such as now by law are voidable. And by the 2nd section, no action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any promise made after full age to pay any debt contracted during infancy, or upon any ratification made after full age of any promise or contract made during infancy, whether there shall or shall not be any new consideration for such promise or ratification after full age. The first section of this Act makes void the particular contracts therein specified only (7). The second section, prohibiting any action upon the ratification of an infant's contract (u), is held to apply to all contracts, of which before the Act the burthen of proving a ratification after full age (x) lay upon the party, who sought to enforce them {y). These are all contracts, as to which under the old practice a plea of infancy merely was a sufficient plea in bar of an action to enforce them, and the plaintiff could not recover unless he set up and maintained a plea of ratification after attaining full age by way of replication (z). Such were contracts executory on both sides, whether to be performed during infancy or afterwards, and contracts to be performed by the infant, either within age or afterwards, in consideration of some fleeting benefit executed in his favour, as the supply of money or of goods other than necessaries (z). There are, however, some contracts by infants which remain binding on them after they have attained full age, unless within a reasonable time after coming of age they repudiate them and give notice of such repudiation to the other party; and the party who sues an infant on one of these contracts has, prima facie, a good cause of action and was not obliged to prove ratification as a condition precedent to charging the infant thereon (a). Of this kind are contracts, by which a permanent interest in property is immediately conferred on the infant, and he himself is laid in return under a continuing obligation (a) to be performed partly or wholly after he has attained full age. Instances of this class of contract are the acceptance by an infant of some permanent property, to which a liability is incident, as where he takes a lease of land at a rent (b) or shares not fully paid up in a company (c). And the same principle has been applied where an infant has by his marriage settlement taken a permanent interest in property and entered into a covenant, which may operate as a disposition of property in equity; as to settle some property to be afterwards acquired by him (d). In these cases, if the infant wish to escape liability on the contract, he must repudiate it and renounce all benefit thereunder and duly communicate (e) his repudiation to the other party within a reasonable time after coming of age. For these contracts remain good until set aside; and if the infant omit so to avoid them, they will be perfectly binding on him, and the Infants Relief Act will be no bar to an action to enforce them (f).

Infants' contracts.

(k) Re Dudley's Contract, 35 Ch. D. 338; see above, p. 308.

(I) Stat. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 38, ss. 22 (1), CO; above, p. 308.

(m) See Re Newcastle's Estates, 24 Ch. D. 129, 137-140, 142; 1 Key & Elph. Prec. Conv. 521, n. (b), 4th ed.; 494, n. {b), 7th ed.

(n) See Re Dudley's Contract, 35 Ch. D. 338, 342, 344; He Simpson, 1897, 1 Ch. 256, 259.

(o) Warwick v. Bruce, 2 M. & S. 205, 6 Taunt. 118; Williams v. Moor, 11 M. & W. 256; Carter v. Siller, 1892, 2 Ch. D. 278; affirmed nom. Edwards v. Carter, 1893, A. C. 360; Stephens v. Dudbridge, etc. Co., 1904, 2 K. B. 225. There is authority to the effect that a unilateral contract by an infant entirely to his own detriment is absolutely void: but it is doubtful whether this means anything more than that it is void as against him, i.e., that he cannot be obliged to perform it, though he may do so, if he likes; see Whelpdale's case, 5 Rep. 119; Saunderson v. Marr, 1 H. Bl. 75; Baylis v. Dinely, 3 M. & S. 477; Kinqsman v. Kingsman, 6 Q. B. D. 122, 127.

(p) Clements v. London and North Western Ry. Co., 1894, 2 Q. B. 482.

(q) Ryder v. Wombwell, L. R. 4 Ex. 32; Johnstone v. Marks, 19 Q. B. D. 509; Walter v. Everard, 1891, 2 Q. B. 369. It may be noted that the law does not go beyond allowing infants' contracts to pay for necessaries supplied to be good. An infant's conveyance, charge, bill, or note, which would otherwise be voidable or void, is not made valid by the fact that it was made or given in consideration of the supply of necessaries; Martin v. Gale, 4 Ch. D. 428; Re Sollykoff, 1891, 1 Q. B. 413. Persons who have furnished an infant with money to buy necessaries are, however, entitled in equity to stand, by subrogation, in the place of those who supplied the necessaries; Marlow v. Pit-field, 1 P. W. 558.