293 (uncertificated conveyances); Davies v. Makuna, 29 Ch. D. 596 (unqualified medical practitioner).

(y) Fisher v. Bridges, 3 E. & B. 642; see above, p. 771.

(z) Shackell v. Rosier, 2 Bing. N. C. 634.

(a) Mallalieu v. Hodgson, 16 Q. B. 689; Begbie v. Phosphate Sewage Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 491, 499; Scott v. Brown & Co., 1892, 2 Q. B. 724.

(b) Hopkins v. Prescott, 4 C. B. 578. See Benjamin on Sales, 415, 437, 2nd ed.

(c) See Egerton v. Brownlow, 4 H. L. 0. I, 123 - 125, 160, 195.

(d) Walker v. Perkins, 1 W. Black. 517; Gray v. Mathias, 5 Ves. 286.

(e) Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 341; 1 Smith L. C.; Williams v. Bay ley, L. R. 1 H. L. 200, 213, 240; Lound v. Grimwade, 39 Ch. D. 605.

(f) Keif v. Leeman, 6 Q. B.

308, 321, 9 Q. B. 371, 395; Fisher v. Apollinaris Co., L. R. 10 Ch. 297; Expte. Wolverhampton, etc. Banking Co., 14 Q. B. D. 32; Windhill Local Board v. Vint, 4 5 Ch. D. 351; Jones v. Merionethshire, etc. Bdg. Socy., 1892, 1 Ch. 173.

(g) Lowe v. Peers, 4 Burr. 2225. As to conditions in general restraint of marriage, see an article by the writer in L. Q. R. xii. 36.

(h) See Maxim, etc. Co. v. Nor-denfelt, 1893, 1 Ch. 630, 1894, A. C. 535 ; Ehrman v. Bartholomew, 1898, 1 Ch. 671; Underwood v. Barker, 1899, 1 Ch. 30; Townsend v. Jarman, 1900, 2 Ch. 698, 702; Dowden v. Pook, 1904, 1 K. B. 45.

(i) Mallan v. May, 11 M. & W. 653, 669; Green v. Price, 13 M. & W. 695, 699; affirmed, 16 M. & W. 346, 353; and cases cited in previous note; Benjamin on Sale, 408, 2nd ed.

Contracts made with the inhabitants of hostile states.

Sales of land are also void if they involve the offence of maintenance or champerty, or infringe the principle of legal policy on which those offences are founded, and which is intended to prevent the multiplication or stirring up of lawsuits (m). Here it may be mentioned that at common law, if a man were disseised of his freehold or wrongfully ejected from his leasehold land, he could not afterwards sell or dispose of his interest therein; for he was then divested of his estate (n), and had only a right of entry on the land or a right of action to recover it according to the circumstances of the case (0), and neither of these rights was assignable (p). By the Statute of Bracery (q) the sale was prohibited of any "pretenced rights or titles" to or in any hereditaments, unless the vendor or his predecessors in title had been in possession of the same or the reversion or remainder thereof, or in receipt of the rents and profits thereof for one whole year next before the sale was made; and any promise or covenant to have any such (r) right or title was equally forbidden unless the promissor or covenantor, or his predecessors, had been so in possession for a year before the contract (s). But persons in lawful possession of any hereditaments were permitted to buy or contract for the pretenced right or title thereto of any other person (t). It was considered that, if a man were wrongfully held out of possession, his right of entry or action was a pretenced right or title within the meaning of this Act, notwithstanding that his claim were lawful (u). And it appears that such a right was not assignable in equity by way of contract dealing with it for value (x), according to the equitable rule established in the case of possibilities not assignable at law (y). By the Real Property Act, 1845 (z), a right of entry such as we are considering was made assignable by deed. It was held that, since that Act, a lawful right of entry could no longer be properly described as a pretenced right or title, and might well be sold, not only to the person in possession, but to any stranger (a). And now, as we have seen (b), the enactment prohibiting the sale of pretenced rights and titles has been repealed. Under the present law, therefore, a man may lawfully sell his interest in any land, of which he is wrongfully kept out of possession. And it appears that he may lawfully sell a part of his interest in such land, so long as it be no part of the bargain that the purchaser shall maintain or assist him in his suit to recover the land (c). The law of champerty, moreover, does not prohibit the sale pendente lite of any property, which is subject of an action to recover or realise it, notwithstanding that the purchaser be empowered to sue in the vendor's name and agree to indemnify him against the past and future costs of the litigation {el). And it seems to be equally lawful to sell a part of such property, if there be no agreement to maintain the vendor in his suit to recover the rest (e). There is an exception, however, in the case of the solicitor acting in the litigation, who cannot lawfully purchase the thing sued for from his client while the action is pending (f); though he is permitted to take a mortgage or charge thereon by way of security for a loan (g).

Sales involving maintenance or champerty.

Sale of a right of entry or action to recover land.

(k) See Esposito v. Bouden, 7 E. & B. 763, 779; Janson v. Driefontein, etc, 1902, A. C. 484, 489, 502, 509; next Chapter, Sec. 1, under the head of Aliens.

(/) M' Connell v. Hector, 3 B. & P. 113; Roberts v. Hardy, 3 M. & S. 533; Albrecht v. Sussmann, 2 V. & B. 323; Janson v. Driefontein, 1902, A. C. 484, 505, 506.

(m) Reynell v. Sprye, 1 De G-. M. & G. 660, 677, 686; Sprye v. Porter, 7 E. & B. 58; Hutley v. Hutley, L. R. 8 Q. B. 112; James v. Kerr, 40 Ch. D. 449, 456; Sees v. He Bernardy, 1896, 2 Ch. 437, 446; Lampet's case, 10 Rep. 46b, 48a; Co. Litt. 214a, 265a, n. (1); Stanley v. Jones, 7 Bing. 369, 377.

(n) Litt. Sec. 450, 451, 455; Co. Litt. 214a, 266a, 267a, 345, 369a, 374b; Goodright v. Forrester, 8 East, 552, 566 - 568; 2 Prest. .Abst. 388 sq.; Cidley v. Hoe d. Taylerson, 11 A. & E. 1008, 1020.

(o) See 3 Black. Comm. 174 sq.; Wins. Real Prop. 147, 19th ed.; L. Q. R. xi. 227, 229, 230.

(p) Not even, before the Wills Act, by will; above, n. (o); 2 Prest. Abst. 419, 420. Rights of entry are now devisable under the Wills Act, stat. 7 Will. IV. and 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 3; and see above, p. 747. The right of a copyholder wrongfully ejected was equally unassignable; Kite and Queinton's case, 4 Rep. 25, 26.