(l) Rolle, Abr. 264; Bac. Abr. Arbitrament and Award (A.).

Judgment.

The right of action upon a contract may also be barred by lapse of time under the Statutes of Limitation; but this does not altogether extinguish the obligation (p). For example, a statute-barred debt, though it cannot be pleaded as a set-off (q), may be revived by acknowledgment (r), may, as a rule, be lawfully paid by an executor or administrator (s), or may, in equity, be required to be brought into account before the party liable is allowed to participate in any fund which should have been increased by its discharge in due course (t).

Effect of Statutes of Limitation.

(m) Above, pp. 478, 921. (n) Expte. Fewings, 25 Ch. D. 338; Wegg Prosser v. Evans, 1895, 1 Q. B. 108; Re King and Beesley, ib. 189; Economic, etc. Socy. v. Usborne, 1902, A. C. 147;' and consider Kendall v. Hamilton, 4 App. Cas. 504; Taylor v. Holland, 1902, 1 K. B. 676, 681; Morel v. Westmorland, 1904. A. C. 11.

(o) Slade's case, 4 Rep. 92, 94b; Chitty on Pleading, i. 488, iii. 107, 7th ed. A judgment by consent has the same operation in this respect as any other judgment; Re South American, etc. Co., 1895, 1 Ch. 37.

(p) Courtenay v. Williams, 3 Hare, 539, 551 sq.; London and Midland Bank v. Mitchell, 1899, 2 Ch. 161, 168; Re Lloyd, 1903, 1 Ch. 385, 401.

(q) Remington v. Stevens, 2 Strange, 1271; stat. 9 Geo. IV. c. 14, s. 4; Walker v. Clements, 15 Q. B. 1046; Dingle v. Coppen, 1899, 1 Ch. 720; Smith v. Betty, 1903, 2k. B. 317

(r) Bac. Abr. Limitation of Actions (E. 8); Morgan v. Rowlands, L. R. 7 Q. B. 493; Chase-more v. Turner, L. R. 10 Q. B. 500; Green v. Humphreys, 23 Ch. D. 207. Any such acknowledgment unless made by way of payment of some principal or interest due on a debt, must be in writing signed by the party chargeable therewith or his agent; stats. 9 Geo. IV. c. 14, s. 1; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 13; Wms. Pers. Prop. 161, 166, 529, 530, loth ed.

(s) See Wms. Pers. Prop. 531, 15th ed.; Re Wenham, 1892, 3 Ch. 59; Midgley v. Midgley, 1893, 3 Ch. 282.

(t) Courtenay v. Williams, 3 Hare, 539, 551 sq.; Re Cordwell's Estate, L. R. 20 Eq. 644; Re Akerman, 1891, 3 Ch. 212; Re Goy & Co., Ld., 1900, 2 Oh. 149, 153, 154; Re Wheeler, 1904, 2 Ch. 66, 71.

Also, if two persons be mutually indebted, having cross claims against each other, some of which could be met by the plea of the Statute of Limitations, and they come to an agreement as to the sum due from one of them upon a balance of account, that agreement is equivalent to actual payment of the debts, which it purports to extinguish; it is valid as having been for a new and valuable consideration, and cannot be impeached on the ground that some of the items allowed in account were statute barred (u). A right of action arising from breach of a contract to sell land is barred, as a rule, in six years after the breach, if the contract were not made by deed (x); but if the contract were under seal, then in twenty years (y). If, however, any acknowledgment of liability should have been made in signed writing or by payment (z), the time runs from the giving of the acknowledgment or the last acknowledgment. And if the party entitled to sue were under the disability of infancy, lunacy or coverture when the cause of action accrued, the time runs from the date of removal of the disability (a). If the party liable were beyond seas at the time when the right of action accrued, the period of limitation does not begin to run till his return (b). The time for enforcing the vendor's lien on the land sold (c) is now limited to twelve years from the date when a present right to receive the money secured by the lien accrued to some person capable of giving a discharge for the same, or from the date of the last acknowledgment by payment or in signed writing (d). The time when the purchase money accrues due for the purposes of this enactment is the date of actual completion, if a conveyance to the purchaser has been executed; but if the purchaser has been let into possession without conveyance, then the time when completion ought to have taken place; that is, when the vendor showed such a title as the purchaser was bound to accept (e). And interest on the purchase money does not become due and payable until the principal has become payable; though it may have to be computed from the day fixed for completion (f). It appears that, where the contract of sale was made by deed, the right to sue the purchaser personally for the amount due on the vendor's lien is barred within the same time as the lien itself (g): though, if the vendor had waived his lien, it appears that the time of limitation would be twenty years (h). Where the agreement for sale was a simple contract, the right to sue the purchaser personally for the price is barred at the end of six years (i), though the vendor's lien would not be barred until twelve years had elapsed. It appears that a vendor suing to enforce his lien can only so recover six years' arrears of interest due thereon (k); but that, where the payment of the interest is secured by bond or other specialty, he can recover twelve years' arrears by suing the purchaser personally (l).

Vendor's lien.

(u) Ashby v. James, 11 M. & TV. 542; Turner v. Willis, 1905, 1 K. B. 468.

(x) Stat. 21 Jac. I. c. 16, s. 3.

(y) Stat, 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, 8. 3.

(z) Above, p. 943, and n. (r); stat. 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, s. 5.

{a) Stats. 21 Jac. I. c. 16, s. 3; 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, s. 4; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 10.

(b) Stats. 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 19;

3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, s. 4; Musurus Bey v. Gadban, 1894, 2 Q. B. 352. But where one of several persons jointly liable was beyond seas, his absence does not prevent the time of limitation from running as against the others not so absent; and the recovery of judgment against them will not bar an action against him on his return; stat. 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 11. (c) Above, pp. 924, 931.