Purchaser must at once repudiate the contract if he wish to insist on the objection.

(u) Lewin v. Guest, 1 Russ. 325: Forrer v. Nash, 35 Beav. 167, 171; Brewer v. Broadwood, 22 Ch. D. 105; Lee v. Soames, 36 W. R. 884; of. Re Baker and Selmon's Contract, 1907, 1 Ch. 238, where a trustee sold as the authorised agent of the beneficiaries.

(x) Re Bryant and Barningham's Contract, 44 Ch. D. 218; see also Be Head's Trustees and Macdonald, 45 Ch. D. 310.

(y) Halkett v. Dudley, 1907,

1 Ch. 590, 597. The purchaser-is entitled, in such circumstances, to repudiate the contract at once, and need not wait till the day fixed for completion; Hoggart v. Scott, 1 Russ. & My. 293, 295; Forrer v. Nash, 35 Beav. 167, 171; Weston v. Savage, 10 Ch. D. 736; Brewer v. Broadwood, 22 Ch. D. 105, 109; Lee v. Soames, 36 W. R. 884; Halkett v. Dudley, 1907, 1 Ch. 590, 596; and see below, p. 185, n. (l).

We have already considered what documents of title the abstract should contain and the manner in which they ought to be abstracted (d). Any defects in these respects should of course be the subject of requisition. The purchaser's adviser must insist on being furnished with an abstract showing a complete chain of the conveyances or other documents dealing with the legal estate in the property purchased from the time of commencement of title down to that of the contract for sale. And whenever the abstract gives him notice of any equitable estate or interest in the premises, he must require the title to such estate or interest to be abstracted (e), and must see that the same has been ultimately got in or released or will be conveyed to the purchaser: unless, of course, the circumstances are such that the concurrence of the beneficiaries is unnecessary, as upon an ordinary trust for sale. It is his further duty to ascertain that each of the abstracted conveyances is at all points complete, so that it really has in law the effect which it purports to have. Thus he must consider whether the conveying parties have due capacity to convey the estate assured; if so, whether they have used an instrument proper and words apt to carry out their intention; and then whether the instrument is duly executed or perfected as required by law. And if he observe any deficiency, he should call for its rectification. If a document be abstracted in an improper manner (as constantly happens) conveyancing counsel ought to require the vendor to furnish a proper abstract sufficient to enable him to exercise his own judgment as to the effect of the words actually used. He ought not to rest satisfied with a mere statement of the effect of any material clause or document; for the very purpose of laying the abstract before him is that he should give his opinion on the effect of the deeds. And if he accept statements of the effect of clauses where he ought to be informed of the exact words used and judge of their effect himself, he is really laying a duty, which he ought to perform in person, on the gentleman who examines the abstract with the deeds. Owing to the unskilled and slovenly way in which abstracts are now too often prepared, counsel have to bear this constantly in mind. What clauses ought to be abstracted in full and what may be properly passed over with a mere statement has been considered above (f). We will merely give one constantly recurring example of the duty we have been pointing out. A proviso for reconveyance in a mortgage deed is now often abstracted in these words - proviso for redemption. And such abstracting is constantly allowed to pass either without comment or with the remark that it is presumed that this proviso is in the usual form. That however is exactly the point on which counsel's opinion is desired. A proviso for reconveyance is the only clause in a mortgage deed which effectively shows what charge on the property is thereby created, and on what terms that charge is redeemable, and it is also a limitation of the equitable estate in the property subject to the charge. All these matters are material to the title, even though a subsequent reconveyance from mortgagee to mortgagor appear on the abstract (g). The proviso therefore to A. in fee on payment by A. to B., a purchaser acquiring title under these deeds would take with notice of the equities both of C. and D. This example is of course an extreme case; and the rule no doubt is that a mortgagor's equitable estate in the mortgaged lands shall not be altered by the terms of a proviso for redemption without a clear expression of an intention in that behalf (Innes v. Jackson, 16 Ves. 356; Co. Litt, 208 a, n. (l); Stansfield v. Hallam, 5 Jur. N. s. 1334: Hastings v: Astley, 30 Beav. 260; Re Briton's Trust Estates, L. R. 12 Eq. 553: Re Byron's Settlement, 1891, 3 Ch. 474): but such an intention may be clearly should always be so abstracted as to enable the purchaser's counsel to judge for himself, from the exact words used, of its effect in these respects (h). And unless counsel insist on being furnished with such an abstract, he does not discharge his duty to his client.

Requisitions as to the contents and manner of making the abstract.

(z) See Morley v. Cook, 2 Hare. 106, 115; 7 Jur. 79, 80; South-comb v. Bp. of Exeter, 6 Hare, 213, 216, 219, 220.

(a) Hoggart v. Scott, 1 Russ. & My. 293; Salisbury v. Hatcher 2 Y. &C. C. C. 54.

(b) Eyston v. Simonds, 1 Y. & C. C. 0. 608; Fry, Sp. Perf. Sec. 1366-9, pp. 607. cos, 3rd ed.;

580, 581, 4th ed.; 2 Dart, V. & P. 1058-1060,5th ed.: 1178-1180, 6th ed.; 1065-1068, 7th ed.; and see Murrell v. Goodyear; 1 De G. F. & J. 432; Halkett v. Dudley, 1907, 1 Ch. 590, 597-600.

(c) See Re Deighton and Harris, 1898, 1 Oh. 158; below, p. 184.

(d) Above, pp. 106-113.

(e) See above, pp. 110-112.

(f) Pp. 112-114.

(g) Of course mortgages are usually redeemable on payment of principal and interest by the original mortgagor to the original mortgagee, when reconveyance is to be made to the mortgagor according to his former estate. But, since persons not named as parties to indentures have been allowed to take benefits thereunder see Wms. Real Prop. 156, 21st ed.), there is nothing to prevent a proviso in a deed of mortgage between A. borrower and B. lender that on payment of principal and interest by A. to C, B. shall reoonvey to D. in foe. In such case, if there wen a subsequent reconveyance by B.