We shall hereafter see (f) that, upon the purchase of an estate in possession, mere inadequacy of consideration, unless shown to be the result of fraud, surprise, misrepresentation, or improper concealment on the part of the purchaser, will be no defence even to a suit for specific performance, unless the inadequacy be so great as in itself to furnish evidence of fraud (g); and a stronger case than what would suffice as a defence to a suit for specific performance, would be necessary to enable the vendor to rescind the contract after conveyance (h).

A distinction has been made between cases where the consideration was for a stated sum, and for an uncertain amount, e. g., a life annuity; but it seems doubtful whether this is sustainable (i).

But there is a well recognised distinction between sales of estates in possession and estates in reversion; and on sales of the latter description, if effected by private contract, mere inadequacy of consideration will enable the Court to decree a reconveyance; and the onus probandi does not, as in ordinary cases, rest with the plaintiff seeking to impeach the sale, but with the defendant (k).

And this relief will be afforded where a small part of the property is in possession and the bulk is reversionary (l); but not where the tenant for life concurs with the immediate reversioner, so that the sale is, in effect, of an estate in possession (m); nor where the sale is made by a vendor entitled to what is, substantially, an estate in possession, and to the ultimate reversion, subject only to an intervening life estate (n); nor where the contract is entered into between a tenant and the person entitled to the reversion and to the rents during the term (o); and relief will be more sparingly afforded where the reversion is subject to an almost incalculable contingency, as where it is expectant on the death, without issue, of a tenant for life aged sixty-three and unmarried (p); although the existence of such a contingency is no absolute protection to a purchaser at an undervalue (q).

Inadequacy of consideration no general reason for setting aside conveyance.

Uncertain amount of purchase-money.

Distinction in cases of reversionary interests.

Onus pro-bandi lies on purchaser.

What interests are considered reversionary

(f) Infra, Ch. XVIII.

(g) See Rice v. Gordon, 11 Beav. 265.

(h) See Sug. 312, 314; Vigers v. Pike, 8 Cl. & Fin. 645; Playford v. Playford, 4 Ha. 546; Bellamy v. Sabine, 2 Ph. 425; Wilde v. Gibson, 1 H. L. C. 617. Lord Eldon seems to have entertained a different opinion, see Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234.

(i) Vide infra, within the rule.

(k) See Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 246; Gowland v. De Faria, 17 Ves. see p. 24; Hincksman v. Smith, 3 Russ. 433; Kendall v. Beckett, 2 Russ. & Myl. see p. 90; Addis v. Campbell, 1 Beav. see p. 262.

And the relief is afforded, as well to the mere owners of reversionary interests (r), as to heirs dealing with their expectancies; although an extraordinary protection is afforded to the latter class of vendors (s).

And where a person bought a reversion at a gross undervalue from an heir in distressed circumstances, and resold it at a large profit to a sub-purchaser who had full notice of the original fraud, and the reversioner, being still in distress, joined in and confirmed the resale, but nothing was paid or secured to him as a consideration for such concurrence, the transaction was set aside as against the sub-purchaser, on repayment of the price paid on the first purchase (t).

Relief given to vendors of reversions as well as to expectant heirs

Relief afforded as against sub purchaser with notice notwithstanding voluntary confirmation by reversioner.

(l) Lord Portmore v. Taylor, 4 Sim. 182.

(m) Wood v. Abrey, 3 Madd. 417; see Cooke v. Burtchaell, 2 Dru. & W. 165; and Sibbering v. Earl of Bal-carres, 14 Jur. 753, V. C. K. B.

(n) Wardle v. Carter, 7 Sim. 490.

(o) Scott v. Dunbar, 1 Moll. 459.

(p) Baker v. Bent, 1 Russ. & Myl. 224; and see Whichcote v. Bramston, cited 4 Sim. 202.

(q) See Sug. 325; Addis v. Camp-bell, 4 Beav. 401; Davies v. Cooper,

5 Myl. & Cr. 270; Boothby v. Boothby, 1 Mac. & G. 604; Wood-roffe v. Allen, 1 H. & J. 73; father and son, when dealing with a third person, need not be represented by separate solicitors, S. C.; Cooke v. Burtchaell, 2 Dru. & W. 165.

(r) Bawtree v. Watson, 3 Myl. & K. 339; Davies v. Cooper, 5 Myl. & Cr. 270; Edwards v. Browne, 2 Coll. 100; see Sewell v. Walker, 12 Jur. 1041.

(s) Sug. 314.

It was laid down by the Court in deciding a modern case (u), First, that this extraordinary protection must be withdrawn from the heir, "if it shall appear that the transaction was known to the father or other person standing in loco parentis, the person, for example, from whom the spes successionis was entertained, or after whom the reversionary interest was to become vested in possession,- even although such parent or other person took no active part in the negotiation, provided the transaction was not opposed by him, and so carried through in spite of him. Secondly, that if the heir flies off from the transaction, and becomes opposed to him with whom he has been dealing, and repudiates the whole bargain, he must not, in any respect, act upon it so as to alter the situation of the other party, or his property; at least that if he does so, the proof lies upon him of showing that he did so under the continuing pressure of the same distress which gave rise to the original dealing."

The first of these propositions is criticized by Sir E. Sugden, who observes that the equity is that of the son (v), not of the parent; and in a late case (w) a purchase was set aside upon the ground of inadequacy, the tenant for life being herself the purchaser: as to the second of the above propositions, Sir E. Sugden remarks, that without the concluding qualification it could not safely be acted upon (x).