But it seems clear on principle, that if a vendor possess any such right, the substituted security for the rent and covenants should be given to the purchaser before the commencement of litigation against the tenants, and should be binding whatever may be its result: for, "the very litigation might unsettle and ruin the tenant and after all prove unsuccessful" (c).

(w) Muskerry v. Chinnery, Ll. & G. tem. Sug. 185.

(x) Ll. & G. tem. Sug. 219.

(y) Ll. & G. tem. Pl. 196.

(z) "I apprehend that this Court can never enter into the question whether the covenant which binds the assets of the executors and trustees of W. P. is or is not an equivalent for the original covenant by W.P.," per V.C. Shadwell, 16 Sim. 390; and see Ridgway v. Gray, 1 Mac. & G. 109.

(a) See 2 B. & B. 548.

(b) See Sheehy v. Muskerry, 7 Cl. & Fin. 1.

"Where the consent of a person is essential to the validity of a lease agreed to be granted, and he himself purchases the inheritance with full notice, yet he will not be bound by it" (d): but where land subject to a lease of a way leave at a reserved rent determinable by the lessee, was sold apart from the rent, and the purchaser of the land agreed with the lessee to determine the lease, and entered into a different one, in order to defeat the right of the purchaser of the rent, the latter was held entitled to have it made good out of the new contract (e).

It was held, in a recent case, where a person, having mortgaged in fee, demised the property without the concurrence of the mortgagee, that a purchaser of the fee simple, who by one deed took a conveyance of the legal estate from the mortgagee and of the equity of redemption from the representative of the mortgagor, was not estopped at Law, although he received rent from the tenant; but might eject him after the expiration of the usual notice to quit (f).

Notice of a conveyance which comes within the provisions of the 27 Eliz. c. 4, as being made for the purpose of defrauding purchasers (g), or as reserving a power of revocation to the grantor (h), is immaterial; and the purchaser's title will be good at Law and in Equity.

Purchaser of land subject to easement may not determine lease of easement as against purchaser of rent reserved by lease.

Purchaser of estate in mortgage-when able to dispute voidable leases.

Notice of fraudulent conveyances, etc., immaterial.

(c) Per Sugden, C, Ll, & G. tem. Sug. 218.

(d) Sug. 1032, citing Lufkin v. Nunn, 11 Ves. 170.

(e) Wood v. Marquis of Londonderry, 10 Beav. 465.

(f) Doe d. Lord Downe v. Thompson, 9 Q. B. R. 1037; he would have been estopped had the mortgagor got in the legal estate prior to the conveyance, and the want of title had not appeared on the face of the lease; see Right d. Jefferys v. Bucknell, 2 B. & Ad. 278.

(g) Equitable mortgagee by deposit with memorandum of agreement for a legal mortgage is a purchaser within the Act; Lister v. Turner, 5 Ha. 281; Ede v. Knowles, 2 Y. &C. C. C. 172.

It is settled that a mere voluntary conveyance (unless it be in favour of a charity) (i), is fraudulent within the meaning of the Statute; e. g., a conveyance in trust for creditors who are not parties to the arrangement (k), or a post-nuptial settlement upon the settlor's wife, husband, or family (l), unless made in pursuance of a binding (m) antenuptial agreement (n), or of a further portion (o), or of an agreement to pay a further portion which is afterwards paid (p), or of the wife relinquishing her interests under an existing settlement (q), or her jointure or dower (r) (if married before the late Act came into operation); and in separation deeds the covenant usually entered into by the trustees to indemnify the husband against her debts, will as against creditors (s), and also, it is conceived, as against subsequent purchasers, support any further settlement he may make upon her: so, if a post-nuptial settlement be made with the aid of another person whose concurrence essential to its full validity - as in the case of a settlement by tenant for life and tenant in tail in remainder - this will, as a general rule, take from the instrument its voluntary character (t).

What are so considered.

(h) See sect. 5.

(i) Att.-Gen. v. Corporation of Newcastle, 5 Beav. 307; 12 Cl. & Fin. 402.

(k) Leech v. Leech, 1 Ch. Ca. 249; Walwyn v. Coutts, 3 Mer. 707; 3 Sim. 14; Acton v. Woodgate, 2 Myl. & K. 492; Garrard v. Lord Lauderdale, 3 Sim. 1; Wilding v. Richards, 1 Coll. 655; Smith v. Keating, 6 C. B. 136; Simmonds v. Palles, 2 J. & L. 489; but see Langton v. Tracy, 2 Ch. R. 16, and Sug. 929.

(l) Evelyn v. Templar, 2 Bro. C. C. 148; Doe v. Roe, 6 Sco. 525; Currie v. Nind, 1 Myl. & C. 17, a case of copyholds settled by a married woman during coverture.

(m) See 12 Ves. 74.

(n) Griffin v. Stanhope, Cro. Jac.

454; Randall v. Morgan, 12 Ves. 74; Ex parte Hall, 1 Ves. & B. 112; see Battersbee v. Farrington, 1 Sw. 106.

(o) Brown v. Jones, 1 Atk., see p. 190.

(p) S. C.

(q) Ball v. Burnford, Prec. in Ch. 113; Parker v. Carter, 4 Ha. 409.

(r) See Sug. 936.

(s) See Worrall v. Jacob, 3 Mer. 256; but the introduction of such a covenant is not, as has been often supposed, essential, but any other good consideration will be equally effective; see Frampton v. Frampton, 4 Beav. 294; Wilson v. Wilson, 14 Sim. 405, affirmed in D. P. 12 Jur. 467.

Marriage is in itself a sufficient consideration for an antenuptial settlement upon the husband, wife, or issue (u); which, as against the settlor, or the heirs of the settlor, is good as in favour of collaterals (v): but how far limitations in favour of collaterals can be supported as against subsequent bond fide purchasers for value, appears to be still doubtful.

Unnecessary difficulty appears to have been thrown over the cases upon the subject, by a confusion between the contract and the consideration for the contract: the common form of objection is, that collaterals are "not within the consideration of the marriage" (w): now this expression is, it is submitted, scarcely accurate: if A. agreed with B. to pay him 10,000l., in consideration of his conveying his estate to the use of A. for life with remainders over in favour of strangers, and the money were paid, and the conveyance executed accordingly, a question might arise, whether the remaindermen took beneficially or in trust for A., but subsequent purchasers from B. could hardly contend that the limitations in the settlement, ultra A.'s life estate, were void upon the ground of the remaindermen not being "within the consideration of the 10,000l." In the case of a marriage settlement, the important questions seem to be, first, whether the collaterals were within the contract? and secondly, whether (if so) there was a sufficient consideration for such a contract?