(h) Sect. 12: this clause is retrospective: see Culley v. Doe d. Tayler-son, 3 Per. & Dav. 539; 11 Ad. & E. 1008; Doe d. Holt v. Horrocks, 1 C. & K. 566; Doe d. Daniel v. Wood-roffe, 13 Jur. 1013, H. L.

(?) Sect. 13.

(j) Sect. 3: see Duke of Leeds v. Earl Amherst, 2 Ph. 125.

(k) Sect. 4.

(l) Sect. 5; and see Doe d. Curzon v. Edmonds, 6 M. & W. 295.

(m) Doe d. Hall v. Moulsdale, 16 M. & W. 689.

(n) Sect. 9: this provision is retrospective; see Doe d. Angell v. Angell, 9 Q. B. 328; see this case, also, p. 355, as to the construction of the word "rent" throughout the 9th sect.

(o) Doe d. Davy v. Oxenham, 7 M. & W. 131; Chadwick v. Broadwood, 3 Beav. 308; see, however, Ex parte Jones, 4 Y. & C. 466: as to rents of mines reserved in specie, see Denys v. Shuckburgh, 4 Y. & C. 42.

(p) See Dean and Chapter of Ely v. Bliss, 5 Beav. 574.

When a married woman and her husband join in a conveyance of her estate by an assurance which for want of a Fine or Statutory Acknowledgment is not binding on her, time will begin to run against her and her heirs only from the death of the husband, (if tenant by the curtesy,) or from her death in his lifetime (if they have no inheritable issue (s)); but where there is no conveyance binding on the husband, but a mere abandonment of possession by husband and wife, it has been held that time will run against her from the date of such abandonment (t).

By the 21st section it is enacted, "That when the right of a Tenant in Tail of any land or rent to make an entry or distress, or to bring an action to recover the same, shall have been barred by reason of the same not having been made or brought within the period hereinbefore limited, which shall be applicable in such case, no such entry, distress, or action shall be made or brought by any person claiming any estate, interest, or right which such Tenant in Tail might lawfully have barred:" and the 22nd section, in effect, provides that time which has commenced running against a deceased Tenant in Tail, shall be counted as against persons claiming in respect of any estate, etc., which he "might lawfully have barred."

Married woman, when barred.

Remainders expectant on an estate tail are barred when estate tail is barred.

(q) Sect. 20; and see Doe d. Hall v. Moulsdale, 16 M. & W. 689 -698.

(r) Doe d. Johnson v. Liversedge, 11M. & W. 517.

(s) Jumpson v. Pitchers, 13 Sim. 327; see Sug. 631; and Neesom v. Clarkson, 2 Ha. 163.

(t) Doe v. Bramston, 3 Ad. & E. 63.

The expresssion in each of these two sections "might lawfully have barred," seems to require personal legal capacity on the part of the tenant in tail to bar the remainders; from which this singular result would seem to follow, viz., suppose the right of a tenant in tail to accrue in possession when he is one year old, and that he attains twenty-one and dies the next day under no personal incapacity, the Statute would run against remaindermen as from the time when his right first accrued; but suppose him to die just before attaining twenty-one, or to attain twenty-one an idiot or lunatic, and so to continue until his death, in such a case it would seem that remaindermen would be in no way affected by the above sections of the Act. This construction, if it be a correct one, must, in many cases where land has been brought into settlement, materially interfere with the beneficial operation of the Statute upon titles.

The 23rd section has been a good deal discussed in the profession: according to Sir E. Sugden its effect is, "that where a tenant in tail executes a deed enrolled under the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, which for want of the consent of the Protector operates only to create a base fee, under which possession is obtained, the title will become good against those in remainder at the end of twenty years from the period when the tenant in tail, or his issue, could, without the consent of any third person, have barred the remainders over under the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74" (u); but it is not-clear that the section has not a retrospective operation (v).

Time runs against the estate tail and the remainders.

But tenant in tail must have been sui juros, semble.

Base fee-when to become a fee simple.

(u) Sug. 632. (v) See 1 Jarm. Conv. by S. 32.

Here, it may be observed, the same question arises as to the necessity for personal legal capacity on the part of the tenant in tail or his issue to execute a disentailing conveyance, as well as the nonexistence of a protector, at the time when the statute is to begin to run.

And in the opinion of Sir E. Sugden, base fees which were created before the passing of the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, are, as a general rule rendered unassailable by the 36th section of the Act (w).

The right of a mortgagor to redeem (x) is to be barred at the end of twenty years from the mortgagee taking possession, or last giving a written acknowledgment of title; the acknowledgment must be given to the mortgagor or some person claiming his estate, or the agent of such mortgagor or person; and the section has been held to be retrospective; so that where, before the Act, a mortgage had been twice transferred, as such, by deeds to which the mortgagor was no party, and no acknowledgment of the equity of redemption had been given to him for seventeen years before the passing of the Act, these years were counted against him upon his subsequently filing a bill to redeem (y): an acknowledgment given to one of several mortgagors, or representatives of a mortgagor, operates in favour of all; but an acknowledgment by one of several mortgagees, or representatives of a mortgagee, does not affect the proportionate interests of the others (z): if a mortgagee while in possession is himself entitled to such possession in respect of a life or other limited interest in, or as a tenant in common of, the equity of redemption, the period for which he is so entitled will not be counted against the parties entitled, in remainder, or together with him, to the equity of redemption (a).