Composition, modus, or exemption, how proved.

Proof of, how far facilitated by 2 &3 Will. IV. c. 100.

(w) See Estcourt v. Kingscote, 4 Madd. 140; Dent v. Rob, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 1.

(x) See 1 Mac. & G. 2G1.

(y) 1 Hare, 203; and see 1 Mac. & G. 261; and Barnes v. Stuart, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 119.

(z) Amended by 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 83.

(a) A custom for the Lord of a Manor to receive a tenth of all tithe-able matters in the manor, and to pay a yearly sum to the rector in lieu of tithe, is not within the Statute; see Knight v. Marquis of Waterford, 15 Mee. & W. 419; see 11 Cl. & F. 653.

(b) Sect. 1; see, as to evidence under this section, Stamford (Earl of) v. Dunbar, 9 Jur. 165; the shorter period of thirty years allowed by the Act, during which there is only a prima facie and not an absolute claim, does not appear to be material as between vendor and purchaser; see s. 6 of Act.

The 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s. 2, which enacts that no person shall bring an action to recover any land, (which by section 1 includes tithes, unless belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole,) but within twenty years next after the right accrued, has been held by the Court of Exchequer not to prevent the tithe owner from recovering tithes as chattels from the occupier, although none have been set out for twenty years; but to be confined to cases where there are two parties claiming adverse estates in the tithes (It).

Defects in the early title, or in the evidence thereof, are occasionally rendered immaterial by the 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 71, and 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74.

Tithes, how affected by Statute of Limitations.

Defects in title, when supplied by Prescription Act, and Statute of Limitations.

(c) Sect. 4.

(d) Sect 5.

(e) See Salkeld v. Johnston, 1 Ha. 196; S. C, 2 C. B. 749; and Fellows v. Clay, 4 Q. B. 313.

(f) Salkeld v. Johnston, 1 Mac. & G. 242.

(g) Stamford (Earl of) v. Dunbar, 9 Jur. 165.

(h) Dean and Chapter of Ely v. Cash, 15 Mee. & W. 617; but see Dean and Chapter of Ely v. Bliss, 5 Beav. 574.

Under the former (commonly known as Lord Ten-terden's) Act, a claim to light becomes absolute and indefeasible after twenty years' uninterrupted enjoyment, unless such enjoyment be shown to have been by virtue of some consent or agreement expressly made or given for that purpose by deed or writing; and local customs to the contrary are expressly rendered inoperative (i).

Claims of right of way, water, watercourse (j), or any other easement, (except light,) become prima facie valid after twenty years' uninterrupted enjoyment, and cannot be defeated by mere proof of such enjoyment having commenced at any prior period; but, until forty years' uninterrupted enjoyment, they remain liable to be defeated in any other way in which they might have been defeated before the passing of the Act; e. g., " by proof of a grant, or of a licence, written or parol, for a limited period, comprising the whole or part of the twenty years, or of the absence or ignorance of the parties interested in opposing the claim, and their agents during the whole time that it was exercised" (k): after forty years' uninterrupted enjoyment they become absolute and indefeasible, unless proof be given of such enjoyment having been under some consent or agreement expressly given or made for that purpose by deed or writing (l); after the end of the twenty years, and before the end of the forty, a grant may still be presumed by a jury (m), notwithstanding that the enjoyment is shown to have originated in an agreement by parol or writing not under seal (n).

Title under Prescription Act to light.

To rights of way and other easements except light.

(i) Sailers' Company v. Jay, 3 Ad. &E., N. S. 109.

(j) The same law seems to be generally applicable to natural and artificial watercourses; Mayor v. Chad-wick, 3 Per. & Dav. 367; 11 Ad. & E. 571; unless the latter be made for particular and temporary purposes: see, as to mining adits, Ark-wright v. Gell, 5 Mee. & W. 203; and see also Wood v. Waud, 3 Exch. R. 748; as to rights of fishing in natural watercourses, see Lamb v. Newbiggin, 1 Car. & K. 549; the presumption is, that each riparian proprietor has a right to fish the stream in front of his own land: see, on the general subject, the authorities cited in the judgment in Wood v. Waud, ubi supra.

(k) Per Parke, B., 1 C. M. & R. 219.

(l) Sect. 2.

Claims of rights of common and other profits a prendre (o), become prima facie valid after thirty years' uninterrupted enjoyment, and cannot be defeated by mere proof of such enjoyment having commenced at any prior period; but, until sixty years' uninterrupted enjoyment, they remain liable to be defeated in any other way in which they might have been defeated before the passing of the Act (p); after sixty years' uninterrupted enjoyment they become absolute and indefeasible, unless proof be given of such enjoyment having been under some consent or agreement expressly made or given for that purpose by deed or writing (q).

From what has been previously said, it would appear that the period for which a vendor, in order to show a title under the Act, must prove uninterrupted enjoyment, is as follows: viz., twenty years in the case of lights; forty years in the case of ways, waters, watercourses, and other easements (except lights); and sixty years in the case of rights of common and other profits a prendre: but, in the second class of cases, where the land or water which is sought to be affected by the easement has, during the period of enjoyment, been held for life, or for any term exceeding three years, the reversioner, notwithstanding the expiration of the forty years, has a period of three years from the determination of the particular estate in which to resist the claim (r); so that unless, (as can seldom he the case,) the vendor can show the title to the land or water, he cannot, by evidence of enjoyment, make a good title to the easement (s); and enjoyment which gives no title as against the reversioner, gives no title as against the owner of the particular estate (t). As respects the easement of light, however, the case seems to be different; there being no similar reservation in the statute of the rights of reversioners.