This section is from the book "A Compendium Of The Law And Practice Of Vendors And Purchasers Of Real Estate", by J. Henry Dart. Also available from Amazon: A compendium of the law and practice of vendors and purchasers of real estate.
The purchasers from mere statutory owners under the above Act arc also liable to pay the costs of the purchase or taking of the lands, or which shall have been incurred in consequence thereof (x), other than such costs as are otherwise provided for by the Act, and the costs of the interim and permanent investment (y) of the moneys deposited (z), and of the necessary applications to the Court for such investment, and for payment of the income, and for payment out of Court of the principal (upon any person becoming absolutely entitled thereto) (a); but those cases are excepted where the moneys are so deposited by reason of the wilful refusal of the party entitled thereto to receive the same, or to convey or release the lands, or by reason of the wilful neglect of any party to make out a good title to the land required (b); nor does the liability extend to such and costs of re-investing purchase-money, and for payment. of it out of Court.
Counties Railway Company v. Tuff-nell, 3 Rail. Ca. 133; as to payment, out of the fund in Court, of such costs as the purchasers under a private act are not liable to pay, see Ex parte Pasmore, Ex parte Long-field, and Ex parte Towgood; Re London Bridge Acts, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 75, 79, and 588; and see In re The Bishop of Salisbury, 16 L. T. 122.
(a?) Sect. 80. This has been held to include the costs of a reference in lunacy as to the propriety of the sale; In re Taylor, 1 Mac. & G. 210; and to have a retrospective effect, where old companies are amalgamated under an Act embodying the general Act: Ex parte Eton College, 16 L. T. 121.
(y) Including the broker's commission on the purchase of stock for interim investment; Ex parte Corporation of Trinity House, 3 Ha. 95; costs of interim investment are not given against the company under private acts, which contain no express provision on the subject; Ex parte Cooke, 7 Jur. 639, V. C. E.; Ex parte Crober, 13 Jur. 481, V. C. E. (z) See 69th and 80th sections of the Act: " wilful" refusal or neglect means, that which arises from mere will or caprice, and not from an exercise of reason: Ex parte Bradsham, 16 Sim. 174; see, however, Elliott v. Turner, 13 Sim. 477, 485. Where a private act omitted to provide for the costs consequent on payment of the money into Court by reason of the title being doubtful, the Court refused to throw such costs on a public body purchasing under the Act: Ex parte Angell; Re Trinity House Lighthouse Act, 4 Y. & C. 496.
(a) See, as to the costs of such applications under private acts, Ex parte Marshall, 1 Ph. 560; Ex parte Molynevx, 2 Coll. 273, and cases there cited; Ex parte Gore Langton, 11 Jur. 686; Ex parte Thoroton, 12 Jur. 130; Ex parte Crober, 13 Jur. 481; Ex parte Slater's Devisees, 5 Rail. Ca. 700; Ex parte the Rector of Loughton, 14 Jur. 102.
(b) See note (z).
What limit to liability.
(c) Sect. 80; see Ex parte Palmer,
13 Jur. 781; and Hore v. Smith,
14 Jur. 55; Ex parte Smith, 6 Rail. Ca. 150; 5. C, 19 L. J., N. S., Ch. 56.
(d) See, upon similar clauses in private acts, Ex parte the Earl of Hardwicke, 12 Jur. 508; In re Yeates, 12 Jur. 279; Ex parte Trafford, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 522; Ex parte Northwick, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 166.
(e) See Ex parte Hodge, 16 Sim. 159; Ex parte Lord Palmerston, 4 Rail. Ca. 57, n.
(f) And see Ex parte Tetley, 4 Rail. Ca. 55; see, also, Ex parte Newton, 4 Y. & C. 518, where extra costs occasioned by the peculiarity of the contract, and which were not considered payable by the company, were directed to be paid out of the fund in Court.
(g) Re Branmer's Estate, 14 Jur. 236.
(h) Jones v. Lewis, 1 De G. & S. 245, and 11 Jur. 511; and see Ex parte Middle Clayton Trust, 16 L. T. 123.
But general expressions referring to costs to be incurred in consequence of the sale, or the proposal for the sale, or the taking of the land, whether occurring in an Act of Parliament or a private agreement (k), will not throw upon the purchasers the costs of reinvestment.
The purchaser, it appears, may generally (l), although not universally (m), require the vendor to get in, at his own expense, outstanding estates or incumbrances, by deeds distinct from the conveyance; or, if that course be not adopted, he may at least require him to bear the increased expense occasioned by the concurrence of trustees and incumbrancers in the conveyance. When an estate was subject to incumbrances, which, to save expense, were got in by separate deeds, and paid off out of the purchase-money, the Court considered that the purchaser should have insisted upon the vendor preparing the deeds, and furnishing an abstract of them, (delaying the execution of them, it is presumed, until such abstract was approved and the engrossed deeds themselves were examined by the purchaser); and that the latter, having laid the drafts of these deeds before Counsel to peruse and settle on his behalf, could not throw the expenses upon parties who were liable to pay his costs properly incurred (n).
General expressions not sufficient to throw costs of reinvestment on purchasers.
Vendor bears additional expenses when estate is incumbered, etc.
(i) See Ex parte Boxmoor Trus-tees, 3 Rail. Ca. 513; In re St. Ka-therine Dock Company, ibid. 514; In re Merchant Tailors' Company and London Bridge Act, 10 Beav. 485, where the costs of a fourth and last re-investment were allowed, the balance sought to be invested being only 63l.: Ex parte the Rector of Lough ton, 14 Jur. 102, where the amount of the second investment was only 6l., part of a balance of 20l. 9s. 5d., and the Court directed the balance to be paid to the purchaser, and fixed the company with the costs: and see Jones v. Lewis, 2 Mac. & G. 163, where it was held (reversing the decision of V.C. K. B.) that the vendors were entitled to an unlimited number of re-investments, unless made vexa-tiously, or in an unreasonable exercise of the direction to invest: and the reasoning of the Court would seem to apply to cases within the Lands Clauses Act.
 
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