(y) 3 Bos. & P. 578; Sug. 1044. (z) Hodgson v. Bean, 2 Sim. & St. 221; affirmed, see Sug. 1048.

(a) See and consider 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 5.

(b) Bugden v. Bignold, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 377.

(c) See Hitchcox v. Sedgwick, on appeal, Sug. 1051.

(d) Sug. 1017.

(e) 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 7.

(f) Miles v. Lamgley, 1 Russ. & M. 39.

(g) See Hanbury v. Litchfield, 2 Myl. & K. 633, and 1 Ha. 62.

(h) Alt.-Gen. v. Backhouse, 17 Ves. 293.

(i) See Borell v. Dann, 2 Ha. 440. 450.

(k) See Att.-Gen. v. Pargeter, 6 Beav. 150.

(l) Sug. 1056.

So, probably, the mere fact of attesting the execution of a deed will not fix the witness with notice of its contents (r); nor, where a purchaser is informed of the existence of an instrument which may, but does not neces-sarily, affect the property, and he is assured that the instrument does not affect that property, but relates to other property, and he, acting fairly and honestly, believes such statement, and it turns out that he is misled, and that the instrument does relate to the property, will he be fixed with a notice of its contents (s): nor will a purchaser be affected by an ambiguous recital (t); or by circumstances inducing merely a suspicion of fraud (u); or by the usual trusts of a term assigned to attend the inheritance (w), where no reference is made to any particular instrument or course of limitations: so, notice of there being a change in the solicitors who are professionally to represent a particular interest, is not, in itself, notice of a change in the ownership of such interest (x).

(m) See White v. Wakefield, 7 Sim. 401.

(n) See Oxwick v. Plumer, Bac. Abr. Mortgage, E, s. 3; and see 1 Ha. 63.

(o) Plumb v. Fluitt, 2 Anstr. 432; Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Ves. 174; and see 1 Ha. 63, and 5 Ha. 279.

(p) Worthington v. Morgan, 16 Sim. 547; see Dryden v. Frost, 3 Myl. & Cr. 670.

(q) See Cothay v. Sydenham, 2 Bro. C. C. 391.

(r) See Sug. 1060, and cased cited.

(s) See Jones v. Smith, 1 Phil. 244, 253; and see West v. Reid, 2 Ha. 260.

(t) Kenney v. Browne, 3 Ridg. P. C. 512; and see 2 Ha. 175.

(u) Sug. 1058; M'Queen v. Far-quhar, 11 Ves. 467.

(w) Sug. 1058.

In a modern case, where the legatee of a legacy charged on land, assigned it for value, and then, without the concurrence of the assignee, joined in mortgaging the estates first to A. and then to B., the latter mortgage being expressed to be, "subject to prior incumbrances," but B. had no notice of the assignment of the legacy, and the mortgagors did not appear to have intended to include it among "prior incumbrances," B. was held to have priority of the assignee (y).

And it appears that, as a general rule, the mere omission to make those inquiries which a prudent, cautious, and wary person would ordinarily make, is not, in itself, sufficient to fix a bond fide purchaser with notice of what he might have ascertained by making such inquiry (z): the fact of the conveyance being in consideration of a preexisting debt, would, of course, induce a doubt whether the purchaser were acting bond fide; but the Courts seem generally disinclined to extend the doctrine of constructive notice (a).

The purchaser, (although an infant purchasing under the sanction of a Court of Equity (b),) is bound by notice to his counsel (c), solicitor, or agent (d), or, perhaps, trustee (e), if acquired either in the same transaction, or in a prior transaction but under circumstances which satisfy the Court that the notice must have been recollected (f):the presumption against such recollection would, no doubt, be stronger in the case of counsel than of a solicitor (g); and, even as respects a solicitor, there seems to be a difficulty in holding that a purchaser, employing one who has not acted for the vendor, can be affected by notice acquired by him previous to retainer (h).

Purchaser not bound to use excessive caution.

Notice to counsel, solicitor or agent is notice to purchaser.

(x) West v. Reid, 2 Ha. 249.

(y) Greenwood v. Churchill, 6 Beav. 314.

(z) See 1 Phil. 257.

(a) See 1 Phil. 254; 1 J. & L. 441; Sug. 1054; but see Worthing-ton v. Moryan, 16 Sim. 547, and Penny v. Watts, 1 Mac. & G. 150.

(6) Toulmin v. Steere, 3 Mer. 210.

(c) Sheldon v. Cox, Amb. 624.

(d) Toulmin v. Steere, ubi supra.

(e) Wise v. Wise, 2 J. & L. 403.

(f) Hargreaves v. Rothwell, 1 Keen, 154; Brothers v. Bence, Fitz. 118; Perkins v. Bradley, 1 Ha. 219 (in which two cases the solicitor was his own client in the later transaction); Fuller v. Bennett, 2 Ha. 394; and see Tylee v. Webb, 6 Beav. 552.

And, as a general rule, the purchaser is equally affected with notice although the solicitor, etc, be also employed by the vendor (i), or be himself the vendor (k); it was decided by Lord Brougham, in opposition to the opinion of Sir J. Leach, that a client is not to be affected with notice of a prior fraud committed by his solicitor, which the latter would, of course, conceal (l); this decision may, perhaps, be thought to be inconsistent with others, in which it has been held, that a mortgagee, employing the mortgagor as his counsel or solicitor, is affected with notice of a prior, and, as against the client-mortgagee,- which is sufficient to bring the case within Lord Brougham's reasoning,--fraudulent incumbrance created by such mortgagor (m): notice to a town or country agent would, in general, be notice to the principal solicitor (n); but, probably, the mere fact of the purchaser's solicitor allowing, (from motives of private friendship,) the vendor's solicitor to transact, for his own benefit, the principal part of the business which is usually done by the former, would not be sufficient to constitute an agency (o).

Although solicitor, etc. is employed by both parties, or is himself the vendor.

(g) See 5 Jarm. Conv. by S. 490.

(h) See Fuller v. Bennett, 2 Ha. 394, 404, and Lord Cottenham's remark as to Mr. Wightwick's evidence in Wilde v. Gibson, 1 H. L. C. 624.

(i) Le Neve v. Le Neve, 3 Atk.; see p. 648; Dryden v. Frost, 3 M. & C. 670.

(k) See Sheldon v. Cox, Amb. 624; Dryden v. Frost, ubi supra.

(l) Kennedy v. Green, 3 Myl. & K. 699.

(m) Sheldon v. Cox, Amb. 624; Marjoribanks v. Hovenden, 6 Ir. Eq. Rep. 238; but see Kendall v. Hulls, 11 Jur. 864.

(n) See and consider Norris v. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 37; Sug. 1041.

(o) See Kendall v. Hulls, 11 Jur. 864.

For the purpose of fixing a purchaser with notice, the evidence of his counsel, solicitor (p), or (probably) certificated conveyancer (q), respecting confidential (r) professional communications, is inadmissible; and the rule includes the clerk of the professional adviser (s), and the agent employed by the solicitor (t); but not (it would appear) an unprofessional agent employed by the purchaser himself (u), unless he be used merely as the medium of communication with the professional adviser (w): and the privilege extends to communications made by an unprofessional agent to the professional adviser (x); but the rule does not include a solicitor whom the purchaser consults, not professionally, but as a friend, agent, or steward (y); nor a person whom he consults as, and supposing him to be, a solicitor, but who is not so in fact (z); nor, where the same solicitor is employed by both parties, does it extend to communications which the purchaser makes to him as solicitor for the vendor (a); nor to communications made to the solicitor from collateral quarters (b); but it extends to all communications which take place between the purchaser and his solicitor (as such) with reference to the purchase (c), and to documents belonging to the purchaser which he leaves with his solicitor (d); nor does the privilege cease by reason of the professional adviser acquiring a personal interest in the property to the title of which the confidential communication related (e).

Professional confidential communications, notice not to be proved by.

(p) See Parkhurst v. Lowten, 2 Sw. 194.

(q) See Cromack v. Heathcote, 2 Bro. & Bing. 4; Gresley on Ev. 380, 2nd ed.

(r) Walsh v. Trevanion, 15 Sim. 577.

(s) Taylor v. Forster, 2 C. & P. 195.

(t) Steele v. Stewart, 1 Ph. 471.

(u) Kerr v. Gillespie, 7 Beav. 572; and see 1 Ph. 693.

(w) Reid v. Langlois, 1 Mac. & G. 627.

(x) Carpmael v. Powis, 1 Ph. 687.

(y) See Wilson v. Rastall, 4 Durn. & E. 753, 759; Greenlaw v. King, 1

Beav. 137; and see Blenkinsopp v. Blenkinsopp, 10 Beav. 277; reversed on further evidence, 2 Phil. 607. (z) Fountain v. Young, 6 Esp. 113.

(a) See Perry v. Smith, 9 M. & W. 681.

(b) Sawyer v. Birchmore, 3 Myl. & K. 572. A map of the estate which the owner leaves with his solicitor for the purpose of effecting a sale is not privileged; Doe d. Marriott v. Lord Hertford, 13 Jur. 632.

(c) See Carpmael v. Powis, 1 Ph. 692; Herring v. Clobery, 1 Ph. 91; Jones v. Pugh, 1 Ph. 96; as to forms of the demurrer, see Walsh v. Trevanion, 15 Sim. 577.

And it appears that even the purchaser himself will not, if a suit be instituted against him, be bound to produce letters written, or cases stated for the opinion of counsel, either by himself or his solicitor, with a view either to that suit or even to a suit with third parties, if respecting the same matter and involving the same question to which such letters and cases relate; nor, a fortiori, the opinions obtained on such letters and cases (f); and, according to recent decisions, the same privilege seems to exist in favour of cases laid before counsel with reference to a known defect in title, although not with any view to threatened litigation (g): but, of course, an opinion which in effect was taken for the joint benefit of the party seeking and the party refusing production is not protected (h).

As to the effect of notice when established; - It may be laid down, as a general rule, that a purchaser with notice, is, in Equity, "bound to the same extent, and in the same manner as the person was of whom he purchased (i):" for Nor will purchaser be obliged to produce cases, opinions, etc.