Equity will enforce specific performance of the contract for sale, against the vendor himself, and also against, first, persons claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract; (except purchasers for valuable consideration who have paid their money and taken a conveyance without notice of the original contract): e. g., his assignees in bankruptcy (b), or committees in lunacy (c), or voluntary alienees (d), or judgment creditors (e), or the after-taken wife or husband of the vendor (f), or the vendor's alienees for value, (if they purchased with notice of the prior contract (g), or have not taken a conveyance (h),) or, (in case of his death,) against his real or personal representatives, (according to the nature of the estate contracted for): and secondly, persons claiming under a title which, although prior to the contract and known to the purchaser, might have been displaced by a conveyance by the vendor: e. g., voluntary alienees (i); wife entitled to freebench, (if, as is the case in most manors, her title depends upon her husband dying seised) (k); dowress who married since the late Dower Act came into operation (l); and remaindermen, or cestuis que trust, in cases where the vendor has contracted in due exercise of a power or pursuant to a trust (m): subject, nevertheless, to these exceptions; viz., that the contract of a tenant in tail who dies before executing the conveyance, does not affect the interests of the issue in tail or remaindermen (n); and that the contract of a trustee will not be enforced if the attendant circumstances constituted it a breach of trust (o).

Enforced against vendor, and parties claiming under him by subsequent title, (except purchasers without notice); and against parties claiming under a prior title, which he might have displaced by conveyance.

(b) Orlebar v. Fletcher, 1 P. Wms. 737; Taylor v. Wheeler, 2 Ver. 564; and see 2 Ves. sen. 633; Parker v. Smith, 1 Coll. 608.

(c) Shelf. on Lun. 564; 1 Will. IV. c. 65, s. 27.

(d) See Hinton v. Hinton, 2 Ves. sen. 631, 633.

(e) Brunt on v. Neale, 14 L. J., N. S., L. C. 8.

(f) See 2 Ves. sen. 633.

(g) Daniels v. Davison, 16 Ves. 249; Lightfoot v. Heron, 3 You. & C. 586; Cutis v. Thodey, 1 Coll. 223; Potter v. Sanders, 6 Ha. 1.

(h) As to which, vide supra, 392.

(i) Buckle v. Mitchell, 18 Ves. 100; Metcalfe v. Pulvertoft, 1 Ves. & B. 180; Willats v. Busby, 5 Beav. 193: but the voluntary settlor, if he contract to sell the estate, cannot himself enforce specific performance; Smith v. Garland, 2 Mer. 123; Johnson v. Legard, Turn. & R. 281.

(k) Hinton v. Hinton, 2 Ves. sen. 631; Brown v. Raindle, 3 Ves. 256.

(l)] 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 105, ss. 4 & 5.

The contract by a married woman, either with or with-out her husband's concurrence, for the sale of her real estate not settled to her separate use or appointment, (other than her chattels real,) (p) is incapable of being enforced against her (q): nor will it, although signed with the husband's concurrence and in his presence, bind any interest which he may then unknowingly have, or subsequently acquire, in the property (r): if, having a power of appointment, she enter into a contract executed with the formalities required by the power (s), or if, as respects estate settled merely to her separate use with no restraint on anticipation, she enter into such a contract as would bind her if a feme sole (t), the estate, it is conceived, in either case is bound, although no decree can be made against her personally (u): and even in the case of an agreement in exercise of a power, the want of mere formalities, may, it seems, be supplied; e. g., where a married woman having a power to appoint by deed enters into a contract not under seal, specific performance may be decreed (w); but this, it is conceived would not be the case where the omission went to the substance of the power, or consisted in the want of formalities which were intended for her protection (x).

Contract for sale of married wo-man's estate, when capable of being enforced.

(m) Mortlock v. Buller, 10 Ves. 315; Dowell v. Dew, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 345; and see cases cited, supra, 461, n. (a).

(n) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, s. 47; and see, as to the same being the rule before the Act, Frank v. Mainwaring, 2 Beav. 115; Sug. 227.

(o) Mortlock v. Buller, 10 Ves. 292; White v. Cuddon, 8 Cl. & Fin. 766.

(p) As to which see next paragraph.

(q) Emery v. Wase, 5 Ves. 846; Davidson v. Gardner, Sug. 230; Aylett v. Ashton, 1 Myl. & Cr. 105; see Lassenee v. Tierney, 1 Mac. & G. 572.

(r) Aylett v. Ashton, 1 Myl. & Cr. 105.

(s) See Sug. 230, n. (p); Martin v. Mitchell, 2 Jac. & W. 425.

(t) Stead v. Nelson, 2 Beav. 245.

(u) Nantes v. Corrock, 9 Ves. 189; Aylett v. Ashton, 1 Myl. & Cr. 112; Francis v. Wigzell, 1 Madd. 258.

It does not appear to be settled (y), whether the husband's contract to sell the term for years, (whether legal or equitable,) of his wife, would bind her surviving: some early authorities are in favour of the purchaser (z); but, in recent decisions, so strong an inclination has been shown to limit the husband and his alienees to their strict legal rights, that it may be reasonably conjectured that the wife surviving would not be bound (a).

In one case (b) a question arose, but was not decided, as to whether the wife surviving may adopt her husband's contract for sale of her real estate.

And the vendor's contract will, of course, not be enforced against persons claiming under a prior title which he himself could not have displaced by a conveyance; e.g., a dowress under the old law, or a wife seised of an estate of inheritance; nor will the contract of a tenant for life be enforced against the trustees of the reversion who are empowered but decline to sell at his request (c).

So, the contract for purchase will be enforced against the purchaser himself, his committees in lunacy (d), and real and personal representatives. If he become bankrupt, his assignees have the option of abandoning the contract or of completing it, (paying, of course, the entire amount due for purchase-money,) and the vendor may, by application to the Court, compel them to make their election (e). It is however conceived, that if, (as might sometimes happen, e. g., in the case of house property destroyed by fire after the contract,) the vendor were willing to convey the estate and to prove under the bankruptcy for the purchase-money, he would have a right to do so. Where the purchaser, having paid part of the purchase-money, becomes insolvent, and his assignees, upon a bill being filed against them, disclaim, the Court will declare the representatives of the vendor absolutely entitled to the estate (f).

Whether wife surviving is barred by husband's contract for sale of her chattels real.

Whether she may adopt his contract.

Vendor's contract cannot be enforced against parties claiming under prior absolute title.

Purchaser's contract will be enforced against him(w) See Stead v. Nelson, ubi supra; Dowell v. Dew, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 345.

(x) See Lassence v. Tierney, 1 Mac. & G. 551, 572.

(y) See the query of V. C. K. Bruce, in Clark v. Burgh, 2 Coll. 226.

(z) See Stead v. Cragh, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 37, 130; and Lord Eldon's re-marts in Bruce v. Denison, 6 Ves. 394.

(a) See Sturgis v. Champneys, 5 Myl. & Cr. 97; Ehvyn v. Williams, 7 Jur. 337; Ashby v. Ashby, 1 Coll. 553; Newenham v. Pemberton, 1 De G. & S. 644; Whittle v. Henning, 2 Ph. 731.

(b) Humphreys v. Hollis, Jac. 76. (c) Thomas v. Bering, 1 Keen,729

(d) Shelford on Lunacy, 564 Sug. 233.

A married woman's separate estate may be liable under her contract for purchase; but the vendor's suit must be directed specifically against such separate estate, and should not seek a decree against her personally (g).