200. Each man is at once profoundly unitary and almost infinitely composite.

201. I believe that the unifying principle of his personality is an indwelling soul, and that souls have actually been observed in operation apart from the organisms which they possess, both while those organisms are still living and after they have decayed.

202. Our aim must be to draw from a study of the disintegrations of human personality some hints which may tend towards its more complete integration.

203. We shall have to discuss consciousness in various ways, and we shall find it convenient to use the word conscious as equivalent to potentially memorable. That will be in our view a conscious act which we imagine as capable of forming under any conceivable circumstances (not necessarily on this planet) a link in a mnemonic chain. We must, therefore, feel no prepossession against any given arrangement or division of the total mass of consciousness which exists within us.

204. As to the mode of original integration of consciousness up to the human level science can tell us nothing; we must wait for the discovery of laws affecting the spiritual world.

205. We have, therefore, no right to assume that all our psychical operations will fall at the same time, or at any time, into the same central current of perception. More probably natural selection has determined what elements shall rise above the conscious threshold. In processes of disintegration these needed elements sink below the threshold again.

206. The series of these degenerations seems to pass tbrcigh a certain critical point where the demarcation between the phases of personality is sufficiently marked to involve a trance-state in passing from one to the other. We begin with minor and partial disaggregations - insistent ideas and the like.

207. These fixed ideas show themselves amenable to psychological rather than to physiological treatment, and are best described as small displacements of the normal level of voluntary control. 207 A. Janet's cases of forgotten terrors giving rise to hysterical attacks.

208. They thus lead up to hysteria, which consists essentially in an undue "permeability of the psychical diaphragm," or confused interchange of elements which should lie above and elements which should lie below the threshold of waking consciousness.

209. In hysteria the field of consciousness is narrowed, so that hysterical anaesthesia is not a real loss of sensibility, but a mere distraction of attention from the affected part.

210. Anaesthetic patches are determined not by anatomical demarcations, but by caprices of the hypnotic stratum - dream-like self-suggestions emanating from partially intelligent subliminal centres.

211. The fragments of perceptive power over which the hysteric has lost control still exist below the threshold, and are capable of being again raised by suggestion into waking consciousness.

212. Example from the recovery by hysterics of their normal field of vision on the presentation of an exciting object.

213. Examples of the partial regression of specific senses in the hysteric to the vagueness of primitive irritability.

214. Similar dissociation of the sense of personality from purposive movements.

215. But a hysteric who squeezes the dynamometer like a weak child can exert great muscular force under the influence of emotion.

216. Hysteria, however, does not necessarily show initial weakness of mind. It may result from the shock of painful circumstances upon natures originally intelligent and refined.

217. Case of Miss Lucy R., as given by Drs. Breuer and Freud.

218. Case of Fraulein Anna O., by the same physicians.

219. Gradual transformation of hysterical malady in this case into a secondary personality.

220. The subliminal convictions or fixed ideas which become morbid when they are encysted in the mind may become sources of power and influence when they are worked in with the products of supraliminal reason, as in martyrs, reformers, &c.

221. From these cases of isolation of certain emotional groups from the psychical complex I pass on to more profound cleavages; - our best starting point for the study of these lies among the phenomena of dreams - especially in their dramatic character. 221 A. R. L. Stevenson's dream of possessing a double personality.

222. In some cases the new personality seems a dramatisation of some dominant morbid emotion. 222 A. Janet's case of "demoniacal possession".

223. Somnambulisms, developing from accesses of sleep-waking, may merge into dimorphic personalities. 223 A. Dyce's case. 223 B. Mesnet's case.

224. Somewhat similar are post-epileptic alternations of personality. 224 A. Case of Sörgel.

225. Other alternations - though possibly post-epileptic in origin - seem dimorphic or allotropic rather than degenerative. 225 A. Case of Ansel Bourne in which the memory of the secondary state was recovered through hypnotism.

226. Two similar cases, in which the secondary state was perhaps to be referred to a form of hysteria. 226 A. Proust's case. 226 B. Boeteau's case.

227. Case reported by Sidis in which an accident was followed by amnesia and the development of two personalities.

228. A case of the "ambulatory" type, apparently associated with a definite physical lesion. 228 A. Drewry's case.

229. In some cases the alternating state seems due to lack of sufficient vitality to maintain the normal personality without intermission. 229 A. Skae's case.

230. Allied with these degenerative alternations are the factitious alternations which are developed in hysterical persons by hypnotic suggestion or self-suggestion. Janet's cases: 230 A. Léonie; 230 B. Lucie. 230 C. Jules Janet's case: Marceline R.

231. In other cases the secondary state is in some ways an improvement on the primary. 231 A. Case of Félida X. 231 B. Barrett's case.

232. In the case of Mary Reynolds, the second state showed a childish gaiety and insouciance, and the two states gradually coalesced into a third phase superior to both. 232 A. Details of the case.

233. An extreme example of dissociations dependent on time-relations; complex ecmnesia with subjacent hypermnesia. 233 A. Case of Louis Vivé.

234. Example of a subliminal self showing a grotesque hostility to the ordinary self. 234 A. Morton Prince's case of "Sally Beauchamp".

235. Osgood Mason's case of Alma Z., in whom the recurring secondary personality was always associated with immediate and marked improvement in the physical condition.

236. In the case of Mollie Fancher, there were several secondary personalities with a childish character fitted to each; and her case shows indications of supernormal faculty. 236 A. Newbold's review of the case.

237. The case of Anna Winsor presents a contrast and conflict between positive insanity on the part of the organism generally with wise and watchful sanity on the part of a single limb) - the right arm - which appeared to become the permanent possession of the sane secondary personality. 237 A. Barrows' report on the case.

238. The "Watseka Wonder" must be regarded as a pseudo-possession determined by suggestion in a hysterical child. 238 A. Details of the case.

239. This series illustrates the complex and separable nature of the elements of human personality. Hysteria the most delicate form of psychical dissection.

240. Hysteria exhibits acquisitions as well as losses of faculty.

241. If the elements of emergence increase, and the elements of submergence diminish, the permeability of the psychical diaphragm may mean genius instead of hysteria.

242. And the sleeping phase may develop into sleep-waking conditions with manifestations of submerged faculty, which hypnotism can fix and utilise.

243. As the hysteric stands in relation to ordinary men, so do we ordinary men stand in relation to a not impossible ideal of sanity and integration.

244. We may be as unable to conceive of the ideal beyond us as the hysteric is unable to conceive, except by fitful flashes, our normal sanity.

245. We have, at any rate, learnt the lesson of our profound modifiability; and we have seen that it is by appeals to the subliminal self that we have the best chance of being modified in the directions that we desire.