§ 1. Introductory. — The apprehension of temporal relations, as they exist for human consciousness, is an extremely complex product of mental development. The part played in it by ideal representation is of predominant importance. Without ideal representation there could be no such thing as the definite apprehension of a timeseries, having a distinguishable beginning and end, connected by a train of intermediate events, each having its own position in the series determined by its relation to other events which come before and after it. For perceptual consciousness it is evident that time cannot exist in this form. On the other hand, we find in perceptual consciousness those primary experiences on which our developed apprehension of time is ultimately based.

§ 2. Immediate Experience of Time Transience.— The first fact we have to take account of is that consciousness itself is a process in time. We must here avoid two opposing fallacies. On the one hand, it must be sharply and distinctly recognised that transition of one conscious state into another is by no means identical with the perception of this transition. The mere fact that B follows A in consciousness does not of itself constitute the consciousness of B as following A. On the other hand, we must not jump to the conclusion that because the sequence AB is not in itself the cognition of that sequence, it is therefore not experienced at all in any way. We must distinguish between consciousness of change or duration, and changeconsciousness or durationconsciousness. Change in consciousness may be felt without being cognised as change, and duration may also be felt without being cognised as duration. Even in a consciousness which has no distinct perception of temporal relations, experience would be different according as change took place in it rapidly or slowly, suddenly or gradually, and the like. Without an immediate changeexperience, "cognition of change would be impossible for lack of presentative material. The thought of succession in time must be based on the direct experience of timetransience, as the thought of red colour is based on the corresponding sensation. As the perception or idea of colourquality is impossible to the blind, so the perception or idea of change would be impossible to a being without the changesentience."*

* Analytic Psychology, vol. i., p. 160. Psych