But we may conclude from a statement of Vigouroux, who excludes the deltoid muscle from the law of neuro-muscular activity, that the thing is not so plain. Gilles de la Tourette also states that the results were only attained after long previous experiment. But, however great may have been the tendency occasioned by the rise of the Nancy school to deny the occurrence of the physical reflexes mentioned above, defenders of those reflexes continue to crop up from time to time, and quite distinct from Charcot's own pupils.

Among these we must reckon Obersteiner, who describes the following experiment performed on himself: - "When I was in light hypnosis and the skin of my hand on the ulnar side was stroked, I expected that the little finger would be bent; instead of that, to my surprise, it was abducted. As a matter of fact, beneath the irritated portion of the skin lay not the flexor, but the abductor digiti minimi, of which, in my half-sleeping state, I had not thought." However exact this statement may be, I would not accept it as an argument against the suggestive origin of contractures. That Obersteiner, after hypnosis was over, believed he had not thought of the abductor proves nothing, for there might very well have been a deception of memory. Even if we admit that this was not the case, Obersteiner knew the exact position of the muscle, although the fact never came into consciousness during hypnosis. I may here refer to the sub-consciousness which I shall have to speak of more particularly later on. We shall then find that experiences that we have once gone through, but which have momentarily become unconscious, may still influence our action.

For this reason Obersteiner's experiment is not an unconditional proof of his view.

Schaffer, also, has attempted, in a very exhaustive work, to demonstrate the existence of physical reflexes in hypnosis. He was able to produce • contractures by various sensory stimuli, by stimulation not only of touch, but of the ear, and especially of the retina. In unilateral stimulation the contractures always appeared on the stimulated side. Schaffer believes that he has excluded suggestion. In bilateral stimulation the contractions appeared on both sides. When one side was made anaesthetic, sensory stimuli on that side were inoperative. On the other hand, Schaffer could also produce-, contractions by suggesting any sensory impression. The same thing then happened as if the sensory stimulus had really been applied. On the ground of this observation, Schaffer concluded that the reflex path is through the cerebral cortex; yet he does not consider himself justified in admitting suggestion. Schaffer also points out that Laufenauer and Hogyes have established the existence of neuro-muscular and senso-muscular hyper-excitability under conditions in which suggestion was excluded. The mere use of the term "suggestion " is certainly no proof of the inaccuracy of all these investigations.

For even if, as often happens, due attention is not paid to suggestion as a possible source of error, we have no right to ascribe everything straightway to suggestion; on the other hand, Schaffer gives us no definite proof of the absence of suggestion in the production of the reflexes in question.

There is another point which I must also discuss, and which seems to tell against the mental origin of many of the phenomena. Schaffer endeavours in his work to weaken one of the arguments brought forward by me against the cdnception that the phenomena are induced by physical means. Now, we saw in the fourth experiment (p. 35) that during deep hypnosis the subject could only be influenced by one persop, the experimenter with whom he was en rapport, as the phrase goes. As we here saw, the experimenter alone could induce contractures, attempts at stimulation by other persons were unavailing. Charcot's pupils also mention this phenomenon. They state that during the somnambulic stage only the few persons who are en rapport with the hynoptized subject can influence the latter's muscles by stimulating his skin. That the contractures should arise without participation of consciousness would be incomprehensible. Against this, Schaffer asserts that in his experiments any one could induce the contractures. That would apparently tell in favour of the upholders of physical influence. To this we may reply as follows: - All the cages in which contracture can only be induced by the experimenter prove that mental influence is at work.

It very far from follows that suggestion plays no part in all those cases .in which, in spite of the rapport existing between subject and experimenter, other persons can also induce contractures. Here, as is so frequently the case, we have to deal with the fact that a hypnotized subject may be trained to respond unconsciously - or, to express it better, subconsciously - to certain influences which may be exerted by all those present.

Schaffer having with particular acumen brought about a discussion of the question whether we have to do with reflex action or suggestion, it is necessary, if we would avoid any misunderstanding, to point out that physiologists very often associate two sorts of reflexes - the physical and the mental.

. In order to make this clear I must say a few words about reflex action. We understand by reflex action of the muscles that action which is induced by excitation of a sensory nerve, without the co-operation of the will. When an insect flies into the eye, the latter closes; this closing is reflex because it is involuntarily. Let. us take the following case: - I touch the eye of a person, A,; the eye closes in consequence by reflex action, without the participation of A.'s will. I now bring my hand near to the eye of another person, B.; long before it is touched it closes, and does so against B.'s will. The closing of B.'s eye is also reflex action; the stimulation here affects the nerves of sight. And yet there is a difference between the two cases.. While in the case of A. no mental action is necessary to produce the reflex, in the case of B. it is otherwise. He shuts his eye because he imagines it will be touched - at least, this is the general opinion. If B. puts his own finger near his eye it does not close, because this idea does not then arise. In any case, a mental action takes place in B., but not in A. On this account we call the closing of B.'s eye a mental reflex, and A.'s a physical one.