Max Hirsch has proposed for such superficial conditions the term Captivation. Hirschlaff also would like to see the aforesaid conditions distinguished from hypnosis, and terms them pseudo-hypnotic. We might even agree with Hirschlaff on this point in spite of the fact that some of his theoretical explanations of the question raise considerable doubts in one's mind. It must, however, be pointed out that it is quite usual to find that the etymological signification of a word no longer covers all the uses to which it was originally applied, or that in time it gains a much wider meaning. I may refer to the word electricity, which now scarcely reminds any one of electron, amber. We need not stay to consider Bernheim's somewhat oracular statement that there is no such thing as hypnosis, but only suggestion. Pierre Janet has justly pointed out that because there are many transitions from the normal state to the hypnotic, we are not therefore entitled to say that there is no special condition of hypnosis.

A condition which, on waking, leaves no recollection behind, as in the fourth case, and in which the subject becomes a mere puppet in the hands of the experimenter, must be considered a condition altogether distinct from the normal.

One peculiar quality of consciousness we shall often find in hypnosis: what is called suggestibility; or, better, increased suggestibility. I shall so often use the word, and words connected with it, that it will be well to define exactly what is meant by it. For this purpose I must make a little digression, remarking at the same time that many works - excellent in their way - which have been written for the purpose of giving a clear definition of what is meant by suggestion, will not be dealt with by me at this juncture; but I may as well mention the names of certain authors in this connection: - Bernheim, Forel, William Hirsch, Bergmann, Lipps, Schrenck-Notzing, Parish, Vogt, Brodmann, Loewenfeld, Dollken, Hellpach, Hirschlaff, Sidis, Bechterew. The works of these and other authors are valuable from a psychological point of view, and I shall refer to them later on in the chapter dealing with the theory of hypnotism. It is not necessary for me to discuss them here at any length, as my object is to arrive at the briefest definition of suggestion possible.

Every concept in human beings has a particular action, which is to be recognized by an external or internal effect. For example, by the laws of association, one concept calls up another. The idea of St. Helena at once awakens that of Napoleon I.

This peculiar arousing of ideas by other ideas was called the law of suggestion by a great school of Scotch psychologists (Thomas Brown and others), and Paul Janet thinks that this expression induced Braid to introduce the term "to suggest" for an analogous phenomenon - the suggestion d' attitude which we shall discuss later on, - though Brandis used it earlier in his Psychische Hcilmitttl, to denote processes which ideas arouse during magnetic sleep.

A concept can, moreover, produce an effect by arousing feeling; if any one thinks of a dead relative, he feels grief, and the thought of a joyful event awakens a feeling of happiness. Inclinations are called up in the same way; the idea of an object for which one has a great longing awakens the desire to possess it. Sensations can also be produced in the same manner. We have an example in the itchings which many persons feel directly fleas are talked of. These ideas, feelings, sensations, and desires, aroused by another idea, form internal processes, which we recognize by internal experience. But an idea can have an effect which displays itself externally - for example, thoughts call up certain movements.

Let us here consider a proceeding which is called thought-reading, which, as the "willing game," was for a long time a favourite society game in England in a somewhat modified form, and which became popular in Germany through the exhibitions of Cumberland. A person A. is made to leave the room; among those who remain, B. is chosen to think of some object present, which A. is to find. A. comes back, takes B.'s hand and demands that he shall think steadfastly of the chosen object; let us say it is the lamp. B. thinks steadfastly of it, and it is seen that A. and B. go together towards the lamp, till A., pointing to it, says, "That was the object thought of." Simple as this process - explained by Beard, Gley, Richet, Obersteiner, Preyer, and known about sixty years ago to Chevreul and Braid - may be, it appeared enigmatical to many at first The usual explanation of thought-reading is the following: - B. thinks steadily of the place of the lamp, and has at the same time slight movements of the body, and particularly of the muscles of the arm, in the direction of the lamp. A. feels these muscular movements and follows them, he permits himself to be directed by them, and in this way finds the object thought of.

B., naturally, did not make the movements intentionally, consequently they were involuntary and unconscious. All the same, the movements were strong enough to show A. the way. This example shows us the following: - B. had a certain idea (namely, that of the lamp) in his head, and this concept called up the movements. The movement of the lips which occurs where one thinks intensely of a word, is of analogous character (Strieker).

We see, then, from the foregoing, that ideas aroused in us have an effect which sometimes shows itself as other concepts (ideas, sensations, and so forth), and sometimes externally as movement; in many cases, perhaps in all, there is both an internal and an external effect. What effect appears, what idea, what feeling, what movement will be induced by the first concept, depends upon the individuality of the person, upon his imagery, upon his character, his habits, and upon the species of the concept.

In many cases a person, A., is able to attain some particular effect intended, by rousing in B. a definite concept; and this effect is often obtained independently of B.'s will, or even against it We see an example of this in a juggler. He wants to take some object or other in his right hand without being seen by the public; to attain this he looks at another point - for example, his left hand. The eyes of the spectators involuntarily follow his. By glancing at his left hand the juggler has caused the spectators to look in the same direction. He has aroused in the spectators the idea that something is going on in his left hand; and this idea has had the effect of making the spectators look at his left hand. It is not at all necessary that the spectator should be conscious of the idea which is being impressed on him. Habit impels him to look in any direction indicated, without further consideration; and thus spectators are often induced to look in the direction desired by the joggler, in order that he may be able to change or hide some object unobserved.