IN the ordinary way this volume would not have required a preface, as the title-page speaks for itself, but a word or two is due to the reader in explanation of its disconnection from the series to which it naturally belongs. Originally I had intended to issue the whole of my works under the general title of the'History of Intellectual Development,' but I have been warned by my literary advisers that in doing so I should seriously prejudice their reception by the public, inasmuch as the common title given to each volume in succession was calculated to give the impression that no one volume could be read with full appreciation and understanding without a knowledge of those which had preceded it;.and besides, that the subjects with which I had dealt in Vol. III. being almost entirely problems of Politics and Society could not properly be said to fall under the designation of a History of Intellectual Development.

Now, when I projected this series, over a quarter of a century ago, what I proposed to myself was, to treat the subject-matter of each volume as a 'specialism,' and to keep each quite independent of every other, except in so far as all alike would be written from the new standpoint, which under the title of'A New Organon' I had explained at length in my first volume, 'Civilization and Progress,' and which was to be the keynote as it were of the whole. I have therefore decided to issue this volume simply as an independent treatise on Political Economy, although I wish it to be understood that it comes in its natural place in the series as originally projected. The point, however, on which I desire to concentrate the reader's attention, and which will explain, besides, why I have included in a book on Political Economy an. introductory chapter on 'the dangers of Specialism,' is the question of whether the'general thinker' or what in the old days was called the'philosopher,' is to be superseded by the 'specialist,' or not.

From the time of Comte, Guizot, Carlyle, and Emerson, down to that of Buckle, Kenan, and Taine, this 'general thinker' has been gradually falling into disrepute in literary and academic circles, until with the deaths of Lecky, Sir Leslie Stephen, and Herbert Spencer, we may say that, except perhaps in the French Academy he has become practically extinct; being elbowed out by the Novelists, the Magazine-writers, the Preachers, and the Press on the one hand, and by the Academicals and 'Specialists' on the other; on the ground, as the latter would say, that being a kind of 'Jack-of-all-trades' he is master of none.

I well remember the impression made on my mind many years ago, when Dr. Hutchinson Stirling in his book on Hegel, talked of Goethe as a mere feather-weight philosopher as it were, compared with Hegel. I afterwards discovered that it was because Goethe was not an'ontologist' - that is to say. one who thoroughly understands the mystery of the Universe and can cover it with a formula - that he was denied substantive rank as a philosopher. Goethe, it appeared, had not attempted to shew you how the'One' and the'Many' could exist together under one hat, and vet be both'One' and 'Many' as Hegel had attempted to do, - although Hegel, no more than any other poor mortal, succeeded in doing it, as I shall some day attempt to show. And it was because the academical'ontologists,' claiming the sole right to the title of 'philosophers,' thought that they had caught Herbert Spencer napping, when in a few chapters of his Introductory volume on'First Principles,' he too made an attempt to solve the ultimate Problem of Existence, that they have been so stinted in their appreciation of his work - and that, too, although otherwise he had enriched every side and aspect of Thought which he touched, and had even helped to found several new Sciences. He, like the rest, had not been able, it seems, to jump the gulf between the'One' and the'Many,' without falling into the water - a feat believed to have been accomplished only by Hegel - and that was enough! Indeed one of them, and a man of broad general culture too, asked me once in surprise whether I really thought Herbert Spencer was a 'philosopher'! But, curiously enough, one of the latest exponents of Hegel finds that the' One' is only a more intimate kind of relation among the 'Many' after all! Now as I am firmly of opinion that the' general thinker' (the Academicals notwithstanding) has still as necessary a function to discharge as ever in the progress of knowledge, I would venture to suggest that the subject of Political Economy would make as good a tilting-field on which in a limited way to decide the issue between the general thinker and the specialist as any other.

The number of readers interested in the problem of Political Economy, since the revival of the Free Trade and Protection controversy in England, is now very large; the jury of instructed readers outside of the Academical ranks, who are intimately acquainted with the doctrines of the Orthodox School, is sufficient in numbers, in ability, in independence of thought, and in fairness of judgment, both to hear and to judge the cause; and the issue in this case is both clear and simple, and may be put as follows :- On the one hand, my contention is, that no scientific specialism dealing with human affairs, and in which human beings - and not mere physical forces - are the chief actors, can be anything but practically false in its deductions and conclusions, until it is overhauled and reconstructed from the standpoint of Civilization in general, which embraces them all alike; - as in an Army where the Generals of division must work under the co-ordination and supervision, from a wider point of view, of the Commander-in-Chief. The Academicals and the specialists on the other hand, deny the competence of any general thinker as such for this supervisory and co-ordinating function, and claim that they themselves as' specialists' are the final court of appeal, each in his own line of work; not only in the Mathematical, Physical, and Biological Sciences, where the 'general orders' under which they march have already been given them by men like Bacon, Newton, and Darwin, but in the Human Sciences as well, such as Psychology, Philosophy, Religion, History, Ethics, Political Economy, etc., where up to the present - in so far as any general principles common to them all are concerned, - all is chaos.

If then we take Political Economy, which is a recognised 'Specialism,' as a test-case, we find that the Academical Economists claim that in all its general principles, its laws, and its deductions, - if not in all its special details, - it is practically a complete and perfected Science. In this volume, on the contrary, 1 shall attempt to show that having had the Science in their own hands for a century or more, literally not one of their fundamental propositions or deductions is true, and that most of their practical conclusions are false; and in order that the matter may not be left hanging in the vague, I have made a first rough attempt at a reconstruction of their Science, on other principles and other methods, - all of which principles I have drawn simply from the standpoint of the ' general thinker' who has to keep his finger on the pulse, as it were, of the Human Sciences in their combination and correlation, if he is to see into the true inner workings of any one of them.

In this attempt I am glad to acknowledge my indebtedness to the works of a number of economists outside the ranks of the orthodox and academical schools; notably to those of Mr. Gunton, Mr. J. M. Robertson, Mr. Hobson, Mr. Mallock, and the essayists of the Fabian Society; from each of whom I have received principles and points of suggestion which I have utilised in the course of my own work, and have referred to at their appropriate places in this volume.

But a word or two perhaps is necessary in reference to my attitude on the burning question of Free Trade and Protection. My sincere conviction which has been entirely unbiassed by all considerations of party, and which rests simply on such arguments as those with which I have supported it, is that in the present stage of Civilization, where nations have separate political existences which it is their dearest wish to maintain, Protection, varying in degree and incidence according to the circumstances of each nation, is more conducive not only to the the economic welfare of the world as a whole, but to its orderly progress as well, than a universal Free Trade; although should that millennial time ever arrive when all the nations would form themselves into a single political unity, no one would be a stronger advocate of a universal Free Trade than myself; and that too for reasons which I have given in the course of this work. And hence it is that I have devoted so large a section of the volume to the discussion of the problem of Free Trade and Protection, both in its theoretical and its practical bearings, as well as having given so much space to the history and evolution of their respective doctrines.

At the same time I fear that in both the extent and the rigour with which I would apply the principle of Protection when necessary, I shall have out-run the sympathy even of the hardiest and most thorough-going of Protectionists; so deterrent an effect has the high authority and prestige, the long reign and influence of the orthodox Political Economy, had on the minds of men, even when in their individual judgments they have not been altogether convinced of the truth of its doctrines. Indeed, of all the great nations of the world to-day, there is none which would be prepared to go so far as the studies and reflections embodied in this work have led me, - with the single exception of Japan, whose rulers on independent grounds have already made preparations for carrying the doctrine to the full length which is here advocated. And her success or failure in this venture, which must soon be made apparent to all the world, will itself afford a useful object-lesson, whether as supporting or nullifying the speculative basis for her action as here set forth.

London,

Sept. 27th, 1906.