5. But if, as is the case of England at present, the full natural industrial supremacy of a nation is impaired at all points, and robbed of its natural fruition by hostile tariff barriers on the part of other nations, let that nation retaliate by means of 'treaties of commerce' made with each on the basis of a general tariff, or what not, and graded according to their industrial fighting strengths; all those that are allowed to enter on reduced terms having to pay a quid pro quo for it; and all being frankly treated on the Roman principle of 'divide et impera.'

And lastly, all obstructions that may arise to the carrying out of these general rules from the political side, ought to be subordinated to economic considerations; and not vice versa. For example, the fact that as things now stand, the main benefits from protecting the landed interests of the nation would go, in the shape of increased rents, into the pockets of a limited class of landlords, is quite sufficient to prevent the great body of the people from insisting that the land of this country shall not be allowed to go out of cultivation. But does anyone imagine that if peasant proprietors were as thick on the soil of England as they are on that of France, this hesitation in protecting the land would continue for a day? It is a case of the political situation 'cornering' the economic one; and is to be remedied by coercing the landlord class into permitting the land to be broken up into freeholds, graded from 'three acres and a cow' up through ten, twenty, fifty, and a hundred or more acre holdings, to the larger but vastly curtailed possessions of the landlords themselves, - the crown and apex of the industrial and social pyramid in the country, as distinct from the manufacturing interests of the towns.

Or again, the aversion to putting a sufficient tax on corn to protect the land from going out of cultivation may be due to the congested swarms of derelicts and incapables who, like the Roman populace, have to be fed at the cheapest rate, or kept at the public expense. In this case, the remedy is to clear the slums of those who cannot afford to pay the increased price of a loaf of bread, and pack them into labour colonies the while, until the political and the economic situation have been brought into harmony again. Or again, the great body of genuine working men may refuse to submit to a tax on corn sufficient to recultivate the soil of their country, owing to the difficulty in getting capitalists to consent to a rise of wages sufficient to cover the increased price of bread. The remedy for this, as in France, is a race of peasant proprietors who in return for the protection of the products of their land, will lend a helping hand, as a quid pro quo, to the Trades Unions in their attempts to wring from the employing capitalists, through legislation if necessary a minimum living wage.

Then again, among other economic obstructions which must be removed by political means, there are, first, the little knots of middle-men sitting in secret conclave, and neutralizing by their extortions all those casual gratuities of Nature, - whether in the corn-market, the fish-market, the meat-market, etc., - which owing to favourable seasons and conditions would naturally result in cheapened prices to the consumer; next, the giant trade combinations, trusts, 'corners' and combines, that hold up prices through monopoly, in spite of all the efforts of the innumerable minnows of the trade (who can always be vanquished in detail) to pull them down; and lastly, the ingenuities by which taxation is shifted from the shoulders of those on whom it was intended to fall, on to those who were intended to be exempt. All such anomalies, which interpose to block and neutralize the economic good of the nation as a whole, are to be dealt with by Legislation, and especially by wider and more elastic powers of Administration adapted to each particular case; and not, as at present, by refusing to do anything at all because no general rule, law, or principle, can be found which is applicable to all alike.

The remedy, in a word, is to get back as quickly as possible to the methods of the days before the gospel of laissez-faire came in, - a doctrine once a blessing, but now proving a curse every day that it survives. For it was adapted to that transitory stage of industry where the industrial investments of individuals were so protected from each other by difficulties of transport, and yet were so subject to each other's competition (when any one threatened to overshadow its neighbour or to grow to excess), that a simple, general, self-working rule like that of leaving things to right themselves, was sufficient to do rough justice to all the interests concerned, and to permit of the greatest ease in industrial expansion as well. But it was not so in earlier times, nor will it ever be again under the present industrial regime. In the Middle Ages, the absence of transport, and of easily recognized standards of judgment, made administration, inspection, and the application of special laws to particular cases, a necessity of industry; made laws against the 'forestalling' and 'engrossing' of corn, too, a necessity, (if dangerous famines were not to be suddenly confronted), owing to the varying incidence of crops and seasons; but the necessity for all these special laws had largely passed away by the time of Adam Smith, who was mainly instrumental in focussing and consolidating the growing body of opinion in favour of leaving all things alone to the play of unrestricted competition.