That is to say, that no particular money in the Debtor's possession belongs to the Creditor, which he can seize upon: none is pledged to him: the Money continues the absolute Property of the Debtor, which he may spend or part with, until of his own free will he transfers the Property in it to the Creditor. But the Debt, or the Duty to pay, exists exactly as it was, no matter whether the Debtor has any Money to pay it with or not.

The difference is clearly marked in Roman Law: if any one had in his possession any goods or chattels which were the Property of another person, that person had a Jus in re, or a Real Right: a Right to that very thing. If he had only an abstract Right to demand something from a person, he had only a Jus ad rem, which is a mere Personal Right: it was also called a Jus in personam, or a Right against the person.

This subtlety is so important to be understood that we shall give an extract from the distinguished Jurist, Pothier - "The Right which this Obligation gives the Creditor of proceeding to obtain the payment of the thing, which the Debtor is obliged to give him, is not a Right in the thing itself (Jus in re), it is only a Right against the person of the Debtor for the purpose of compelling him to give it (Jus ad rem). The thing which the Debtor is obliged to give, continues then to belong to him, and the Creditor cannot become the proprietor of it, except by the delivery, real or fictitious, which is made to him by the Debtor in performance of his Obligation.

"And till this delivery is made, the Creditor has nothing more than a Right of demanding the thing, and he has only that Right against the person of the Debtor, who has contracted the Obligation.

"Hence it follows that if my Debtor, after contracting an Obligation to give a thing to me, transfers it upon a particular title to a third person, whether by sale or donation, I cannot demand it from the party who has so acquired it, but only from my Debtor .. The reason is, as the Obligation does not, according to our principle, give the Creditor any Right in the thing which is due to him, I have not any Right in the thing which was due to me, that I can pursue against the person in whose hands it may be found."

This distinction is perfectly plain, and of the highest im-portance in Economics: for if the Creditor had the Right to any specific money in the Debtor's possession, that would be a diminution of the Debtor's property: he would have no right to part with, or sell it: and there would in fact only be one Economic Quantity in existence, i.e. the quantity of Money. But as a matter of fact the whole of the money remains the Debtor's Property, which he can sell or exchange as he pleases: and also there is the Right or Property, in the person of the Creditor, which he can also sell or exchange : and which may be sold or exchanged any number of times like money till it is paid off and extinguished. Hence in this case there are two Economic Quantities in existence, which may each circulate in commerce at the same time.

5. Having explained this subtlety it might be thought that all difficulties on the subject were cleared up. But unfortunately this is not the case: we have still more ambiguities to clear up, each of which has been the cause of great misconception.

The word Debt evidently in strictness means the Duty of the Debtor to pay the Money. But unfortunately, the word Debt has long been transferred to mean the Right of Action in the person of the Creditor: and thus it is used as synonymous with Credit.

We have not found in any ancient writer the word Debitum used to mean the Right of Action: but this change in its meaning had already come into use in the 12th century.

In 1194 Richard I. issued a Commission for a judicial visitation on financial matters in which it is said - "Let all the Debts (Debita, Rights of action) of the Jews be scheduled, their lands, houses, rents and possessions. . . .

"Also let every Jew swear that he will make a true schedule of all his Debts (Debita, Rights of action) pledges, rents, and all his property and possessions."

And this is the meaning which the word Debt has long acquired in English Law. It means a Right of action, a Claim, or Demand.

Thus in the Statute of Acton Burnell, 11 Edward I. (1283) commonly called the Statute of Merchants, it is said - "That merchants may quickly recover their Debts . . . The King by his council has ordained and established that the merchant who would be sure of his Debt."

So the Act, 46 Geo. III. c. 125. s. 3 enacts that "one Debt or Demand" may be set off against another. Mr. Williams says - "Within the class of choses-in-action was comprised a Right of growing importance, namely, that of suing for Money due, which Right is all that is called a Debt" - "We have seen that a Debt was anciently considered as a mere Right to bring an action against the Debtor" - "Debts being formerly considered as mere Rights of action."

So as may be seen in any daily paper the executors of deceased persons advertise for any persons who have "Debts, claims, or demands," against the estates of the deceased to give in a statement of them.

An administrator is appointed by the Court of the "goods, chattels, and Credits of the deceased."

Thus it is seen that the words Credit and Debt are used as synonymous in Law.

Accordingly in the Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange, Bank Notes, etc. which we prepared for the Royal Commissioners for the Digest of the Law we began with the following fundamental Definition of the subject "Credit or Debt, in Legal and Commercial [and Economical] language means a Eight of Action against a Person for a sum of Money."