4 This is the effect of Graves v. United States, 165 U. S. 323, and United States v. Allis, 73 Fed. R. 165. But United States v. Allen, holds somewhat different language. See 47 Fed. R. 696.

5 Graves v. United States, 165 U. S. 323.

6 United States v. Means, 42 Fed. R. 599; United States v. Allis, 73 Fed. R. 165. The intent must be proven as alleged. United States v. Allen. 47 Fed. R. 696.

7 United States v. Harper, 33 Fed. R. 471. The principle stated in that case applies here.

8 United States v. Bartow, 10 Fed. R. 874. Compare United States v. Allis, 73 Fed. R. 165.

9 United States v. Eqe, 49 Fed. R. 852. It must be averred that the report was verified by proper officer. United States v. Potter, 56 Fed. R. 97. See also note 2 to this section for cases contra, which are United States v. Booker, 80 Fed. R.

376, and Bacon v. United States, 97 Fed. R 35. This last case does not notice United States v. Eqe, supra, and United States v. Potter, supra.

10 United States v. Potter, 56 Fed. R. 97. Contra, United States v. Means, 42 Fed. R. 599. But it is held in United States v. Hughitt, 45 Fed. R. 47, that the indictment need not aver that the report was made pursuant to a call, or upon a form prescribed, or at a time called by the comptroller. This case is wrong. See notes 2 and 10 to this section.

11 United States v. Potter, 56 Fed. R.97.

12 In both United States v. Allis, 73 Fed. R. 165, and United States v. Graves, 53 Fed. R. 634, which are charges to juries, long disquisitions will be found upon these reports and kindred matters. Both charges are very good examples of what a judge ought to avoid in charging the jury. They are full of bold assertion and irrelevant rhetoric that would be pardonable in a "stump speech," but not in a charge to a jury.

13 United States v. Graves, 53 Fed. R.634

14 Cochran v. United States, 157 U. S. 286.

15 This is the effect of Graves v. United States, 165 U. S. 323, and United States v. Allis, 73 Fed. R 165. See Sec. 150, infra.

16 United States v. Allis, 73 Fed. R 165. But Graves v. United States, 165 U. S. 323, while not plain upon this point, seems to decide the contrary. Now the circuit court of appeals, in a very poorly considered and reasoned opinion, has practically refused to follow Graves v. United States, supra. See the opinion of Bacon v. United States, 97 Fed. R 35.

17 United States v. Allen, 47 Fed. R 696; Commonwealth v. Dunham, Thach. Cr. Cas. 519. But Bacon v. United States, 97 Fed. R 35, holds that the books are admissible without the suppletory oath, as against any officer of the bank, and are presumably correct, and seemingly holds that the books control the facts.

18 He may be indicted for an entry made by his direction. United States v. Youtsey, 91 Fed. R 864. Bacon v. United States, 97 Fed. R. 35, does not agree with the text.

Therefore the conclusion seems plain, in spite of a decision to the contrary, that overdrafts so called, which are evidenced by demand notes, are properly returnable as loans and discounts,19 but if so returned out of caution they should be accompanied by an explanation stating the facts. The jurisdiction of this offense is in the United States courts,20 but the same act may constitute a crime against the state authority.21 Certain matters as to the evidence have arisen in the cases which are cited in the note.22 False entries are practically the same kind of offenses as false returns, as the cases cited to this section show.

19 United States v. Allis, 73 Fed. R 165, seems to so hold when carefully examined. Potter v. United States, 155 U. S. 438, recognizes this defense as to certifying a check, where there were no funds. It is said to be the uniform course of national bankers to call such overdrafts loans and discounts. But now Bacon v. United States, 97 Fed. R 35 (C. C. A), holds that such loans must be returned as overdrafts. The court, in its opinion, makes the test of overdraft to be the state of the depositor's account But it misses the real point, which is, that if the depositor has been given a credit up to the amount of the overdraft note, he has the right to compel the bank to pay his checks up to the amount of his credit. It is a misnomer to call such a loan an overdraft, because it is of the essence of an overdraft that it is an authority revocable at any time. Conceding that the authority given is the right to overdraw the apparent balance shown by the books, it is nevertheless binding upon the bank, if the directors permit or authorize an officer to permit it The consideration making it binding is the making and delivery of the demand note. Hence, if the bank should dishonor the depositor's check, he could sue the bank for damages, and, therefore, such a credit cannot be an overdraft, and Bacon v. United States is a total misconception. Yet because a bank president had returned such loans as loans and not as overdrafts, he was sentenced to the penitentiary for seven years. The ferocity of the sentence staggered the upper court. Since this note was first written, the present and the last comptrollers have recommended the defendant's pardon. In his report upon the case the present comptroller says the return was properly made. The attorney-general stated that he could not understand how any reasonable human being could find that the defendant had been guilty of any offense. The defendant (plaintiff in error) was therefore pardoned in order to remedy this frightful miscarriage of justice, wholly caused by an inexcusable blunder as to the law.

20 In re Eno, 54 Fed. R 669.

21 Hoke v. People, 122 111. 511.

22 Allis v. United States, 155 U. S. 117; United States v. Allen, 47 Fed. R 696; United States v. Graves, 53 Fed. R 634; United States v.