This section is from the book "The Law Of Banks And Banking", by John Maxcy Zane . Also available from Amazon: The law of banks and banking.
The person to be charged by demand and notice must make the waiver either himself or through an agent with express or implied authority. Where the agent's authority to waive demand and notice of dishonor is express, no difficulty can arise if it be kept in mind that the authority ends with the death of the principal, unless it is coupled with an interest. But the person who makes the waiver must be sui generis and not a married woman under disability.1 But the latter case is not a frequent one now owing to "Married Woman's Acts." If the person be not sui generis he cannot, of course, grant authority to an agent. A partner may waive demand and notice for his firm, and may do it even after dissolution of the firm,2 but in a peculiar case this has been denied.3 The agent of a corporation who is authorized to create a liability against the corporation may waive demand and notice for the corporation.4 But this ruling should properly be put upon the ground of a ratification by the corporation resulting from its reception of benefits, for the agent was acting for another party as well as for the corporation. It is therefore a case of express authority to the agent. Implied authority to waive may result from the fact that the person who makes the waiver is apparently in charge at the indorser's place of business in the absence of the indorser,5 or from the fact that the person is negotiating the note for the benefit of the indorser.6 The same rule would apply to the indorser and drawer of a bill of exchange. These last cases of implied authority are examples of an agency by estoppel, and it is needless, perhaps, to say that if the person receiving the waiver had notice (either personally or through his agent receiving the waiver) of the lack of authority, the estoppel does not arise.
1 Marshall v. Overbay, 10 La. 161.
2 Darling v. March, 22 Me. 184j Seldner v. Mt. Jackson Nat. Bank, 66 Md. 488. Contra, see case in note 6, infra, which is wrong.
3Manney v. Coit, 80 N. C. 300 (dormant partner was sought to be bound). The case seems to be unsupported.
4 Whitney v. South Paris Mfg. Co., 39 Me. 316.
5 Johnson v. Zeckendorf, 12 Pac. R. 65 (Ariz.). Tliere was no proof of special authority.
6 Driggs v. Driggs, 11 N. Y. St R. 256.
 
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