The question of the person to whom notice is to be given has hitherto been considered as if the holder were himself giving notice. But the theory of commercial paper is that it is a succession of contracts, each party separately putting his name to the paper becoming the maker of a new contract, all of which contracts pass to the holder of the paper, who has a separate contract with each party to the paper, and each holder and indorser in succession is bound to each holder subsequent to himself by a series of separate contracts, and has bound to him each preceding party by a series of separate contracts.1 Each party to the paper has the right to choose which of these contracts he will enforce - any or all. Therefore the holder may give notice to his immediate indorser,2 or he may give notice to any indorser he chooses,3 or to the drawer or maker.4 He is not required to give notice to any particular indorser.5 Therefore a second indorser notified cannot defend on the ground that a party to the paper prior to himself was not notified.6 It is the duty of each indorser to protect himself by giving notice to any or all of the parties prior to himself.7 But every notice given to a party to the paper inures to the benefit of every one on the paper who stands between the person giving the notice and the one to whom notice is given.8 Even if the holder tries to notify a party to the paper and fails, yet a notice received in due time by that party from a subsequent party to the paper properly notified will bind him to that subsequent party and all others between them,9 as well as to all other parties subsequent to that subsequent party.10 The holder may mail all the notices to the last indorser for service,11 and that indorser may mail to his indorser,12 and so on through all the parties; and each party, who receives notice in due time under this method, even though it be circuitous, and even though he would have received notice sooner if it had been mailed directly to him, will be held.13 All indorsements are on the same level under this rule, whether they are for value or for collection, and all persons who hold the paper for collection unindorsed.14 The indorsee for collection, even under an unsigned transfer, may, acting as holder, send the notice to his indorser for service,15 the residence of the parties being perfectly immaterial as to the right.16 The rule has been extended to include an agent, and the agent may have the same right to send notices to his principal without inquiry as to residences as if he were an indorsee,17 or he may himself serve the notices upon any or all the parties18 if he be authorized to do so,19 and the presumption will be as against a party notified by him that he is so authorized.20 Yet, if he were expressly forbidden to do so, there would be nothing to prevent the principal from giving the notices if he did it in due time, even if his agent had tried to do so but failed.21 If the paper passes through a succession of indorsees for collection, each agent or bailee is to be treated as a holder for the purposes of this rule,22 although there has been some doubt as to an agent who was not indorsee.23 Since, therefore, the holder has the right to assume that the agent for collection or the indorsee for collection will transmit the notices to himself for service, he is not negligent in not giving the agent any information whatever as to the residences of the parties,24 unless he direct that agent or indorsee for collection to serve the notices, when he should give the agent all the information in his possession in order to escape the imputation of a want of due diligence.25 The party to the paper desiring to serve a notice may send the notice to a third party, a stranger to the paper, to serve where he does not know the address, and if that third person acts with due diligence the service is good.26 But if the person knew the address, the sending of the notice to a third person not a party to the paper would not bo due diligence.27 The second case cited in the last note applies wrongly a sound principle by mistaking the facts. There the president of the bank, who had received in his private capacity knowledge of the residence of a person to be charged with notice, was not in the bank, and took no part when the notice was sent, and his knowledge was clearly therefore not imputable to the bank; so the case is one of that numerous list where courts have failed to understand properly the rules of agency.28 Sometimes statutes require all indorsers to be served, and thus modify the preceding rules.29

23Taylor v. Young, 3 Watts, 339.

24 House v. Vinton Nat. Bank, 43 Ohio St. 346.

25 American Nat. Bank v. Junk Bros. Co., 94 Tenn. 624; Callahan v. Bank of Ky., 82 Ky. 231.

26 See Bliss v. Nichols, 94 Mass. 443; Casco Nat. Bank v. Shaw, 79 Me. 376; Bank of America v. Shaw, 142 Mass. 290.

27 Donnell v. Lewis Co. Sav. Bank, 80 Mo. 165. This seems to be the conclusion from what the court holds in this case. The statement, however, is dictum, because the notice was held good, the holder having no knowledge of the assignment.

1 See the following cases in the notes to this section.

2 Griffith v. Assmann, 48 Mo. 66; West River Bank v. Taylor, 34 N. Y. 128.

3 Henry v. State Bank, 3 Ind. 216; Crane v. Trudeau, 19 La. Ann. 307.

4 See the last note. Sometimes a statute requires notice to all prior parties. See note 29, infra.

5 Unless a statute requires all to be served. See note 29, infra.

6 Boteler v. Dexter, 20 D. C. 26; Henry v. State Bank, 3 Ind. 216; Valk v. Bank of State, 1 McMul. Eq. 414.

7Lawson v. Farmers' Bank, 1 Ohio St. 206; Renshaw v. Triplett, 23 Mo. 213; Crocker v. Gitchell, 23

Ma 392; Watson v. Templeton, 11 La. Ann. 137; Spencer v. Ballou, 18 N. Y. 327.

8 Mead v. Engs, 5 Cow. 303; Jordan v. Ford, 7 Ark. 416; Grand Gulf Co. v. Barnes, 12 Rob. (La.) 127.

9 Marr v. Johnson, 9 Yerg. 1.

10 Westfall v. Farwell, 13 Wis. 504; Linn v. Horton, 17 Wis. 151. But if the notice to a certain indorser was excused, another party subsequent to the one not notified cannot hold the unnotified party liable on the strength of the excuse, if he could himself have given the notice. Beale v. Parrish, 20 N. Y. 407.

11Pate v. State Bank, 3 Ind. 176; Wood v. Callaghan, 61 Mich. 402.

12 Wood v. Callaghan, 61 Mich. 402; Butler v. Duval, 4 Yerg. 265.

13Triplett v. Hunt, 3 Dana, 126; Church v. Barlow, 9 Pick. 547. And see cases in note 16, infra.

14 Eagle Bank v. Hathaway, 5 Met. 212; Burnham v. Webster, 19 Me. 232; Blakelee v. Hewitt, 76 Wis. 341.

15RossOn v. Carrol, 90 Tenn. 90; Bowling v. Harrison, 6 How. 248; Big Sandy Nat. Bank v. Chilton, 40 W. Va. 491; First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass. 227 (unsigned)

16 West River Bank v. Taylor, 34 N. Y. 128; True v. Collins, 85 Mass. 438; Fitchburg Bank v. Perley, 84 Mass. 433; First Nat. Bank v. Smith. 132 Mass. 227.

17 Rosson v. Carrol, 90 Tenn. 90; Bowling v. Harrison, 6 How. 248; Hartford Bank v. Stedman, 3 Conn. 489; Colt v. Noble, 5 Mass. 167 (foreign bill); Bank of U. S. v. Goddard, 5 Mason, 366; Morgan v. Van lngen, 2 Johns. 204. The agent may give the notice in his own name. Dexter v. McGlynn, 99 Cal. 143.

18 Griffith v. Assmann, 48 Mo. 66; Wood v. Callaghan, 61 Mich. 402.

19 See the next note.

20 Payne v. Patrick, 21 Tex. 680.

21 This particular case does not seem to have arisen.

22 See cases in notes 17 and 18.

23 Fish v. Jackmann, 19 Me. 467, Slack v Longshaw, 8 Ky. Law R. 166. But the other rule is correct. Lawson v. Farmers' Bank, 1 Ohio St. 206; Ellis v. Commercial Bank, 7 How. (Miss.) 294, See Tunno v. Lague, 2 Johns. Cas. 1, and note 17, supra.

24 See Bartlett v. Ishell, 31 Conn. 296. But Clarke v. Ward, 4 Duer, 206, seems contra, and so seems to be First Nat. Bank v. Farneman, 93 Iowa, 161, but they are wrong.

25 See Lawrence v. Meller, 16 N. Y. 235; Smith v. Fisher, 24 Pa. 222.

26Sewell v. Russell, 3 Wend. 276; Lafayette Bank v. McLaughlin, 4 W. L. J. 70. It was held in the first case above that where the notice was sent to an agent to serve, he has not one day after receipt merely to put in the mail. See Carmena v. Dougherty, 1 La. Ann. 369.

27 Carmena v. Dougherty, 1 La. Ann. 369; Central Nat Bank V. Levin, 6 Mo. App. 543. But the first case is wrong, since the notice was sent to the holder.

28 See Sec. 112, ante.

29 Bowling v. Arthur, 34 Miss. 41.