The existence of a state of war between the country of the maker of a note or the drawee of a bill and that of the holder, or the interdiction of commercial intercourse between the places where the holder and where the person upon whom demand is to be made resides, excuses a delay in the demand, but not a total failure to make a demand.1 The demand must be made as soon as it is reasonably and conveniently possible after the commercial relations have been resumed.2

1 See Tun no v. Lague, 2 Johns. Cas. 1; Hanauer v. Anderson, 16 Lea, 340; Roosevelt v. Wood hull, Anth. N. P. 50.

2 See note 7 to the next section for the rule as to a state of war.

1 Jex v. Tureaud, 19 La. Ann. 64;

Union Bank v. Robertson, 19 La. Ann. 72; Norris v. Despard, 38 Md. 487; Dunbar v. Tyler, 44 Miss. 1; Hardin v. Boyce, 59 Barb. 425. See Ford v. McClung, 5 W. Va. 156.

2 Lane v. Bank of West Tennessee, 9 Heisk. 419, and cases in last note

The extent of the interruption to excuse delay in a demand is either a matter of proof or a fact of which the court takes judicial knowledge.3 The cases are not clear upon this point, but, on principle, the question ought to be one solely for the court.4 But the existence of a state of war will not excuse a demand, if a demand would have been legal and could have been made by the use of reasonable diligence.5 One case went so far as to hold that the interruption of the mail was not sufficient to excuse a transmission of notice where other means that were practicable were not used,6 and a number of other cases as to transmission of notice in time of war will be found under the head of notice to a drawer or indorser.7 But the reason of those cases cannot apply to a demand where the demand must be made within hostile lines. It would be illegal for the holder to venture into the hostile country, and it would be equally illegal to require him for the purposes of demand to send his property into a belligerent's territory to some agent therein, or by some agent who penetrates into the hostile territory. The making of any contract between alien enemies is inhibited by the accepted rules of law. Therefore a demand must, in such cases, be excused until the obstacles to making a demand have ceased to exist.8 But if the parties live in the same section and there be no hostile occupation therein, the delay in demand is not excusable,9 unless the war has demoralized and obstructed the ordinary regulations of trade.10