Bills of exchange may be drawn payable on demand or at sight, or so many days after sight, or upon a fixed day. As we have seen, a bill payable so many days after sight,1 and a bill payable at sight,2 needs presentment for acceptance, and the non-acceptance of a bill dispenses with the necessity of demand in order to hold the drawer and indorser, if their liability be fixed upon the non-acceptance.3 If the bill be accepted it must none the less be presented for payment to the acceptor in order to hold the drawer and indorsers, unless such demand be excused or waived.4 The proper time for a demand may be looked at, first, from the standpoint of delay. The reasonableness of a delay upon a bill of exchange payable on demand or at sight must be determined from the manner in which the bill has been treated by the holder. If the bill has not been put into circulation, a demand of payment upon a bill payable at sight or upon demand must be made within a reasonable time after its reception by the holder;5 or if it is a demand bill or a sight bill and it has been accepted, and no date for maturity of the acceptance fixed, the acceptance may go into circulation; demand may be delayed for a reasonable time, it has been held, after its acceptance.6 The rule has been held by a court, which did not understand the rule, to be that the bill should be presented for payment upon the same day, or forwarded upon the next day after its receipt.7 In accordance with the general rule, a sight draft drawn in Arkansas upon the fifteenth day of the month and deposited in a Memphis bank for collection, and presented for payment in Kansas City on the nineteenth day of the month, was considered to have been presented within a reasonable time;8 but a sight draft upon New York indorsed to a party in Wisconsin, upon which a delay of fourteen days was had by a particular holder, was held not to have been presented within a reasonable time.9 A delay of four days upon a bill of exchange has been held to be unreasonable.10 The cases upon demand drafts are more numerous under the head of checks, but those cases are not reliable criteria, because a draft payable at sight or after sight or demand may be put into circulation,11 while a check, it appears, is not expected to be so treated. Since such a draft may be put into circulation, it necessarily follows that what is a reasonable time for its presentation for payment, whether the draft is a sight draft or a demand draft, depends wholly upon circumstances. If the draft passes from hand to hand and is by no holder held for an unreasonable time, its presentment cannot be considered as unreasonably delayed.12 A bill of exchange drawn in the West Indies at sixty days sight upon London was put into circulation and not presented for several months, yet the presentment was in time.13 So a bill drawn in Antigua, one of the "West Indies, upon London at ninety days, which was presented after a delay of six months, was presented within a reasonable time, it appearing that the bill had numerous indorsements;14 and a St. Louis bill at sixty days upon New Orleans which had numerous indorsements was presented in time though delayed for three months.15 The rule to be extracted from the cases is that the question of reasonable time upon the presentment of the bill depends not only upon the distance and means of communication between the place of drawing and that of payment, but also upon the manner in which the bill has been circulated. A delay of eighty or ninety days,16 a delay of fifteen days between Ohio and New York City,17 a delay of two months where the holder resided for part of the time with the drawee,18 have been judicially determined to be unreasonable, while a delay of forty-seven days,19 or of ten days,20 has been considered reasonable. Each case depends upon its peculiar circumstances, and not a little upon the disposition of the particular court. It is needless to say that drafts payable at a fixed date must be presented for payment at maturity, just as a promissory note or an acceptance payable at a fixed date must be presented at maturity in order to hold the drawer or the indorser. Bank drafts, which are drafts by one bank upon another, are said to be governed by a more liberal rule than bills of exchange,21 but as a matter of fact bank drafts are sin ply checks and are to be governed by the rules in regard to checks.22 The delay may be occasioned by a mistake in the postoffice or by the fact that the bill has been lost. The postmaster's mistake will not prejudice the holder, nor will a delay in demand caused by a loss of the bill.23 One court informs us that the loss of the bill excuses only a reasonable delay.24 It meant to say that a delay on account of the loss of the bill would not be extended to cover a delay not occasioned by the loss of the bill. This time within which presentment for payment should be made may be varied or extended by statute.25

1 See Sec. 206, ante, note 10.

2 See g 206, ante, note 11.

3 See Sec. 233, ante, note 10.

4 See Sec. 293 et seq., post, and Sec. 233, ante, note 3.

5Dumont v. Pope, 7 Blackf. 367 (the document was treated as a bill of exchange); English v. Trustees, 6 Ind. 437; Mohawk Bank v. Brod-erick, 10 Wend. 304; Chambers v.

Hill, 26 Tex. 472; Thomburg v. Emmons, 23 W. Va. 325 (sight draft). 6Nichols v. Blackmore, 27 Tex. 586. This case is a good instance of oversight by both court and counsel, for no one seemed to know the difference between an accepted and an unaccepted bill. The statement in the text is what the case amounts to as an actual decision.

7 Slack v. Longshaw, 8 Ky. Law R. 166. The case cites 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst., sea 605, but the author does not seem to know that a demand bill can be put into circulation. See Angaletos v. Meridian Nat Bank, 4 Ind. App. 573, holding that demand bills can be put into circxilation.

8 Wards v. Sparks, 53 Ark. 519. The case impliedly holds the above, but the objection was that it was presented for payment prematurely.

9 Walsh v. Dart, 23 Wis. 334 It would appear in this case that the court did not seem to know that this draft was presentable for acceptance; but a reference to the former decision, 12 Wis. 635, would indicate that proof was made that under the New York law a sight draft does not require presentment for acceptance.

10 See note 18, infra.

11 Robinson v. Ames, 20 Johns. 146.

12 Wallace v. Agry, 4 Mason, 336; Bolton v. Harrod, 9 Mart (O. S.) 326.

13 See first case in last note.

14 Gowan v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 176.

15Little v. Pratt, 1 Mo. 201. See Montelius v. Charles, 76 I1L 303.

16 Brower v. Jones, 3 Johns. 230.

17Vantrol v. McCulloch, 2 Hilt. 272.

18 Fernandez v. Lewis, 1 McCord, 322. For other cases of unreasonable delay see Burrett v. Tidmarsh, 5 Bradw.341 (six years); Bridgeford v. Simon, 18 La. Ann. 121 (two years); First Nat. Bank v. Bensley, 2 Fed. R 609 (one year); Bull v. First Nat Bank, 14 Fed. R. 612 (five months); Little v. Phoenix Bank, 2 Hill, 425, 7 Hill, 359 (ten months); Olshausen v. Lewis, 1 Biss. 419 (one month); Willets v. Paine, 43 111. 432 (twenty-five days, but the ground of this decision was wholly wrong);

Angaletos v. Meridian Nat. Bank, 4Ind. App. 573 (twoor five months); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 501 (twenty days); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Gray, 13 Mich. 191 (twenty-one days); Orear v. McDonald, 9 Gill, 350; Brady v. Little Miami R Co., 34 Barb. 249 (four days); Taylor v. Sip, 30 N. J. Law, 284 (two days, but this is wrong. It was a post-dated check put into circulation. The opinion of the chief justice is so manifestly correct that it is amazing to see that the other two judges overruled him).

19 Nichols v. Blackmore, 27 Tex. 586.

20 National Newark Banking Co. v. Second Nat. Bank, 63 Pa. 404

The foregoing cases have been concerned with the fact of a demand not within time. But a bill cannot be properly presented for payment before its maturity. If the bill be accepted so as to fix its maturity, a demand at its maturity is necessary. If the maturity of the bill is fixed by the bill itself, the acceptance must be, as we have seen, unless the drawer and indorsers concur in an extension, one payable upon the day of maturity.26 If the accepted bill is payable at sight the acceptance is not payable until maturity. The maturity of all bills of exchange, except demand bills, is determined by adding to the date of apparent maturity the three days of grace, and the presentment for payment must be not before the last of the three days of grace,27 unless the bill is drawn without grace, or unless days of grace upon bills are abolished by statute. A demand of payment before the last day of grace is premature,28 and will not hold the drawer and indorser; and this is true as to the indorsereven though the other parties to the bill agree upon an earlier date.29 Days of grace are added even to an acceptance due on a particular day unless it appear that the acceptance included the days of grace. Thus an acceptance due May 21st, where the acceptance was not dated, was due May 24th, and a demand on May 21st was premature.30 It will appear that the time of demand upon bills of exchange may be varied by the usage of banks, or by the death of a party.

21 Nutting v. Burked, 48 Mich. 241; Marbourg v. Brinkman, 23 Mo. App. 511. The reason for this statement is not sound, if it is based upon the proposition that bank drafts are supposed to be put into circulation, as is suggested in McDonald v. Mosher, 23 111. App. 206. and National Newark Banking Co. v. Second Nat Bank, 63 Pa. 404. They would be governed by the same rule precisely as a bill of exchange put into circulation.

22 See Sec. 206, ante, note 3.

23 Windham Bank v. Norton, 22 Conn. 213; Pier v. Heinrichshoffen, 67 Mo. 163, which were postal mistakes; Benton v. Martin, 31 N. Y. 382, and Aborn v. Bosworth, 1R1. 401 (loss of bill).

24 Aborn v. Bosworth, 1R.L 401.

25 See Warner v. Citizens' Bank, 6 S. D. 152.

26 See Sec. 230, ante, note 4