The general statement of the rule for making a demand upon the obligor upon commercial paper, where a demand is required, is that the demand should be made upon the drawee or maker, or upon his agent duly authorized.1 Subject to many limitations arising from considerations as to the proper place to make a demand and as to diligence in discovering the drawee or maker, the rule is correct. If a personal demand is made at a proper time and place and in a proper manner, it is of course sufficient. The ingredients of time and place and a proper manner of making the demand will be discussed in the succeeding sections, but even if the demand be not made in a proper manner or at a proper hour or place, an absolute refusal to pay or to accept, where no objection is made as to the nature of the demand, will cure the defects in the presentment.2 The determination of the obligor is not always an easy matter, but generally the persons named as makers or drawees are the proper recipients of the demand. Thus, the makers of a note were the standing committee of the parish, and a demand upon them was held sufficient without any demand upon the treasurer of the parish.3 In the case of joint obligors, the rule is that if the note is joint and several,4 or joint,5 the demand must be upon each obligor;6 and this rule is applied in one jurisdiction, as the cases cited show, to indorsers, who are in fact makers; but some cases which do not seem well decided, considering a joint note in the form of a partnership venture, hold that a demand upon one of the joint makers is sufficient.7 But if some of the makers are accommodation makers and the indorser had notice of that fact, a demand upon the makers primarily liable ought to be sufficient.8 In the case of partnership notes a demand upon either partner before dissolution is sufficient.9 If the partnership note was made after dissolution in renewal of a partnership note or for a demand against the partnership, a demand upon one partner is sufficient.10 But where the partnership is dissolved it has been held that, though the holder knew of the dissolution, a demand upon one partner is good, and this is the proper rule.11 Other courts admit the validity of the demand upon one partner where the holder had no notice of the dissolution.12 Other courts hold that where the holder has notice of the dissolution, or it seems even if he has not such notice, a demand upon one partner after dissolution is not sufficient.13 There might be some rational excuse for this holding if the partnership had appointed one of its members to wind up the partnership affairs and this fact was known to the holder. He might then be required to present his note to that partner. But the controlling consideration is that when the note was given the holder gained the right to present it for demand to any one of the partners, and to say that the partners can by some arrangement between themselves change the holder's rights, or his transferee's rights, is wholly, profoundly and perfectly absurd. Where the partnership is dissolved by death of one of the partners, the surviving partner or partners gain the right to close up the partnership affairs. A demand upon the survivors, or one of them, is sufficient without any demand upon the personal representative of the deceased partner, because he has nothing to do with the matter. The fact that the individual property of the deceased partner may become liable if the partnership assets are insufficient does not vary the matter, except to the extent of requiring the claim to be presented to the administrator or executor. That presentation is not, however, anything that the indorser can claim, but is a defense for the estate. There is a case, however, which holds that where one partner is dead and his administrator is out of the state, and the other partner has absconded, demand upon the syndic of the firm (who is a sort of statutory assignee) is sufficient.14 This suggests the rule that, if a partner is dead and the other partners cannot be found, demand should be made upon the administrator or executor of the deceased, which is a very proper rule. But where the firm is insolvent a demand upon the assignee is said not to be sufficient,15 but that holding is wrong. The only excuse for it is that the individual property of the partners may not be assigned, and therefore the indorser has the right to a demand upon one or both of the partners in order to see whether the note might not be paid. But that reason would not be germane, because it would require a presentment to each partner of an insolvent firm still doing business. The indorser is not prejudiced in the least by a failure to demand from all the partners. The rule is unquestionably wrong in Maryland, where it was held because in that state a partnership assignment must include the individual property of the partners, which ought to be the rule everywhere, but some deluded courts deny it. "Where the bill of a bank is payable at its branch, but the branch is discontinued, the demand should be made at the bank itself.16

4 Gale v. Tappan, 12 N. H. 145.

5 It is of little importance whether he be considered holder or agent.

6 Shed v. Britt, 1 Pick. 401; Cole v. Jessup, 10 N. Y. 96; Jex v. Tu-reaud, 19 La. Ann. 64. See Batchel-lor v. Priest, 12 Pick. 399.

7 Cole v. Jessup, 10 N. Y. 96; Agnew v. Bank of Gettysburg, 2 Har. & G. 478; Morris v. Foreman, 1 Dall. 193.

8 Blakeslee v. Hewitt, 76 Wis. 341; Powell v. State Bank, 1 Disn. 260; Freeman's Bank v. Perkins, 18 Me. 292.

9 See Sec. 182, ante.

10 Draper v. Clemens, 4 Mo. 52, so states as to authority to receive a demand, and the same rule must be true as to making demand.

U Church v. Barlow, 9 Pick. 547.

12 Freeman v. Boynton, 7 Mass. 483; Bank of Utica v. Johnson, 18 Johns. 230. The drawees may act as agents for the holder in giving notice to other parties. Mt. Pleasant Branch Bank v. McLeran, 26 Iowa, 806.

13 Gale v. Tappan, 12 N. H. 145.

1 See the cases cited in the following notes, which all recognize the rule.

2Follain v. Dupre, 11 Rob. (La.) 454; Gilbert v. Dennis, 3 Met. 495; Waring v. Betts, 90 Va. 46; King v. Crowell, 61 Me. 244; Parker v. Kellogg, 158 Mass. 90. A refusal to change account is not a demand and refusal. Burch v. Newberry, 10 N. Y. 374. Presenting check for certification not a demand. Bradford v. Fox, 39 Barb. 203, wrong, and absurdly so. Certification is payment by a novation.

3 Casco Bank v. Mussey, 19 Me. 20.

4 Blake v. McMillen, 22 Iowa, 358;

Union Bank v. Willis, 8 Met. 504; Benedict v. Schweig, 13 Wash. 476; Taylor v. Davidson, 2 Cranch, C. C. 434; Harris v. Clark. 10 Ohio, 5; Greenough v. Smead, 3 Ohio St. 415; Shedd v. Britt, 1 Pick. 401; Hestus v. Petrovic, 1 Rob. (La.) 119.

5 Bank of Red Oak v. Orvis, 40 Iowa, 332; Arnold v. Dresser, 90 Mass. 435.

6 If one joint obligor is dead, demand must be made on his personal representative. Hale v. Burr, 12 Mass. 86; Haight v. Kindhart, 1 S. C. 189. This of course does not apply to partnership paper. Union Bank v. Willis, 8 Met 504.

7 Harris v. Clark, 10 Ohio, 5. Compare Greenough v. Smead, 3 Ohio St. 415; Hestus v. Petrovic, 1 Rob. (La.) 119.

8 Britt v. Lawson, 15 Hun, 123. 9Shedd v. Britt, 1 Pick. 401; Mt.

Pleasant Bank v. McLeran, 26 Iowa, 306; Hunter v. Hempstead, 1 Mo. 67; and see the cases in notes 4 and 5, supra.

10Greatrake v. Brown, 2 Cranch, C. C. 541

11Crowley v. Barry, 4 Gill, 194; Fourth Nat. Bank v. Hueschen, 52 Mo. 207; Gates v. Beecher, 60 N. Y. 518. This is true of an acceptance also. Kendrick v. Campbell, 1 Bailey, 522. Where partnership is dissolved by death of one partner the demand should be on the surviving partner, not the personal representative of the deceased partner. Barlow v. Coggan, 1 Wash. Ter. 257.

12 See the next note.

13See the case of Commercial Bank v. Perry, 10 Rob. (La.) 61, which holds that one partner after dissolution cannot accept, payable at a particular placa If that is so, he cannot accept at all, and therefore a presentment to him for acceptance is not good, and by necessary inference a presentment to him for payment would not be binding. This same court holds the rule as to notice that if given to one partner after notice of dissolution to the holder the notice is not good. It must necessarily hold the same as to a demand. See Nott v. Downing, 6 La. 680.

14 Wogan v. Thompson, 9 La. Ann. 300.

15 Armstrong v. Thruston, 11 Md. 148. Either a demand is excused altogether because the maker is absolutely insolvent (as to this, however, there is considerable question), or the assignee should be considered the agent of the partners to receive a demand. Service of notice of non-payment upon the assignee has been held to be good. American Nat. Bank v. Junk Bros. Co., 94 Tenn. 624, which cites all the authorities. There is one case which rules that a demand on a certificate of deposit must be made upon the receiver of the bank. Ballard v. Burton, 64 Vt 387.

"Where the presentment for payment is made to an agent the difficulty lies in determining whether the agent is authorized to receive the demand. If the authority actually exists no difficulty arises except upon the proof. But where the authority must be implied, the inference arises from circumstances. But if an attorney in fact signs a note, demand may not be made upon him,17 on the presumption that his authority is co-extensive with the note. And even if the power to pay were given, it would cease upon the death of the principal. The authority would be revoked unless it were coupled with an interest. So if one signs as agent without stating his principal, a demand upon him as agent is good though he had in fact ceased to be agent.18 The principal should have been given notice if he knew of the note; if he did not, he is bound by his agent's act apparently; but the decision is very questionable unless the holder took all proper steps to ascertain who the principal was. A demand at the place of business of the drawee or maker upon a bookkeeper or clerk, when the drawee or maker is absent, is prima facie sufficient.19 If the clerk states that he is authorized to receive the demand it is certainly sufficient.20 The same rule is held as to a firm as drawee.21 The rule seems to be that no evidence is needed to show the clerk's authority,22 although such evidence may be given.23 The person presenting at the place of business is not only justified in relying upon the clerk's statement, but if some one therein states that he is the maker or drawee he may rely upon that statement.24 If no one is at the place of business within business hours of the day, the place being closed, the demand is complete.25 A demand at a bank should be upon some officer or employee in the bank who is competent to make answer to the demand.26

16 Nashville Bank v. Henderson, 5 Yerg. 104

17 Luning v. Wise, 64 CaL 410.

18 Hall v. Bradbury, 40 Conn. 32. Compare Stinson v. Lee, 63 Miss. 113, which seems palpably erroneous. A demand on the authorized agent is, of course, good. Phillip v. Poindexter, 18 Ala. 579. Good on treasurer of corporation for corporation. Commercial Bank v. Manufacturing Co., 33 Me. 280.