We have already discussed the question of the bearing of the agent's adverse interest in another transaction wherein he acquired knowledge which is sought to be imputed to a bank in a transaction wherein he acted, where he had no interest. Such knowledge was seen to be a case of knowledge acquired either in his course of acting as agent, or as knowledge acquired about his private affairs. But where an agent is acting in a particular transaction wherein he has an interest adverse to the bank, two cases may arise. The person with whom the agent is transacting business may know of the agent's adverse interest or he may not. "We have already seen what facts may show that the agent's interest is adverse, in a case where the agent's power to act is in question.1 In such a case the person having the knowledge of the agent's lack of power is a wrong-doer with the agent, and he can claim nothing against the bank unless the bank insists upon the transaction.2 But the question as to notice is a different one. The bank in the first instance may have a right to rescind or to refuse to be bound by the transaction, because the agent acted upon both sides; but this right it waives when it adopts the transaction and insists upon it. Having adopted its agent's act, it adopted it altogether. This matter must be kept plainly in view, or only confusion will result. It presupposes the agent's power to act; but the question is whether facts that the agent knows will be considered facts known to the bank, where the agent is acting upon a matter where he is bound not to disclose such facts, or is interested in concealing his knowledge, and the bank is enforcing such a transaction. It presupposes also that the third person who is acting with the agent is not a wrongdoer as to the bank. If the third person, who claims that the bank had notice of certain facts through its agent, had no notice of the agent's adverse interest, the fact of such interest is immaterial as to him.3 That rule applies both to the transaction in which the notice of the fact was acquired, and to the after transaction in which the notice or knowledge acquired in the former transaction is sought to be imputed to the bank. In the latter transaction it is plain that the same or different officers may be acting for the bank. But if the third person has notice of the agent's adverse interest in a former transaction in regard to which the agent was acting not for the bank, and the knowledge gained in such a transaction is such that needs to be communicated to the bank in order to bind it, that is to say, if it is knowledge acquired by the officer outside of his duties, there will be no presumption of a communication where the officer.has an interest4 or a duty5 in concealing the matter. But where the fact is not one that needs communication, but is imputed to the bank by reason of the fact that it is within the officer's knowledge by reason of facts learned in the discharge of his duties, or by reason of the fact that the officer has the power to act and is acting about the particular transaction with the knowledge present in his mind, the third person who charges such notice to the bank adopting the transaction, where he is himself acting in good faith and not a wrong-doer, will be held entitled to claim.6 Courts have not kept distinct the two transactions, the first being the transaction of which notice is to be imputed to the bank, the second being the transaction wherein notice is to be imputed to the bank. The same rule holds good as between two corporations dealing with each other through a common officer, as has been heretofore stated.7 This case is one where the officer of the bank is also acting as agent for another. It is merely one phase of an agent acting in a matter wherein he has an adverse interest, as was pointed out in section 106, ante. The cases ought to distinguish between knowledge acquired by the officer officially in the performance of his duties in the bank, and knowledge acquired by him outside of those duties; as, for example, while acting as agent for another. In the former case the agent's knowledge of the former transaction is imputable to the bank in the particular transaction, regardless of any adverse interest of the agent in the latter transaction. But-the principle does not differ in the least whether the officer acts for another corporation as well as for the bank, or for another person as well as for the bank. There are certain cases, however, which are palpably erroneous, and they all show how the principles of the law, when misunderstood, can be made the engine of gross injustice. The case of First National Bank v. Foote, 12 Utah, 157, discloses that a note had been executed to the bank by the president thereof, the cashier thereof, and two other parties. The last two parties were accommodation makers, without any personal interest in the loan. After the note had been renewed several times, always by the same parties, the cashier had the two parties sign a new note, and informed them so as to make the matter an agreement that he, the cashier, would sign it, and that the president's signature would be obtained, and then the note would be delivered to the bank. The cashier did sign it, but, without obtaining the president's signature, put the note among the bank's discounts. This transaction was, of course, not binding on the bank, because the cashier had no power to take the new note and release the president. But the president, being in control of the bank, had the bank adopt the transaction by suing upon it. The cashier was then a felonious bankrupt, but the president was perfectly solvent. The whole transaction could have been found to be a scheme to let the president escape liability. It was held that the bank took the note as a oonajlde holder, and that the knowledge of the cashier could not be imputed to the bank because he was on the note. But the question of notice was not really in the case. The question involved was one of power, and that was granted by the bank ratifying and adopting the transaction by suing on the note. The note was not made to a third party and negotiated to the bank, but was made directly to the bank. Hence the bank, having adopted the note, adopted the cashier's agreement in regard to the note, and consequently there was never any delivery of the note. The bank still had the right to sue on the former note. But the real question involved, even if it were considered one of notice, was whether the cashier's knowledge, he alone having acted for the bank, was the knowledge of the bank. The transaction having been adopted by the bank, the whole of it was binding. The knowledge of the cashier was binding on the bank for two reasons: First, it was knowledge gained in the general line of his duty, and therefore the question of his interest was immaterial; second, even if not gained in the line of his duty, it was prior knowledge, which he must have had when he alone was acting for the bank in taking the note for the bank, and how he acquired the knowledge was immaterial. The court cites Claflin v. Bank, 25 K. Y. 293, where the president of a bank having certified his own check, the form of the check was held notice of his lack of authority as to a holder of the check; the bank did not adopt the certification, but repudiated it; Volts v. Blackmar, 64 N. Y. 440, where the rule of an agent's lack of power was held as against the agent himself; and Bank v. Shawnee Co. Bank, 95 U. S. 557, where the form of the paper was notice to the indorsee of the officer's lack of authority, the bank repudiating the transaction. It is painful to think that a court would cite cases which had so little application. The case denounces Atlantic Cotton Mills v. Indian Orchard Mills, 147 Mass. 268. It is contrary also to Twenty-sixth Ward Bank v. Stearns, 148 N. Y. 515, and a number of other cases.8 This is one of those crude and ill-advised products of inadequate knowledge which bring so much discredit upon the law. Another case is Terrell v. Branch Bank, 12 Ala. 502. There a customer of the bank handed a note signed in blank to a director of a bank, and asked him to fill it in with a certain sum and renew his note at the bank. The director took the note, filled it in with a larger sum, and discounted it for his own benefit. The director acted for the bank in the discount as well as for himself. It was held that the bank had no notice. This case is an exceedingly incorrect and unjust decision, although one text-writer upon banking law has been so misled as to give it his earnest approbation. It may be said that the director had no power to bind the bank, and that the knowledge which he had was not acquired in the line of his duty. But if he acted for the bank in the discount of the note, and the bank adopted the transaction, as it did, his knowledge ought to have been held to be the bank's knowledge if the circumstances showed, as they did, that it was present in his mind. The case of Commercial Bank v. Burgwyn, 110 N. C. 267, may be justified on the ground that the director with knowledge did not act for the bank, but it is now overruled. The foregoing statement of the law applies where the officer who has an adverse interest acts for the bank as well as in his own interest. But where the officer does not act for the bank, but adversely thereto, while other officers act for the bank, the knowledge which the officer has gained in his private affairs, and not in the course of his duties at the bank, will not be imputed to the bank,9 and the rule is not changed by the fact that the officer acted for another corporation instead of for himself individually.10 For the same reason, practically, it was held that where an officer of the bank gave to a mortgagee certain worthless securities in release of a mortgage, whereupon the bank purchased the premises for full value, the bank is not charged with notice of its officer's acts.11 While under some circumstances the form of negotiable paper may be notice to third parties