When the officer of a bank in a particular transaction acts as agent or trustee for another, and also as agent for the bank, the question involved is more frequently one of notice than of power in the agent; but it may serve a useful purpose to collect some of the cases in one section in order to illustrate the general principle. Some of the cases are decided on the question of which party has received a benefit. Thus, where the treasurer of one company was the cashier and manager of a bank, and took the bonds of the company and pledged them in the name of the bank, and secured advances to be made to the bank, the directors of the bank as well as the directors of the corporation being ignorant of the whole matter, the bank was held liable for the bonds, on the plain ground that it had received a benefit.1 Again, a cashier was the agent of a trustee. He received trust moneys into the bank, and knowingly allowed the trust money to be taken to pay the private debt of the trustee,2 and his bank was held liable. This is a simple case of notice to the bank, where the agent had acquired his knowledge while acting upon the bank's business, and his knowledge was therefore imputable to the bank. In another case a town treasurer was the cashier of a bank. He drew a note as town treasurer and discounted fact. See note 2, supra. The distinction should be that the act be not forbidden by a statute or rule of general law.

7 Caldwell v. National Mohawk Val. Bank, 64 Barb. 333; Martin v. Webb, 110 U. S. 7; Mercantile Bank v. McCarthy, 7 Mo. App. 318; First Nat Bank v. Graham, 79 Pa. 106; Neiffer v. Bank of Knoxville, 1 Head, 162, as to president signing checks and receiving payments instead of cashier. Iowa State Bank v. Black, 91 Iowa, 490, is not contra, because there was no course of dealings. See also First Nat. Bank v. Stone, 106 Mich. 367; Winton v. Little, 94 Pa. 64

1 Fishkill Sav. Inst v. Bostwick, 80 N. Y. 162.

2 Loring v. Brodie, 134 Mass. 453.

3 First Nat. Bank v. New Milford, 36 Conn. 93. The opinion puts the case on the ground that by suing on the note it ratified the fraud. But that ground seems hardly sound. Suppose the bank had sued for money had and received, not ratifying the fraud, under the opinion it could have recovered. But it could not because it had notice.

4 First Nat Bank v. Christopher, 40 N. J. Law, 435.

5 Thus Fort Dearborn Nat. Bank v. Seymour, 73 N. W. R. 724, is a question of power.

whether he gained his knowledge on the affairs of the bank or the other corporation B., if the latter was present in his mind, is to be imputed to the bank A., and all that he knew as agent of the other corporation B., or as agent of the bank A., if it was present in his mind, is to be imputed to B.6 Thus, the cashier of a bank makes a contract with the directors of a corporation, of which he is also a director, but in regard to which he acted solely for the bank; his power is to be determined by the general scope of his authority, the particular course of dealing as to the allowance of power to the cashier in that bank in connection with the considerations of express or implied authorization or of ratification or of retention of benefits by the bank. But if the cashier of the bank makes a contract with a corporation of which he is an officer, and he acts on both sides, his power to make the contract is still to be determined by the rules of law stated as to the last illustration, with the limitation that if he knows that as officer of the bank he has not the power to make the contract, although it would generally be lawful for him to make it, his knowledge is to be imputed to the other corporation, if present in his mind, and that corporation's rights are to be treated as if he knew the cashier's lack of power; and conversely, if he knew that he, as officer of the other corporation, or the other officers with whom he was acting for the other corporation, had not the power to make the contract, his knowledge is to be imputed to the bank if present in his mind, and the bank is to be treated as if it knew that he, as the officer of the other corporation, had not the power to make the contract. The cases applicable to banks it is believed bear out this statement of the law. Thus, it is held that if the bank officer dealing as officer for another corporation with the bank does not communicate his knowledge to the bank, the bank is not bound, where the hank officer did not act in the particular transaction for the hank? But if in such a dealing of the bank with another corporation, the bank officer acting for the other corporation also acted for the bank, the bank is chargeable with whatever knowledge the bank officer had.8 But the limitation by some of the cases is made that the common officer must alone act for both corporations.9 This limitation is not logical for this reason: If the officer is acting as one of a board of directors or one of a committee, the knowledge of one member of the committee is the knowledge of all of them; and so one case plainly recognizes,10 where the point was drawn to its attention, while it was not carefully or at all examined in the other cases, in both of which the assertion is the purest dictumt1 But it should appear that the knowledge was present in the mind of the agent when he acted, unless the court of the particular jurisdiction recognizes a presumption of communication.

6 Murray v. Pauly, 56 Fed. R. 962, illustrates this point

7 Corcoran v. Snow Cattle Co., 151

Mass. 74; Innerarity v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 139 Mass. 332; First Nat. Bank v. Loyhed, 28 Minn. 396;