(u) For this distinction, see Sedgwick on Damages, p. 283, citing Stanton p. Small, 3 Sandf. 230; McNaughter v. Cas-sally, 4 McLean, 530. But we think this distinction is without foundation. The circumstances, in the first case, that the goods were not in the possession of the vendor, but only contracted for, was not alluded to by the court in assessing damages.; The 'plaintiff only claimed what the court allowed. The cases seem tu show that a vendor may, on default of vendee, not only elect to resell, and charge the vendee for the loss on the resale, or sue for the contract price, considering the goods as the vendee's, but may also elect to consider them as his own, the contract being rescinded, and sue for the this the purchaser may recover although he has resold, the article for more than he gave for it(xx) He may also recover for the consequential * injury he has sustained by reason of the breach of warranty, if it were the immediate, direct, and natural consequence, but not otherwise, (y)l Thus, if goods are warranted fit for a particular purpose, the purchaser is entitled to recover, in his action for breach of the warranty, what they would have been worth to him if they had conformed to the warranty, (z) And if they are wholly worthless, he may recover, beside the price, all the damage which was caused directly by the failure of the article;2 as where one bought seed, warranted good, but which turned out to be worthless, the purchaser recovered the price paid for the seed and the expense of preparing the ground and sowing the seed, (zz)3

If the goods are sold on credit, that is, if it is a part of the contract of sale, that payment shall be made at a future day, there can, of course, be no suit for the price until that day. But if it is also a part of the contract that a note or bill of * exchange shall be given immediately, which is to be payable on that future day, if this be not given, an action can at once be maintained for it; not only because it is a separate promise, but because, by the practice of merchants, this note or bill might be made, by the vendor's getting it discounted, the means of present payment (v)

If the sale was with warranty, and an action is brought on a breach of the warranty, if the vendee may not rescind the contract and return the goods, - a question we have considered elsewhere(w) - he can have no other compensation than that which would make up the difference between what the goods are and what they ought to be. Nor is the price paid for the article anything more than prima facie evidence of the value which it should have had, if it is even so much. The jury cannot assume that the warrantor only agreed that the thing purchased should be worth what was given for it, because the purchaser may have been induced by the low price to make the purchase. He has a right to have just such goods as the vendor agreed to sell, and compensation for the whole difference by which they fall short of this, without reference to the price paid for the goods, (x) And special damage; i. e. the difference between the market value and the agreed price.

(v) Hanna v. Mills, 21 Wend. 90; Rinehart v. Olwine, 5 Watts & 8. 157; Hutchinson v. Reid, 3 Camp. 329. See also Mussen v. Price, 4 East, 147 , Dntton v Solomonson, 3 B. & P. 582 In the action for not giving the note, the measure of damages is the fall price of the goods. Hanna v. Mills; Rinehart v. Olwine; Carnahan v. Hughes, 108 Ind. 225; Stephenson v. Repp, 47 Ohio St. 551.

(w) Vol. i. p.* 592.

(x) Clare v. Maynard, 7 C. & P. 741, 6 A. & E. 519, note, Curtis v. Hannay, 3 Esp. 82; Woodward v. Thatcher, 21 Vt. 580; Worthy v. Patterson, 20 Ala. 172; Slaughter v. McRae, 3 La. An. 453; Thornton v. Thompson, 4 Gratt. 121; Voorhees v. Earl, 2 Hill, 288; Freeman v. Clute, 3 Barb 424; Cum stock v. Hutchinson, 10 id. 211. In Carv v Gruman, 4 Hill, 625, the action was for a breach of a warranty, in the sale of a horse. The measure of damages was held to be the difference between what would have been its value as a sound horse and its value with the defects. Cowen, J.f said: " The rule undoubtedly is, that the agreed price is strong evidence of the actual value; and this should never be departed from, unless it be clear that such value was more or less than the sum at which the parties fixed it. It is sometimes the value of the article as between them, rather than its general worth, that is primarily to be looked to; a value which very likely depended on considerations which they alone could appreciate. Things are, however, very often purchased on account of their cheapness, In the common language of vendors, they are offered at a great bargain; and when taken at that offer on a warranty, it would be contrary to the express intention'of the parties, and perhaps defeat this warranty altogether, should the price be made the inflexible standard of value. A man sells a bin of wheat at fifty cents per bushel, warranted to be of good quality. It is worth one dollar if the warranty' be true; but it turns out to be so foul that it is worth no more than seventy-five cents per bushel.

The purchaser is as much entitled to his twenty-five cents per bushel in damages as he would have been by paying his dollar; or if he had given two dollars per bushel, he could recover no more." The measure of damages was once held, to be the difference between the price paid and the value of the article with defects. Caswell v. Coare, I Taunt. 566. See Armstrong v. Percy, 5 Wend. 535. In Coolidge v. Brig-ham, 1 Met. 547, where the indorsements on a promissory note warranted genuine proved to be forged, it was held, that the measure of damages would be the difference between the amount of the note and its actual value, whatever that may be. See also Ladd v. Lord, 36 Vt. 194; Wallace v. Wren, 32 111. 146.

(xx) Brown v. Bigelow, 10 Allen, 242.

(y) In an action for the breach of warranty on a sale of a horse, the expense of selling him, and of keeping him for such reasonable time as may be necessary to effect a sale at the best advantage, is recoverable as special damage. Clare v. Mavnard, 7 C. & P. 741; Ellis v. Chinnock, 7 (5. & P. 169; M'Kenzie v. Hancock, Ryan & M. 436; Chesterman v. Lamb, 4 Nev. & M. 195, 2 A. & E. 129. One sold seed barley with warranty; the purchaser resold it with the same warranty, and was obliged to compensate the sub-purchasers for their loss in using it as seed. Held, that his liability was a consequence of the breach of the warranty to him. Randall v. Raper, E. B. & E. 84,27 L. J. Q. B. 266. See also Dingle v. Hare, 7 C. B. (n. s.) 145.