1 See Michigan, etc. R. Co. v. Oehm, 56 Ill. 293; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Shea, 66 Ill. 471.

If the owner of goods gives new directions as to their delivery after they are taken by the carrier, of course these directions may be followed by him. And if they are indefinite, or if they require the carrier to be governed by information or directions which he does not receive, he may discharge himself from the obligation of delivery by storing them for the owner, in the best way he can. (n) So the carrier is discharged by any new agreement made between him and the owner or shipper, or by the consent of the owner or shipper, to some other disposition of them, which may be express or implied. (o) And the shipper may accept the goods at some place short of that to which they should have been carried, and at which, by the original contract, dethe Albany basin for the purpose of receiving goods brought by their barges, and then transferring them to the canal craft, which came alongside of the float to receive their loading. On the 15th of August, the agent of "The Atlantic Line" was notified on behalf of the proprietors of the Hudson River line, that there were goods on their float for his line, and he was requested to call and take them away. The like notification and request were made to him on the next day, and repeated again on the 17th of August, when the agent said he was taking some goods for another line, and when he got them on he would shove up to the float and take those goods on. But on the same afternoon, the float, with the goods in question, was consumed by fire. The court held, that under the circumstances, the strict liability of the defendants, as common carriers, had ceased at the time of the fire, and that they were then holding the goods as bailees in deposit merely; and the goods having been destroyed without any fault on their part, that they were not liable.

(m) Storr v. Crowley, McClel. & Y. 129.

(n) Boyle v. McLaughlin, 4 Har. & J.

291. But a carrier in whose possession goods are left, becomes chargeable as a depositary. Smith v. Nashua & Lowell R. R. Co. 7 Foster (N. H.), 86.

(o) Thus, if A, for whom goods are transported by a railroad company, authorizes B to receive the delivery thereof, and to do all acts incident to the delivery and transportation thereof to A, and B, instead of receiving the goods at the usual place of delivery, requests the agent of the company to permit the car which contains the goods, to be hauled to a near depot of another railroad company, and such agent assents thereto, and assists B in hauling the car to such depot, and B there requests and obtains leave of that company to use its machinery to remove the goods from the car; then the company that transported the goods is not answerable for the want of care or skill in the persons employed in so removing the goods from the car, nor for the want of strength in the machinery used for the removal of them, and cannot be charged with any loss that may happen in the course of such delivery to A. Lewis v. The Western Railroad Co. 11 Met. 408. And Dewey, J., said: "The duty of the defendants was to transport the article, and deliver it at their depot. But this duty may be modified as to the manner of its performance. The omission of the defendants to remove goods from the cars, and place them in the warehouse, or upon the platform, would not, in all cases, subject them to an action for non-delivery, or for negligence in the delivery. Suppose a bale of goods was transported by them, and, on its arrival at the depot, the owner should step into the car, and ask for a delivery there, and thereupon the goods should be passed over to him in the car, the delivery would be perfect; and if any casualty should subsequently occur, in taking out the bale, the loss would be his. The place and manner of delivery may always be varied with the assent of the owner of the property; and if he interferes to control or direct in the matter, he assumes the responsibility." See Scotthorn v. South Staffordshire Railway Co. 18 E. L. & E 553; s. c. 8 Exch. 341.

livery should have been made. And such acceptance,

* whatever be the motive for it, discharges the carrier, if it be voluntary, and if it be made before any cause of action has arisen against the carrier for non-delivery, or other default. (p) After such cause exists by reason of the injury that has been inflicted, nothing discharges the carrier but a release, or the receipt of something by way of accord and satisfaction. (q)

If the owner or shipper, by his illegal act, prevents or interferes with the delivery of the goods by the carrier, the obligation of delivery is at an end. But only an actual illegality has this effect. (r) An alleged one, if it be not true in fact, does not discharge the carrier; but if, though not true in fact, or although the cause of a seizure or other interference with the goods which prevents their delivery is not substantiated, yet if there be a justifiable cause for such seizure, it would seem reasonable that

* the carrier should not be held responsible for the con sequences. It would certainly be unjust to hold him so, where it was the fault of the owner or shipper that such apparent cause for seizure existed.

(p) Parsons v. Hardy, 14 Wend. 215; Harris v. Rand, 4 N. H. 259, 555; Welch v. Hicks, 6 Cowen, 504; Lorent v. Ken-tring, 1 Nott & McC. 132; Hunt v. Haskell, 24 Me. S39. But the goods must be voluntarily received. Rossiter v. Chester, 1 DougL (Mich.) 154. And in Lowe v. Moss, 12 Ill. 477, it was held, that the receipt by the owner of a part of a lot of goods in transitu, though it would discharge the carrier from all further liability as to such part, would not so discharge him as to the residue.

(q) Willoughby v. Backhouse, 2 B. ft C. 821; Baylis v. Usher, 4 Mo. ft P. 790; Bowman v. Teall, 23 Wend. 306.

(r) Gosling v. Higgins, 1 Camp. 451. This was an action for the non-delivery of ten pipes of wine, shipped at the island of Madeira, on board a vessel of which the defendant was owner, to be carried to Jamaica, and from thence to England. When the vessel arrived off Jamaica, she was seized, with her cargo, for a supposed violation of the revenue laws, and there condemned; but, upon an appeal to the Privy Council of England, the sentence of condemnation was reversed. Upon these facts, Lord Ellenborough held that the defendant was liable, and must seek his remedy against the officers of the government. 80 in Spence v. Chadwick, 10 Q. B. 517, which was assumpsit by a shipper on a contract of affreightment. The declaration stated that the plaintiff had shipped on board the defendant's ship, then in the bay of Gibraltar, and bound for London, calling at Cadiz, certain goods to be safely conveyed to London, and there delivered in good order, the act of God, the Queen's enemies, fire, and all and every other dangers and accidents of the seas, rivers, and navigation, of whatever nature or kind soever, save risk of boats, etc., excepted, the plaintiff paying freight. The declaration then averred a promise by the defendant so to convey and deliver the cargo, saving the above exceptions; and alleged as a breach that he failed to do so. The defendant pleaded, that the ship in the course of her voyage called at Cadiz, and was then within the jurisdiction of the officers of customs there, and of a certain court of Spain (described in the plea); that while the ship was there, the goods were, according to the law of Spain, lawfully taken out of the ship by the said officers, against the will, and without the default of the defendant, on a charge of suspicion of their being contraband according to the law of Spain, and were confiscated by a decree of the said court, upon the charge aforesaid. Upon demurrer, the court held that the plea alleged no excuse within the express exceptions in the contract; that the decree of confiscation was in itself no answer; and that it did not appear by the plea to have been incurred through any fault of the plaintiff.