(x) Chickering v. Fowler, 4 Pick. 371.

(y) This was very authoritatively declared by Mr. Justice Porter, in Kohn v. Packard, 3 La. 224. "The contract of affreightment," said he, " does not impose on the owner of the vessel the obligation to deliver merchandise shipped on board of her to the consignee, at his residence. It is a contract to carry from port to port, and the owners of a vessel fulfil the duties imposed on them, by delivering the merchandise at the usual place of discharge. The authorities cited on argument, as well as the reason of the thing, clearly establish this rule. But though the contract does not require the owners of the vessel to deliver the goods at any other place in the port but that where ships generally discharge their cargoes, it is not to be concluded that they have a right to land the goods at these places and release themselves, by doing so, from all further care and responsibility, without giving notice to the person who is to receive them. The authorities on this subject are contradictory. Some of those cited support fully the position that a landing on the wharf is equivalent to a delivery. We should have reviewed them, had not the counsel who argued the case carefully, on the part of the defendant, very properly refrained from pressing the rule to that extent. We have the high authority of Chancellor Kent for saying, that the better opinion is, there must be a delivery on the wharf to some person authorized to receive the goods, or some act which is equivalent to, or a substitute for it. The contrary doctrine appears to us too repugnant to reason and justice to be sanctioned by any one who will follow it out to the consequences to which it inevitably leads. Persons to whom goods are sent may be absent from the port when the ship reaches it; they may be disabled by sickness from attending to their business; they may not be informed of the the part of the consignee excuse the want of notice. (z) Nor can the goods be put on the wharf on a day that is not by law, usage, or custom, a day of business. (a) Nor may the master heap them confusedly with other goods upon a wharf; but he must, to a reasonable extent, separate and discriminate them. (b) We have seen, that leaving goods in the office, or store, or even in the carriage of the carrier, is no delivery to him, to make him responsible for them as carrier, unless he has notice of such delivery, that he may forthwith take charge of the goods and provide for their safety. In the same way, no delivery by him discharges him from responsibility, unless the party entitled to the goods has, in fact, or by construction of law, such knowledge of the delivery as will enable him to take charge of them at once. The notice must therefore be prompt and distinct. And indeed it seems to be settled in England, that the landing of goods upon a wharf, with notice, is not a sufficient delivery of them, unless made so by a distinct and established usage, (c) 1 arrival of the vessel. Under such circumstances, or many others similar that may be supposed, it would be extraordinary indeed if the captain were authorized to throw the goods on shore, where they could not fail to be exposed to injury from the weather, and would be liable to be stolen. There would be little difference in such an act and any other that would occasion their loss Contracts impose on parties not merely the obligations expressed in them, but every thing which by law, equity, and custom, is considered as incidental to the particular contract, or necessary to carry it into effect. La. Code, 1987. Delivery is not merely an incident to the contract of affreightment, it is essential to its discharge, and as there cannot be a delivery without the act of two parties, it is indispensable that the freighter should be apprised when and where the ship-owner, or his agent, is ready to hand over the goods." See also Northern v. Williams, 6 La. An. 578; House v. The Schooner Lexington. 2 N. Y Leg. Obs. 4; Chickering v. Fowler, 4 Pick 371 ; Price v. Powell, 3 Comst 322; Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Ward, 2 Mich. 538. But see Mich. C. R. R. Co. v. Hale, 6 Mich. 243. As to what will constitute a sufficient notice, see Kohn v. Packard, 3 La. 224.

1 See remarks of Earl, J., in Richmond v. Union Steamboat Co. 87 N. Y. 240, on the effect of usage in modifying a carrier's duty to deliver to the consignee.

(z) The Ship Middlesex, Cir. Ct U. S. Mass. May T. 1857, 21 Law Rep. 14.

(a) S. F. M. Co. v. Bark Tangier, Cir. Ct. U. S. Mass. May T. 1857, 21 Law Rep. 6. In this case it was held, that Fast-day was not, in Massachusetts, a day of business, within this rule. But in the case of Richardson v. Goddard, 23 How. 28, the foregoing decision of the Circuit Court was reversed, and the unlading on Fast-day held to be a good delivery, on the ground that there was no law, or general usage, or special custom, forbidding the unlading of a vessel on such a day.

(b) The Ship Middlesex, 21 Law Rep. 14.

(c) Gatliffe v. Bourne, 4 Bing. N. C. 314. In this case, to a count in assumpsit, by A against B, upon a contract by B, safely and securely to carry in a steam-vessel certain goods of A from Belfast to Dublin, and from Dublin to London, and to deliver the same at London to A, or to his assigns, upon payment of freight, - assigning a breach in the non-delivery of the goods at London; B pleaded that the goods were put on board under a bill and even then, it cannot be the right of the earner to of lading, by which they were made deliverable to A, or his assigns, on payment of freight; that after the arrival of the vessel and goods at London, B caused the goods to be unshipped, and safely and securely landed and deposited upon a certain wharf at London, there to remain until they could be delivered according to the bill of lading, - the said wharf being a place at which goods conveyed in steam-vessels from Dublin to London were accustomed to be landed and deposited, for the use of consignees, and a place fit for such purpose; and that the goods, while they remained upon the said wharf, and before a reasonable time for the delivery thereof had elapsed, were accidentally destroyed by fire. It was further pleaded to the same count, that after the arrival of the vessel and goods at London, B was ready and willing to deliver the goods to A, or his assigns, but that neither A nor his assigns was or were there ready to receive the same; whereupon B caused the goods to be landed on the said wharf, there to remain until A or his assigns should come and receive the same, or until the same could be conveyed and delivered to A or his assigns, with the like averment as to the said wharf being a usual and a fit place; and that the goods, while they remained upon the said wharf, and before A or his assigns came or sent for the same, and before B had been requested to deliver the same to A or his assigns, or a reasonable time for conveying them from the said wharf to A or his assigns had elapsed, and before the same could be removed therefrom, were accidentally destroyed by fire. The court held, that both pleas were bad. And Tindal, C. J., said: "The defendants, in each of the pleas, profess to substitute a delivery at Fenning's wharf, in the port of London, for and in the place of a delivery 'at the port of London, to the plaintiff or his assigns,' as required by the terms of the bill of lading; and call upon us to say, by our judgment, that such delivery, under the circumstances stated in each plea, is a good delivery in point of law under the bill of lading. But we know of no general rule of law which governs the delivery of goods under a bill of lading, where such delivery is not expressly in accordance with the terms of the bill of lading, except that it must be a delivery according to the practice and custom usually observed in the port or place of delivery. An issue raised upon an allegation of such a mode of delivery would accommodate itself to the facts of each particular case; and would let in every species of excuse from the strict and literal compliance with the precise terms of the bill of lading, which must necessarily be allowed to prevail with reference to the means and accommodation for landing goods at different places; the time of the arrival and departure of the vessel; the state of the tide and wind; interruptions from accidental causes; and all the other circumstances which belong to each particular port or place of delivery. The delivery, therefore, of these goods, not being alleged in the pleas to have been made according to the custom or practice of the port of London, we cannot take notice that it is sanctioned by such practice; and the delivery must therefore stand or fall upon the allegations contained in each plea." s. c. 3 Man. & G. 648, 7 id. 850. See also Dixon v. Dunham, 14 Ill. 324.